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ABSTRACT 
 
Matthew W. Lowder: Effects of Sentence Structure on  
Processing of Complex Semantic Expressions 
(Under the direction of Peter C. Gordon) 
 
 Seven eye-tracking-while-reading experiments were conducted to examine how the 
processing of complex semantic expressions is modulated by changes to sentence structure.  The 
results show that inanimate subject-verb integration (e.g., The pistol injured the cowboy), 
metonymy (e.g., The journalist offended the college), and complement coercion (e.g., The 
secretary began the memo) impose a processing cost on the reader when the critical constituents 
appear together the same clause.  In contrast, processing difficulty is reduced or eliminated 
completely when there is a distant structural relationship between the constituents that convey 
the complex meaning (e.g., The pistol that injured the cowboy; The journalist offended the honor 
of the college; The memo that the secretary began).  Two corpus analyses demonstrate that there 
is not a straightforward relationship between reductions in online processing difficulty due to 
sentence structure and frequency patterns in samples of naturally occurring language.  A 
theoretical framework is proposed that conceptualizes the processing of a variety of complex 
semantic expressions as stemming from a similar processing stage reflecting the need to detect 
and resolve a semantic mismatch, although the precise mechanisms underlying this process 
likely vary depending on the specific type of semantic expression.  Reductions in processing 
difficulty due to structural separation reflect linguistic deemphasis of a complex semantic 
relationship and the reader’s tendency to process this deemphasized relationship at a shallow or 
underspecified level.  
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CHAPTER 1:  Introduction 
 
Two very different types of sentence complexities have been documented in the 
psycholinguistic literature.  On the one hand, a sentence may be considered semantically 
complex, as when an expression requires a figurative interpretation (e.g., The gentleman read 
Dickens).  On the other hand, a sentence may be considered syntactically complex, as when a 
single expression is represented in multiple clauses within the same sentence (e.g., The reporter 
that the senator attacked admitted the error).  Although a great deal of research has examined 
separately how semantic and syntactic manipulations influence sentence processing, very little 
work has examined how processing is influenced when these two sources of complexity combine 
in the same sentence. 
This dissertation includes three empirical papers, each of which investigates the effects of 
sentence structure on the processing of a different type of complex semantic expression: 
inanimate subject-verb integration (e.g., The pistol injured the cowboy; Lowder & Gordon, 
2012), metonymy (e.g., The journalist offended the college; Lowder & Gordon, 2013), and 
complement coercion (e.g., The secretary began the memo; Lowder & Gordon, under review).  
Together, these three papers present the results of seven eye-tracking-while-reading experiments 
demonstrating that readers experience enhanced processing difficulty with these complex 
expressions (compared to control sentences) when the critical constituents appear together in the 
same clause of the sentence.  In contrast, difficulty is substantially reduced or eliminated 
altogether when one of the critical constituents appears in the main clause of the sentence and 
another is embedded in a relative clause or some other adjunct phrase.  
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As will be discussed in the chapters below, the psycholinguistic literature on inanimate 
subject-verb integration, metonymy, complement coercion, and other types of complex semantic 
expressions has tended to characterize these phenomena as distinct from one another without 
considering whether they share any similar processing mechanisms.  Notably, these expressions 
all involve some sort of semantic mismatch.  In these expressions, a semantic mismatch occurs 
when an inanimate subject must be integrated with an action verb that requires an animate 
subject (e.g., The pistol injured the cowboy), when a psychological verb that requires an 
experiencer object is paired with an object that refers to a non-human place (e.g., The journalist 
offended the college), or when a verb that requires an event-denoting noun is paired with a noun 
that instead refers to an entity (e.g., The secretary began the memo).  In trying to characterize the 
processing of these various expressions, a plausible account might be the standard pragmatic 
model or indirect access model (e.g., Clark & Lucy, 1975; Grice, 1975; Janus & Bever, 1985; 
Searle, 1979), which was originally proposed as an explanation of how figurative language is 
processed.  According to this account, the comprehender computes the literal meaning of an 
expression using the stored meanings of lexical entries, which results in a “defective” (Searle, 
1979) interpretation in the case of figurative language, leading the comprehender to search for an 
alternative meaning.  A focus of this dissertation involves determining how processing accounts 
such as the indirect access model (among others), which were originally developed to explain 
one semantic phenomenon, may also be useful in explaining the processing of semantic 
mismatches more broadly.  This involves gaining a better understanding of which processing 
mechanisms are common among various complex semantic expressions in general and which 
depend instead on the specific type of expression under consideration.   
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The finding that the processing of several types of complex semantic expressions is 
modulated by sentence structure in similar ways supports the notion that these expressions may 
share a similar processing mechanism.  Indeed, a variety of linguistic and psycholinguistic 
perspectives have previously suggested that the relations between different parts of a sentence 
are processed to varying degrees, with the depth of processing depending to a large extent on the 
structure of the sentence (e.g., Baker & Wagner, 1987; Ferreira, Bailey, & Ferraro, 2002; Gordon 
& Hendrick, 1998; Sanford & Sturt, 2002).  It may be the case that structural separation of a 
complex semantic expression reduces the likelihood that the comprehender will detect the 
semantic mismatch.  Alternatively, structural separation may influence the process of searching 
for an alternative meaning.  These possibilities are considered in detail in the chapters that 
follow.  
The General Discussion sections of Lowder and Gordon (2012) and Lowder and Gordon 
(2013) outline various implications that the obtained results have for inanimate subject-verb 
integration and metonymy, respectively.  The General Discussion section of Lowder and Gordon 
(under review) discusses the implications of the obtained results for complement coercion, but 
also sketches a theoretical framework that explains the processing of complex semantic 
expressions more generally and possible reasons that their processing is modulated by structural 
manipulations.  Following Lowder and Gordon (under review), I present the results of two 
corpus analyses as a new source of empirical evidence.  The first analysis examines whether 
sentence structure influences the frequency of literal versus figurative uses of metonyms in 
naturally occurring language.  The second examines whether event-selecting verbs are more 
likely to combine with an entity-denoting noun phrase in an object-extracted relative clause than 
in a subject-extracted relative clause.  These corpus patterns are then discussed in light of the 
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experimental results obtained in Lowder and Gordon (2013, under review).  Finally, I conclude 
by expanding on the theoretical points outlined in Lowder and Gordon (under review), 
discussing the implications of the corpus results, and offering some possible directions for future 
research. 
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CHAPTER 2:  Lowder and Gordon (2012)
1
 
 
The expressive power of human language rests in part on its ability to represent multiple 
relationships between different entities in a single sentence with more than one clause.  The 
process of understanding such complex sentences requires that this representation be built 
incrementally as the words of a sentence are read or heard, even though the relationships 
between the meanings conveyed by those words may not be clear until all the words of a 
sentence are encountered.  Research investigating the cognitive processes underlying the 
comprehension of complex sentences has focused a great deal on sentences containing subject-
extracted and object-extracted relative clauses (RCs).  In a subject RC (SRC), as in (1a), the head 
noun phrase (NP) is the subject of the RC, whereas in an object RC (ORC), as in (1b), the head 
NP is the object of the RC.  These two sentences contain the exact same words, just in a different 
order, yet ORCs have been shown to impose greater processing difficulty than SRCs on a wide 
variety of tasks (e.g., Caplan, Alpert, & Waters, 1998; Caramazza & Zurif, 1976; Ford, 1983; 
Holmes & O’Regan, 1981; Just, Carpenter, Keller, Eddy, & Thulborn, 1996; King & Just, 1991; 
Wanner & Maratsos, 1978). 
 1a. The reporter that injured the senator persuaded the members of the jury. 
 1b. The reporter that the senator injured persuaded the members of the jury. 
Although different types of cognitive mechanisms have been implicated as contributing to the 
difficulty of incremental interpretation of complex sentences (for a review see Gordon & 
                                                          
1
 This chapter previously appeared as an article in the Journal of Memory and Language.  The original citation is as 
follows: Lowder, M. W., & Gordon, P. C. (2012). The pistol that injured the cowboy: Difficulty with inanimate 
subject-verb integration is reduced by structural separation. Journal of Memory and Language, 66, 819-832. 
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Lowder, in press), it is clear that mechanisms that find meaningful relationships between parts of 
a sentence can offset complexity effects when those relationships are easy to establish.  For 
example, King and Just (1991) demonstrated that the difficulty associated with processing an 
ORC sentence with arbitrary noun-verb pairings (e.g., The robber that the fireman detested 
watched the program) was substantially reduced when there were inherent semantic relationships 
between the nouns and verbs (e.g., The robber that the fireman rescued stole the jewelry).   
The factors that facilitate establishment of meaningful relationships between parts of a 
complex sentence do not depend completely on there being specific relationships between nouns 
and verbs at the level of events that are likely to occur (as in fireman rescued and robber stole in 
the King and Just example).  Instead, it has been argued that they include relationships at the 
level of thematic roles (Gennari & MacDonald, 2008, 2009; Mak, Vonk, & Schriefers, 2002, 
2006; Traxler, Morris, & Seely, 2002; Traxler, Williams, Blozis, & Morris, 2005).  For example, 
Traxler et al. (2002, 2005) varied the animacy of the two critical NPs in RC sentences, as in (2).  
They found that ORCs with an inanimate head NP and an animate embedded NP (2b) were as 
easy to process as SRCs (2c)-(2d), but that ORCs with an animate head NP and an inanimate 
embedded NP (2a) were more difficult than the other three conditions.  This difficulty emerged 
not only on the relative clause itself, but also extended to the matrix verb.   
2a. The cowboy that the pistol injured was known to be unreliable. 
2b. The pistol that the cowboy concealed was known to be unreliable. 
2c. The cowboy that concealed the pistol was known to be unreliable. 
2d. The pistol that injured the cowboy was known to be unreliable.  
As can be seen in (2), the experimental materials used by Traxler et al. (2002, 2005) 
compared conditions in which each sentence contains both an animate and an inanimate NP.  
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This configuration is problematic because it is impossible to determine whether the greater 
difficulty found between the ORC sentences in (2a) and (2b) is caused by the animacy of NP1, 
the animacy of NP2, or a combination of both.  Determining the source of the processing 
difficulty is complicated further by the need to use different embedded verbs in the two types of 
ORC sentences.  While previous research on the role of animacy in RC processing has typically 
varied the animacy of NP1 and NP2 together, the role of the animacy of NP2 on the processing 
difficulty found in ORCs can be isolated by varying the animacy of NP2 and holding both NP1 
and the embedded verb constant as shown in (3).   
3a. The sheriff that the cowboy injured persuaded the members of the jury.  
3b. The sheriff that the pistol injured persuaded the members of the jury.  
The contrast between (3a) and (3b) suggests that at least part of the reason for the 
advantage in understanding ORCs with animate NP2s as compared to inanimate NP2s is local to 
the processing of the embedded clause rather than to processing the embedded clause in relation 
to information in the main clause.  The embedded verb may be easier to interpret when there is 
an animate NP2 (e.g., cowboy injured) than when there is an inanimate NP2 (e.g., pistol injured).   
A local difference in ease of processing could arise for several reasons.  For example, it has been 
suggested that an inanimate subject NP may force a non-prototypical assignment of thematic 
roles (instrument rather than agent; Cruse, 1973; Dowty, 1991; Fillmore, 1968; Schlesinger, 
1989; Wolff, Jeon, Klettke, & Li, 2010; Wolff, Jeon, & Li, 2009).  Difficulty might also arise 
from additional processing steps required for enriched composition (McElree, Traxler, Pickering, 
Seely, & Jackendoff, 2001; Traxler, Pickering, & McElree, 2002; Pustejovsky, 1995), or from 
the need to access literal interpretations prior to figurative interpretations (Grice, 1975; Searle, 
1979).  Thus, a variety of types of evidence suggest that local interpretation of the inanimate 
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noun and verb paired within the embedded ORC might account for all or part of previously 
reported effects of animacy on the ORC-SRC asymmetry in ease of processing.  However, this 
possibility is by no means certain, as other psycholinguistic research supports the notion that 
interpretations that are metaphorical (Glucksberg, 1991; 2003) or metonymic (Frisson & 
Pickering, 1999; Humphrey, Kemper, & Radel, 2004) are accessed as quickly as literal 
interpretations, an alternative that suggests that there would be no local difference in ease of 
processing the inanimate-noun and verb pairings within the embedded ORC. 
 The hypothesis that a local effect of NP2 animacy accounts for results previously 
attributed to the effect of animacy on relative-clause processing per se (e.g., 2a vs. 2b) is 
challenged further by evidence that the animacy of NP1 has little or no effect on the ease of 
processing within SRC sentences (e.g., 2c vs. 2d).  Such an effect might be expected since the 
head of an SRC is the subject of the embedded verb, yielding pairings of inanimate NP1 with 
embedded verb (see 2d) that match those found in the ORC constructions with an inanimate NP2 
(see 2a).  If interpretation of the pairings of inanimate nouns and verbs used in these studies 
imposes a local processing cost, then the absence of such an effect for the SRC sentences must 
be explained.  A variety of types of psycholinguistic evidence indicates that the relations 
between different parts of a sentence are processed to varying degrees, with the depth of 
processing depending greatly on the structure of the sentence (Baker & Wagner, 1987; Bredart & 
Modolo, 1988; Ferreira, Bailey, & Ferraro, 2002; Gordon & Hendrick, 1998; Sanford & Sturt, 
2002).  This suggests that processing of the meanings of an NP and a verb may occur at a deeper 
level when the expressions are within the same clause as compared to when they are separated by 
a clause boundary such as when an SRC modifies an inanimate head noun (e.g., 3d).   
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Experiment 1 
 This experiment examined the processing of ORCs when the embedded NP was animate 
versus inanimate.  The ORCs used by Traxler et al. (2005, Experiment 3) were adapted for the 
current experiment so as to allow a careful examination of the locus of this difficulty.  Traxler et 
al.’s sentences contained embedded nouns that differed in animacy, but the experimental 
contrasts also involved different embedded verbs (e.g., pistol injured versus cowboy concealed; 
see 3a-3b) and different head nouns.  Accordingly, these materials were altered so that the only 
difference between the two ORCs was the animacy of the embedded NP (see 4b-4c).  In addition, 
we created an SRC version of each sentence (4a).  Thus, a comparison of condition (4a) with 
(4b) should reveal an ORC-SRC processing difference, whereas a comparison of (4b) and (4c) 
allows examination of the locus of the processing difficulty associated with integrating an 
inanimate versus animate subject with a verb.  We refer to these three conditions as SRC, ORC-
Animate, and ORC-Inanimate, respectively. 
4a. The sheriff that injured the cowboy persuaded the members of the jury.  (SRC) 
4b. The sheriff that the cowboy injured persuaded the members of the jury. (ORC-
 Animate) 
4c. The sheriff that the pistol injured persuaded the members of the jury. (ORC-
 Inanimate) 
 Based on the findings of previous work (Gennari & MacDonald, 2008; Traxler et al., 
2002, 2005), we expected the ORC-Inanimate condition to be more difficult than the ORC-
Animate condition.  With regard to the locus of this effect, two outcomes are possible.  First, it is 
possible that the difficulty associated with the ORC-Inanimate condition will appear in a broad 
region of the sentence, perhaps beginning early in the RC and continuing on to the matrix verb.  
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This pattern would provide support for the idea that NP animacy influences RC processing, as a 
large body of literature has demonstrated that the difficulty associated with processing an ORC 
affects reading times for several words in the sentence  (e.g., Ford, 1983; Gordon, Hendrick, & 
Johnson, 2001, 2004; Gordon, Hendrick, Johnson, & Lee, 2006; Holmes & O’Regan, 1981; 
Johnson, Lowder, & Gordon, 2011; King & Just, 1991; Traxler et al., 2002, 2005; see Gordon & 
Lowder, in press, for review).  Alternatively, it is possible that the difficulty associated with the 
ORC-Inanimate condition is unrelated to broad RC-level effects, but instead emerges due to the 
local difficulty of integrating an inanimate noun with an action verb, such as pistol injured.   
 The possibility of using an inanimate noun as the subject of an action verb was noted by 
Fillmore (1968), who observed that an instrument that appears as part of an adjunct phrase in a 
causal construction (e.g., John broke the window with a hammer) can also often appear as the 
external argument of the verb (e.g., A hammer broke the window; see also Cruse, 1973).  
Inanimate NPs vary in their acceptability as “causers,” and verbs vary in the ease with which 
they can be paired with inanimate causers.  For example, Schlesinger (1989) noted that The 
dishwasher cleaned the dishes sounds more natural than The rag cleaned the dishes, perhaps 
because machines make better agents than do rags.  He further noted that The bullet killed the 
president is acceptable while The bullet murdered the president is anomalous, because the verb 
murder requires that the subject possess intention (see also Wolff et al., 2010).  Dowty (1991) 
proposed that the thematic roles assigned to the arguments of a verb tend to possess certain 
prototypical features falling into one of two broad categories, which he terms Proto-Agent and 
Proto-Patient.  Dowty lists several features belonging to a Proto-Agent, which include the ability 
to change the state of another participant and the ability to initiate movement.  This perspective 
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may help explain why certain inanimate NPs are more acceptable than others as the subject of an 
action verb. 
 In addition, the presence of an inanimate NP as the subject of an action verb might 
require a process of figurative interpretation.  For example, in (4c), a pistol is incapable of 
performing the action injure on its own.  Thus, one may infer here that the tool is being used as a 
referential expression to stand for the unnamed animate agent (e.g., the one who used the pistol).  
This suggests a type of metonymic construction, where some salient characteristic of an entity 
refers to the entity as a whole.  Research on language processing provides conflicting 
perspectives about whether literal and figurative meanings are processed differently.  While 
some models propose that a literal interpretation must be accessed before a figurative 
interpretation (e.g., Grice, 1975; Searle, 1979), others propose that literal and figurative 
interpretations can be accessed in parallel (e.g., Glucksberg, 1991, 2003).  Although a great deal 
of work has been devoted to better understanding the processing of figurative language in 
general (e.g., Gerrig & Healy, 1983; Gibbs, 1980, 1986; Gibbs, Bogdanovich, Sykes, & Barr, 
1997; Inhoff, Lima, & Carroll, 1984; Onishi & Murphy, 1993; Ortony, Schallert, Reynolds, & 
Antos, 1978; Shinjo & Myers, 1987), very little work has examined the processing of metonymy 
specifically.  One prominent exception is Frisson and Pickering (1999), who measured eye 
movements while participants read sentences containing place-for-institution metonyms (e.g., 
That blasphemous woman had to answer to the convent) and place-for-event metonyms (e.g., A 
lot of Americans protested during Vietnam).  Frisson and Pickering showed that processing these 
metonyms was just as easy as processing the same words when they were used in their literal 
sense, thus providing evidence for parallel access of the literal and figurative interpretations. 
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 Expressions such as pistol injured are closer in form to what Lakoff and Johnson (1980) 
termed object-for-user metonyms (e.g., The gun he hired wanted fifty grand) than to the place-
for-institution and place-for-event metonyms studied by Frisson and Pickering (1999).  Object-
for-user metonyms were studied by Gibbs (1990), who found greater whole-sentence reading 
times when the sentence subject was metonymic (e.g., scalpel to refer to surgeon) compared to 
both a literal condition (e.g., doctor) and a metaphoric condition (e.g., butcher), suggesting some 
processing cost associated with figurative interpretation.  Whereas the object-for-user metonyms 
studied by Gibbs were constructed so that the metonym referred to a person (e.g., The scalpel 
was sued for malpractice), constructions like (4c) can be understood either by inferring that the 
instrument represents a person (e.g., pistol to refer to shooter), or by inferring that the instrument 
represents an event (e.g., someone’s shooting of the pistol).  This latter perspective has been 
discussed by Pustejovsky (1995) in his comparison of the two sentences presented in (5).  Here, 
the verb kill specifies an action, and so it selects for an animate NP as its subject.  This 
requirement is satisfied in (5a), but not in (5b).  Specifically, Pustejovsky proposes that the 
inanimate subject in (5b) represents a type of metonymic construction that requires an additional 
process of deep interpretation, which he called coercion.  That is, Pustejovsky proposes that the 
inanimate entity in (5b) makes sense as the subject of the sentence because it is coerced from an 
object (e.g., the gun) into an event involving an animate agent (e.g., someone’s shooting of the 
gun).   
5a.  John killed Mary. 
5b. The gun killed Mary.  
Evidence that coercion incurs a processing cost has been found for NPs that syntactically appear 
as direct objects and which refer to objects when they follow verbs that require an event 
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complement as compared to those that take a direct object (e.g., The author began/wrote the 
book; McElree et al., 2001; Traxler et al., 2002).  However, psycholinguistic evidence of 
coercion has not previously been reported for the conditions to be studied here – subject NPs that 
do not meet animacy specifications of verbs.   
 In sum, multiple linguistic and psycholinguistic approaches suggest that subject-verb 
integration should be more difficult for inanimate than animate nouns.  Previous studies on 
animacy and relative-clause processing have provided evidence that there is difficulty associated 
with embedding an inanimate NP within an ORC and that this difficulty contributes to the 
overall processing of the RC.  However, the covariation of animacy configurations and different 
embedded verbs used by these studies make this interpretation problematic.  Experiment 1 was 
designed to more carefully isolate the locus of processing difficulty by comparing ORCs where 
the only variation across ORC conditions was in the animacy of the embedded noun. 
Method 
Participants.  Twenty-four students at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill 
participated in this experiment in exchange for course credit.  They were all native English 
speakers and had normal or corrected-to-normal vision.   
 Materials.  Each participant was presented with 30 experimental sentences and 94 filler 
sentences.  The 30 experimental sentences were adapted from Traxler et al. (2005, Experiment 
3).  These materials were modified to include a new animate noun that served as NP1 in all three 
versions of each sentence (e.g., sheriff; see 4a-4c).  The embedded verb, animate NP2, and 
inanimate NP2 were all taken directly from Traxler et al.  Importantly, Traxler et al. had 
carefully balanced the animate and inanimate NP2s for length and frequency.  The matrix verb 
and the remainder of the sentence were modified such that the meaning could feasibly apply to 
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either of the two animate NPs or the inanimate NP.  (See Appendix A for full set of experimental 
stimuli).   
4a. The sheriff that injured the cowboy persuaded the members of the jury.  (SRC) 
4b. The sheriff that the cowboy injured persuaded the members of the jury. (ORC-
 Animate) 
4c. The sheriff that the pistol injured persuaded the members of the jury. (ORC-
 Inanimate) 
In addition to controlling for frequency of N2, we computed bigram (word-pair) 
frequencies of N2 and the embedded verb for the ORC-Animate versus ORC-Inanimate 
conditions (e.g., cowboy injured vs. pistol injured) using two different corpora: the Corpus of 
Contemporary American English (COCA; Davies, 2008) and the Google Terabyte N-Gram 
corpus (Brants & Franz, 2006).  These corpora give highly consistent estimates of the relative 
frequency of the critical words in the study, showing the following Spearman rank-order 
correlations: embedded animate nouns (rho = .92, p < .001), embedded inanimate nouns (rho = 
.89, p < .001), and embedded verbs (rho = .90, p < .001).  COCA provided bigram frequencies 
for 25 out of the 60 critical noun-verb pairs in the materials, whereas Google N-Gram provided 
bigram frequencies for 39 of the 60 pairs.  This difference is likely due to COCA being based on 
a smaller sample of text (425 million words) as compared to Google N-Gram (approximately 
1,000,000,000,000 words).  The fact that over one third of the noun-verb pairs were not observed 
even in Google N-Gram points to the limitations of using even a very large corpus, one far larger 
than any individual’s life experience with language, to estimate the predictability of a word 
based on the preceding word.  Transitional probabilities, defined as the probability of 
encountering a particular word, given the preceding word (McDonald & Shillcock, 2003), were 
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computed from Google N-Gram.  These did not differ between the ORC-Animate (.000089) and 
ORC-Inanimate (.000091) conditions, [t(37) = 0.02, p > .98], suggesting that predictability of the 
verb did not vary systematically across conditions based on the animacy of the preceding noun.   
Traxler et al. (2005, Experiment 3) had matched their stimuli for plausibility across 
conditions.  In Traxler et al.’s experiment, rating data collected from 12 participants showed no 
significant differences in mean plausibility ratings between any of the conditions.  Although our 
materials involved only minor changes to Traxler et al.’s materials, we nevertheless wanted to 
ensure that there were no differences in plausibility among our three conditions.  Accordingly, 
we presented our stimuli, along with filler items, to 15 raters who did not participate in the eye-
tracking experiment.  The task was to indicate how likely they believed the events described by 
the sentence were on a scale from 1 (highly unlikely) to 5 (highly likely; e.g., Pickering & 
Traxler, 1998; Traxler & Pickering, 1996).  Each rater saw the sentences in a different random 
order.  Mean plausibility ratings were 3.3 (SRC), 3.2 (ORC-Animate), and 3.2 (ORC-Inanimate).  
A repeated-measures ANOVA revealed no significant differences across conditions, F < 1. 
For the eye-tracking experiment, one version of each item was assigned to one of three 
lists such that no participant saw more than one version of each item.  After each sentence, a 
true/false comprehension question appeared.  For the experimental sentences, two-thirds of the 
comprehension questions asked about the action being described in the RC, whereas the other 
third asked about the action being described in the main clause (King & Just, 1991).  Half of the 
questions were true and half were false.  
Design and procedure.  Each experimental session began with four filler sentences.  
After this warm-up block, the remaining 120 sentences were presented in a different random 
order for each participant.  Participants were instructed to read at a natural pace and to press a 
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key after reading each sentence.  At this point, the comprehension question appeared, and 
participants pressed one key to answer “true,” and another to answer “false.” 
Participants’ eye movements were monitored using an EyeLink 1000 system (SR 
Research).  This device records eye movements using a camera mounted on the table in front of 
participants, sampling pupil location at a rate of 1000 Hz and parsing the samples into fixations 
and saccades.  After undergoing a procedure that calibrated the eye-tracker, the experimental 
session began.  At the start of each trial, a fixation point was presented on the screen in the 
location where the first word of the sentence would appear.  When the experimenter judged the 
participant’s gaze to be steady on the fixation point, the experimenter pressed a button that made 
the fixation point disappear and the sentence appear.  After reading the sentence, the participant 
pressed a key, which made the sentence disappear and a comprehension question appear.  After 
the participant responded to the comprehension question, the trial ended and the fixation point 
for the next trial appeared.   
Results 
 Reading times from all trials were included, regardless of whether the comprehension 
question was answered correctly.  Analysis of the eye-tracking data focused on three standard 
measures.  Gaze duration is the sum of all initial fixations on a word or region; it begins when 
the region is first fixated and ends when gaze is directed away from the region, whether to the 
left or the right.  Regression-path duration (also called go-past time) is the sum of all fixation 
durations beginning with the initial fixation on a particular region and ending when the gaze is 
directed to the right of that region.  This measure incorporates both early and later stages of 
language comprehension and is particularly useful for measuring integration difficulties (Clifton, 
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Staub, & Rayner, 2007).  Total time is the sum of all fixations on a word or region. The offline 
measure of comprehension-question accuracy is also reported.  
 To assess the RC effect, we report reading times for two regions of interest: the RC and 
the matrix verb.  We chose to analyze the RC as a single region, rather than as a series of 
individual words, to control for the different word orders of SRCs and ORCs.  This region 
consisted of the three words between the complementizer and the matrix verb.  At the matrix 
verb, the word orders of SRCs and ORCs are identical once again, so this word can be analyzed 
on its own.  In addition to comparing reading times for the RC region and the matrix verb across 
the three conditions, we were able to take a more fine-grained look at the RC region for the 
ORC-Animate and ORC-Inanimate conditions.        
Table 1 displays reading-time means relevant to RC-level effects.  Specifically, we 
compared reading times for all three conditions at the RC and the matrix verb.    
RC region.  For each of the three reading-time measures, we conducted a one-way 
repeated-measures ANOVA comparing the three conditions.   Analysis of gaze duration on the 
RC region revealed no significant differences among the three conditions [F1(2, 46) < 1; F2(2, 
58) < 1].  In contrast, significant differences were obtained for regression-path duration [F1(2, 
46) = 27.69, MSE = 35478, p < .001; F2(2, 58) = 21.04, MSE = 58416, p < .001] and total time 
[F1(2, 46) = 16.31, MSE = 58099, p < .001; F2(2, 58) = 6.32, MSE = 182402, p < .005].  Follow-
up comparisons indicated a robust ORC-SRC processing difference, with longer reading times 
for ORC-Animates compared to SRCs on regression-path duration [F1(1, 23) = 43.86, MSE = 
21782, p < .001; F2(1, 29) = 33.02, MSE = 36624, p < .001], as well as total time [F1(1, 23) = 
36.06, MSE = 51054, p < .001; F2(1, 29) = 10.64, MSE = 210967, p < .005].  Similar differences 
were observed for ORC-Inanimates compared to SRCs on regression-path duration [F1(1, 23) = 
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32.29, MSE = 57191, p < .001; F2(1, 29) = 35.20, MSE = 65440, p < .001], as well as total time 
[F1(1, 23) = 16.50, MSE = 46875, p < .001; F2(1, 29) = 6.59, MSE = 139593, p < .02]. In 
addition, regression-path durations showed that ORC-Inanimates were read more slowly than 
ORC-Animates (significant in the subject analysis) [F1(1, 23) = 5.30, MSE = 27460, p < .05; 
F2(1, 29) = 2.39, MSE = 73185, p > .13], whereas there were no significant differences for these 
two conditions in the total time data (p’s > .10).  The nature of the difference between the ORC-
Animate and ORC-Inanimate conditions is explored in greater detail below. 
Table 1 
Eye-tracking results of relative-clause effects in Experiment 1.  The RC region was defined as the 
three words after the complementizer and before the matrix verb.  
______________________________________________________________________________ 
                              Measure (in milliseconds)                      
                       ____________________________________ 
Region of Interest     Condition          Gaze       Regression- Total        
         Path  Time  
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
RC region   SRC    509  796  1423 
   ORC-Animate   536  1078  1814 
   ORC-Inanimate          519  1188  1676 
 
Matrix verb  SRC    284  467  594 
   ORC-Animate   306  641  671 
   ORC-Inanimate          301  624  672 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 Matrix Verb.  Analysis of gaze durations on the matrix verb showed no significant 
differences between the three conditions, [F1(2, 46) < 1; F2(2, 58) = 1.25, p > .25].  There was, 
however, a significant difference between the three conditions at the matrix verb for regression-
path duration [F1(2, 46) = 7.02, MSE = 31566, p < .01; F2(2, 58) = 5.35, MSE = 46103, p < .01] 
and a significant difference for total time in the subject analysis, but not in the item analysis 
[F1(2, 46) = 4.73, MSE = 10197, p < .05; F2(2, 58) = 1.87, MSE = 30497, p > .15].  Follow-up 
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comparisons revealed longer reading times for ORC-Animates compared to SRCs for regression-
path duration [F1(1, 23) = 8.64, MSE = 42054, p < .01; F2(1, 29) = 9.33, MSE = 44517, p < .01], 
and a similar pattern in the subject analysis for total time [F1(1, 23) = 5.36, MSE = 13314, p < 
.05; F2(1, 29) = 2.50, MSE = 35354, p > .10].  Likewise, there were significant differences 
between the ORC-Inanimates and the SRCs for regression-path duration [F1(1, 23) = 17.48, MSE 
= 17060, p < .001; F2(1, 29) = 4.90, MSE = 65015, p < .05], and a similar pattern in the subject 
analysis for total time [F1(1, 23) = 8.52, MSE = 8593, p < .01; F2(1, 29) = 2.55, MSE = 32489, p 
> .10].  In contrast to the ORC-SRC difference, there were no differences between the ORC-
Animate and ORC-Inanimate conditions at the matrix verb for either regression-path duration or 
total time (p’s > .60).     
 Words in the ORC.  As noted above, there was a significant difference between the two 
ORC conditions for regression-path duration on the RC region as a whole.  Because these two 
conditions have identical word orders, it was possible to isolate the locus of this effect with a 
more fine-grained, word-by-word analysis of the RC region (see Table 2).  Comparing 
regression-path duration for ORC-Animates and ORC-Inanimates at these individual words 
revealed no differences at the determiner  [F1(1, 23) < 1; F2(1, 29) < 1], nor at the embedded 
noun  [F1(1, 23) < 1; F2(1, 29) < 1].  Critically, however, the two conditions differed 
significantly at the embedded verb, such that ORC-Inanimates were slower than ORC-Animates  
[F1(1, 23) = 8.23, MSE = 19026, p < .01; F2(1, 29) = 4.05, MSE = 55971, p = .05]. This pattern 
of effects is depicted graphically in Figure 1.
2 
                                                          
2
 To assess whether the observed animacy difference at the embedded verb could be explained by differences in 
noun-verb bigram frequency, we conducted a Spearman rank-order correlation comparing mean regression-path 
durations at the verb and transitional probabilities (see Method section) for the 39 bigram pairs for which Google N-
gram contained frequency data.  The correlation was not significant (rho = -0.19, p > .25).  Even so, a closer 
examination of the data revealed that this non-significant effect was being driven by two items (burglar shot and 
revolver shot), both of which had transitional probabilities over twice as large as any of the other items.  Removing 
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Analysis of gaze durations and total times for each word in the RC revealed no 
significant differences between the ORC-Inanimate and ORC-Animate conditions. 
Table 2 
Eye-tracking results of animacy effects in Experiment 1.  
______________________________________________________________________________ 
                              Measure (in milliseconds)                      
                       ____________________________________ 
Word       Condition          Gaze       Regression- Total        
         Path  Time  
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Determiner   ORC-Animate   234  392  564 
   ORC-Inanimate          206  386  586 
 
Embedded noun ORC-Animate   234  444  782 
   ORC-Inanimate          230  444  678 
 
Embedded verb  ORC-Animate   298  518  847 
   ORC-Inanimate          305  633  805 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 Comprehension-question accuracy.  Comprehension questions following four of the 
sentences had overall accuracy rates lower than 50%.  A closer look at these items revealed that 
the questions were worded ambiguously.  These four questions were omitted from the analysis.  
A one-way repeated-measures ANOVA showed that accuracy rates differed by condition, 
although this effect was only significant by subjects [F1(2, 46) = 4.86, MSE = 105, p < .05; F2(2, 
50) = 2.06, MSE = 191, p > .13].  Follow-up comparisons indicated that responses to questions 
following SRCs were significantly more accurate (93%) than questions following ORC-
Animates (87%) [F1(1, 23) = 6.41, MSE = 66, p < .05, F2(1, 28) = 4.41, MSE = 137, p < .05].  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
these two items completely erased any hint of a correlation (rho = -0.05, p > .77).  Thus, we did not find any 
evidence for the hypothesis that differences in bigram frequency of N2 and the embedded verb were contributing to 
the observed differences in reading times at the embedded verb for animate versus inanimate nouns. 
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There was no difference in accuracy rates between ORC-Animates (87%) and ORC-Inanimates 
(84%) [F1(1, 23) = 1.07, MSE = 113, p > .31; F2(1, 26) < 1]. 
 
Figure 1 
Mean regression-path durations for the three conditions in Experiment 1.  Error bars represent 
the standard error of the mean. 
  
           
           
           
             
 
 
 
 
         The        sheriff       that      injured        the       cowboy     persuaded 
         The        sheriff       that        the         cowboy    injured     persuaded 
        The        sheriff       that        the           pistol      injured     persuaded 
Discussion 
 The results of Experiment 1 showed greater processing difficulty for ORCs compared to 
SRCs, as indicated by longer regression-path durations and total times at the RC region of the 
sentence and at the matrix verb.  Also, responses to comprehension questions were less accurate 
for ORCs than SRCs.  These findings are consistent with previous demonstrations of the ORC-
SRC processing difference.  Comparing regression-path durations on the RC region for the ORC-
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Animate and ORC-Inanimate conditions initially suggested that there might be greater RC-
related processing difficulty for ORC-Inanimates; however, a word-by-word analysis of this 
region revealed that this effect emerged entirely at the embedded verb (see Figure 1).  In fact, 
there was no hint of an animacy effect at the matrix verb in any of the three eye-tracking 
measures used to analyze the data.  This pattern shows that integrating an inanimate subject with 
a verb imposes a local processing cost, but does not contribute to the difference in processing 
ORCs versus SRCs, as might have been demonstrated by effects on the embedded noun and the 
matrix verb, in addition to the difference we observed on the embedded verb.  These results are 
consistent with our hypothesis that subject-verb integration is difficult when an inanimate NP 
must combine with an action verb; however, the results are inconsistent with a view that RC 
processing is made easier by altering the animacy configuration of the critical nouns (Gennari & 
MacDonald, 2008, 2009; Traxler et al., 2002, 2005).  
The results of Experiment 1 differ from previous studies on RC processing that have 
found that the animacy of the embedded noun affects processing of the matrix verb (Gennari & 
MacDonald, 2008; Mak et al., 2002, 2006; Traxler et al., 2002, 2005).  One possible reason for 
this discrepancy has to do with the choice of comparison condition.  In our experiment, the two 
ORC conditions differed only at the embedded noun (e.g., The sheriff that the cowboy injured… 
versus The sheriff that the pistol injured…).  In contrast, the two ORC conditions that previous 
studies have used differed in their head nouns, embedded nouns, and embedded verbs (e.g., The 
pistol that the cowboy concealed… versus The cowboy that the pistol injured…).  Accordingly, 
differences at the matrix verb found by previous studies may have been influenced by differential 
spillover onto the embedded matrix verb from the preceding words.  Overall, these differences in 
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stimulus materials may help explain the conflicting findings between the work presented here 
and the results of previous studies.  
 Furthermore, our findings are consistent with the notion that the integration of an 
inanimate subject NP with an action verb represents a form of enriched composition or 
metaphorical interpretation, which requires additional processing compared to the integration of 
an animate NP with a verb.  For example, Pustejovsky (1995) has proposed that inanimate 
subject-verb pairs, such as gun killed, can only be properly understood via a process of coercion, 
where the noun is type-shifted from an object to an event.  Several previous studies have 
demonstrated a processing cost associated with complement coercion, where the meaning of an 
expression is coerced from an object to an event (e.g., McElree et al., 2001; Traxler et al., 2002), 
as in began the book being interpreted as began reading the book.  The current experiment is the 
first to demonstrate such a coercion cost for subject-verb integration. 
Experiment 2 
 Experiment 1 demonstrated a local cost associated with integrating an inanimate subject 
with a verb, which was independent of the broader cost associated with processing an ORC as 
compared to a matched SRC.  This demonstration of a local cost for integrating an inanimate 
noun with a verb raises the question of why such an effect was not observed in the SRC 
sentences on which the stimuli for Experiment 1 were based (Traxler et al. 2005, Experiment 3). 
A possible explanation of these differing results is that for the sentences used in 
Experiment 1 the inanimate subject NP and the verb that had to be integrated appeared together 
in the same clause, whereas in Traxler et al.’s (2005) SRCs, the inanimate NP was the head 
which was modified through its integration with a verb that only appeared overtly in a different 
24 
 
clause.  On several accounts of human language comprehension, the relations between different 
parts of a sentence are processed to varying degrees, with the depth of processing depending 
greatly on the structure of the sentence (e.g., Ferreira et al., 2002; Gordon & Hendrick, 1998; 
Sanford & Sturt, 2002).  Direct evidence that information in a relative clause is processed less 
deeply in relation to the head than information in a main clause comes from Baker and Wagner 
(1987), who showed that false information is less likely to be detected by readers when the 
critical NP and verb phrase are presented in two different clauses, as in (6a), compared to when 
they appear in the same clause, as in (6b). 
6a. The liver, which is an organ found only in humans, is often damaged by heavy 
 drinking. 
6b. The liver, which is often damaged by heavy drinking, is an organ found only in 
 humans. 
This work suggests that noun-verb pairs are not integrated as fully when they are separated by a 
clause boundary as when they appear together overtly in the same clause.  This finding is 
particularly relevant to the current study, as it raises the possibility that a subject-verb pair such 
as pistol injured may be processed in very different ways, depending on whether the noun and 
verb appear in the same clause or in different clauses. 
Accordingly, Experiment 2 explores whether the magnitude of the animacy effect 
depends on the syntactic structure of the sentence by examining the processing of subject-verb 
relations between the head NP of an SRC and the embedded verb.  We predicted that the 
difficulty associated with integrating an inanimate subject and verb would be reduced when these 
constituents appeared in two separate clauses, compared to when they were in the same clause.  
This hypothesis was driven in part by Traxler et al.’s (2002, 2005) finding that there was no 
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difference in processing times for SRCs with an animate versus an inanimate head NP (i.e., no 
difference between 2c and 2d).  However, based on the results of our Experiment 1, one might 
expect greater difficulty for (2d; pistol injured) compared to (2c; cowboy concealed).  Finding no 
difference between these two sentences might suggest that the relations between the semantic 
properties of a subject and verb have reduced relevance when the verb is part of an embedded 
clause. 
Method 
 Participants.  Thirty-two students at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill 
participated in this experiment in exchange for course credit.  They were all native English 
speakers and had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. 
 Materials, design, and procedure.  Each participant was presented with 40 experimental 
sentences and 84 filler sentences.  The 40 experimental sentences were adapted from Traxler et 
al. (2005, Experiment 3).  The SRCs from Traxler et al.’s experiment comprised two of our 
conditions (7a & 7c).  Our other two conditions were created by dropping the complementizer of 
the SRCs and rewriting the end of the sentence such that the embedded verb was now the main 
verb of the sentence (7b & 7d).  These changes allowed us to fully cross animacy (i.e., animate 
versus inanimate head NP) with syntax (i.e., SRC versus simple sentence; see Appendix B for 
full set of stimuli).   
7a. The cowboy that concealed the pistol was known to be unreliable. (Animate-SRC) 
7b. The cowboy concealed the pistol last night in the saloon. (Animate-Simple) 
7c. The pistol that injured the cowboy was known to be unreliable.  (Inanimate-SRC) 
7d. The pistol injured the cowboy last night in the saloon. (Inanimate-Simple) 
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Fifteen participants who did not participate in the eye-tracking experiment rated these 
sentences for plausibility.  As in Experiment 1, the task was to indicate how likely they believed 
the events described by the sentence were on a scale from 1 (highly unlikely) to 5 (highly likely).  
Each rater saw the sentences in a different random order.  Mean plausibility ratings were 3.7 
(Animate-SRC), 3.9 (Animate-Simple), 3.4 (Inanimate-SRC), and 3.6 (Inanimate-Simple).  
Analysis of these plausibility ratings revealed a significant main effect of syntax F(1, 14) = 8.18, 
p < .05, indicating higher ratings for simple sentences than SRCs.  In addition, there was a 
significant main effect of animacy F(1, 14) = 7.84, p < .05, indicating higher ratings for 
sentences with animate versus inanimate NP1s.  Critical to our hypothesis, however, there was 
no hint of an interaction between syntax and animacy, F < 1.  Thus, any reading-time effects 
demonstrating reduced processing difficulty for inanimate subject NPs when they appear in an 
SRC compared to a simple sentence cannot be attributed to plausibility differences.   
For the eye-tracking experiment, one version of each item was assigned to one of four 
lists such that no participant saw more than one version of each item.  All other aspects of the 
design and procedure were identical to Experiment 1. 
Results 
 As in Experiment 1, we report results for gaze duration, regression-path duration, total 
time, and comprehension-question accuracy.  Reading times are presented in Table 3.  In our 
analyses, we focused on the verb as our target region (i.e., main verb for simple sentences, 
embedded verb for SRCs), as this was the word where processing difficulty emerged for 
inanimate subjects in Experiment 1.  The design of Experiment 2 allowed us to test for the 
presence of an interaction at this target region to determine whether the animacy effect depends 
on the syntactic structure of the sentence.  For this analysis, a contingent-expansion technique 
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(Rayner & Duffy, 1986) was implemented for the SRC conditions, such that for trials where the 
target word was skipped but the complementizer was fixated, processing time on the 
complementizer was used in place of the target word.
3
 
Table 3 
Eye-tracking results of Experiment 2. 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
                              Measure (in milliseconds)                      
                       ____________________________________ 
Region of Interest     Condition          Gaze       Regression- Total        
         Path  Time  
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Determiner 1   Animate SRC   193    217 
   Animate Simple  201    247 
   Inanimate SRC  195    221 
   Inanimate Simple  196    226 
 
Noun 1  Animate SRC   272  295  551 
   Animate Simple  250  274  526 
   Inanimate SRC  258  300  534 
   Inanimate Simple  256  304  630   
 
Complementizer Animate SRC   247  315  446 
   Inanimate SRC  252  293  443 
    
Verb    Animate SRC   269  343  547 
   Animate Simple  287  379  640 
   Inanimate SRC  256  322  571 
   Inanimate Simple  312  415  734 
 
Determiner 2   Animate SRC   214  259  318 
   Animate Simple  224  301  314 
   Inanimate SRC  223  267  327 
   Inanimate Simple  225  296  332 
 
Noun 2  Animate SRC   232  311  389 
   Animate Simple  240  353  381 
   Inanimate SRC  259  343  439 
   Inanimate Simple  255  328  422 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
                                                          
3
 There was no difference between animacy conditions in percentage of trials that went into the contingent 
expansion: animate head NP: 13%, inanimate head NP: 14%, F1(1, 31) < 1; F2(1, 39) < 1. 
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Verb.  Analysis of gaze durations showed no main effect of animacy at the verb [F1(1, 
31) = 1.12, MSE = 1831, p > .25; F2(1, 39) = 1.14, MSE = 5028, p > .25].  There was a main 
effect of syntax, such that simple sentences were read more slowly than SRCs [F1(1, 31) = 13.64, 
MSE = 3441, p < .01; F2(1, 39) = 20.07, MSE = 3254, p < .001].  Of primary importance, there 
was a significant interaction between syntax and animacy [F1(1, 31) = 6.33, MSE = 2867, p < 
.05; F2(1, 39) = 9.08, MSE = 3821, p < .01].  This interaction was probed further using two sets 
of contrasts: one holding syntax constant and one holding animacy constant.  These analyses 
revealed that the Inanimate-Simple condition was more difficult than the Animate-Simple 
condition [t1(31) = 2.57, p < .05; t2(39) = 2.20, p < .05],  but that there was no difference between 
the Inanimate-SRC condition and the Animate-SRC condition [t1(31) = 1.34, p > .19; t2(39) = 
1.16, p > .25].  Furthermore, there was a large difference between the Inanimate-Simple and 
Inanimate-SRC conditions [t1(31) = 4.25, p < .001; t2(39) = 4.86, p < .001], but no difference 
between the Animate-Simple and Animate-SRC conditions [t1(31) = 1.08, p > .28; t2(39) = .91, p 
> .36].    
 Analysis of regression-path durations at the verb revealed a pattern of effects identical to 
the findings obtained for gaze durations.  Again, there was no main effect of animacy [F1(1, 31) 
< 1; F2(1, 39) < 1], but there was a main effect of syntax with simple sentences overall causing 
more difficulty than SRCs [F1(1, 31) = 10.00, MSE = 12362, p < .01; F2(1, 39) = 12.41, MSE = 
12474, p < .01].  This main effect was qualified by the significant interaction between syntax and 
animacy [F1(1, 31) = 5.97, MSE = 5311, p < .05; F2(1, 39) = 5.35, MSE = 12528, p < .05].  
Follow-up contrasts revealed greater difficulty with the Inanimate-Simple condition than the 
Animate-Simple condition [t1(31) = 2.04, p = .05; t2(39) = 1.92, p < .07], but no difference 
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between the Inanimate-SRC condition and the Animate-SRC condition [t1(31) = 1.54, p > .13; 
t2(39) = 1.45, p > .15].  In addition, there was a large difference between the Inanimate-Simple 
and Inanimate-SRC conditions [t1(31) = 4.11, p < .001; t2(39) = 4.02, p < .001], but no difference 
between the Animate-Simple and Animate-SRC conditions [t1(31) = 1.27, p > .20; t2(39) = 0.87, 
p > .38].  This pattern of effects is depicted graphically in Figure 2. 
 Finally, total times on the verb showed a significant main effect of syntax [F1(1, 31) = 
32.13, MSE = 17302, p < .001; F2(1, 39) = 24.66, MSE = 24769, p < .001] and a main effect of 
animacy that was significant in the subjects analysis and marginal in the item analysis [F1(1, 31) 
= 5.33, MSE = 18200, p < .05; F2(1, 39) = 3.23, MSE = 44388, p < .09].  Also, there was a 
marginally significant interaction between syntax and animacy [F1(1, 31) = 3.05, MSE = 15866, 
p < .10; F2(1, 39) = 3.42, MSE = 30153, p < .08].  In line with the pattern of results obtained for 
gaze duration and regression-path duration, the total time data showed longer reading times on 
the verb for the Inanimate-Simple condition compared to the Animate-Simple condition [t1(31) = 
2.75, p < .05; t2(39) = 2.17, p < .05], but no difference between the Inanimate-SRC condition and 
the Animate-SRC condition [t1(31) = .50, p > .60; t2(39) = .28, p > .75].  In addition, there was a 
large difference between the Inanimate-Simple and Inanimate-SRC conditions [t1(31) = 5.19, p < 
.001; t2(39) = 4.19, p < .001], which replicated the gaze duration and regression-path duration 
findings.  Unlike these other two measures, however, the total time data also showed longer 
reading times for the Animate-Simple condition compared to the Animate-SRC condition [t1(31) 
= 2.95, p < .01; t2(39) = 2.28, p < .05]. 
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Figure 2 
Mean regression-path durations for the four conditions in Experiment 2.  Error bars represent 
the standard error of the mean. 
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 The           cowboy                            concealed      the             pistol 
 The           cowboy           that           concealed      the             pistol 
 The           pistol                            injured      the             cowboy 
 The           pistol           that           injured      the             cowboy 
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 Additional reading-time effects.  Gaze duration and regression-path duration on N1 
showed no effects; however, analysis of the total time data on this word revealed an interaction 
between syntax and animacy that was significant in the item analysis and marginally significant 
in the subject analysis [F1(1, 31) = 3.24, MSE = 35308, p < .09; F2(1, 39) = 6.10, MSE = 27698, 
p < .02].  Follow-up contrasts showed longer total reading times on N1 for the Inanimate-Simple 
condition compared to the Animate-Simple condition [t1(31) = 2.29, p < .05; t2(39) = 2.57, p < 
.05], but no difference between the Inanimate-SRC condition and the Animate-SRC condition 
[t1(31) = .51, p > .60; t2(39) = .39, p > .65].  There were also marginally longer reading times on 
N1 for the contrast comparing the Inanimate-Simple condition to the Inanimate-SRC condition 
[t1(31) = 1.93, p < .07; t2(39) = 1.87, p < .07], but no hint of a difference between the Animate-
Simple condition and the Animate-SRC condition [t1(31) = .68, p > .50; t2(39) = 1.03, p > .30].  
The inflated total times on N1 in the Inanimate-Simple condition reflect readers’ tendency to go 
back and reread earlier parts of the sentence after encountering difficulty at the verb.  As such, 
these effects are in line with the pattern of results found at the verb in further demonstrating the 
difficulty associated with the Inanimate-Simple condition relative to the other conditions.   
 At the determiner following the verb, we observed a main effect of syntax in regression-
path duration, such that there were significantly longer reading times for simple sentences 
compared to SRCs, regardless of animacy [F1(1, 31) = 4.20, MSE = 8870, p < .05; F2(1, 39) = 
6.75, MSE = 13682, p < .05].  This finding may reflect general facilitation with processing an 
object NP when it is embedded in an RC compared to when it is in the same clause as the subject 
NP.  On the other hand, the overall high skipping rates of this word (i.e., over 50% for all 
conditions) combined with the fact that this effect did not emerge on N2 make it difficult to 
interpret this effect on the article. 
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 We did, however, observe significant main effects of animacy on N2, such that there was 
greater difficulty for sentences that had an inanimate sentence subject compared to sentences that 
had an animate sentence subject, regardless of syntax.  This effect was significant in gaze 
duration [F1(1, 31) = 10.40, MSE = 1330, p < .005; F2(1, 39) = 5.26, MSE = 3411, p < .05] and in 
total time (significant in the subject analysis, marginal in the item analysis) [F1(1, 31) = 7.70, 
MSE = 8620, p < .01; F2(1, 39) = 2.91, MSE = 21025, p < .10].  Together with the findings 
obtained on the verb, these results suggest that the difficulty associated with the Inanimate-
Simple condition begins early and extends to N2, whereas difficulty with the Inanimate-SRC 
condition does not emerge until after the verb. 
 There were no additional significant main effects or interactions.  
Comprehension-question accuracy.  Analysis of comprehension-question accuracies 
revealed a main effect of syntax, such that responses following simple sentences (96%) were 
significantly more correct than responses following SRCs (89%), F1(1, 31) = 16.63, MSE = 78, p 
< .001; F2(1, 39) = 8.24, MSE = 216, p < .01.  There was no main effect of animacy, F1(1, 31) = 
1.10, MSE = 38, p > .30; F2(1, 39) < 1, nor was there a syntax by animacy interaction, F1(1, 31) 
< 1; F2(1, 39) < 1. 
 Discussion 
 Experiment 2 replicated the finding from Experiment 1 that there is greater processing 
difficulty for inanimate compared to animate subject-verb pairs when the two words appeared 
together in the same clause.  Whereas Experiment 1 had demonstrated this greater difficulty 
when the noun and verb both appeared in the embedded relative clause, Experiment 2 showed 
that this pattern is also observed when the noun and verb both appear in the main clause.  
Crucially, Experiment 2 further demonstrated that this processing difficulty was significantly 
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reduced when integration occurred across the boundary created by an SRC.  This finding is 
consistent with the notion that the depth at which the words of a sentence are processed depends 
critically on the structure of the sentence.   
General Discussion 
 Together, the two experiments reported in this paper demonstrate that the difficulty of 
integrating an inanimate subject with a verb depends on the syntactic structure of the sentence.  
Experiment 1 showed that subject-verb integration was difficult for inanimate subjects, 
compared to animate subjects, when the two constituents appeared together in the same clause.  
This difficulty emerged entirely at the verb, indicating that the animacy manipulation had no 
effect on processing times for any other part of the sentence.  Experiment 2 showed that 
inanimate subject-verb integration was just as easy as animate subject-verb integration when the 
subject and verb appeared in two different clauses.   
 Our comparison of ORCs versus SRCs in Experiment 1 demonstrated that the processing 
difficulty occurs over a broad region of the sentence, encompassing the RC as well as the matrix 
verb.  This finding is consistent with a large literature showing that the difficulty associated with 
processing an ORC is not confined to a single word (e.g., Ford, 1983; Gordon et al., 2001, 2004, 
2006; Holmes & O’Regan, 1981; Johnson et al., 2011; King & Just, 1991; Traxler et al., 2002, 
2005).  In contrast, our comparison of ORCs with an animate versus an inanimate embedded NP 
showed that the animacy manipulation influenced reading times only at the embedded verb.  
Accordingly, these results provide no evidence that NP animacy influences RC processing per 
se.  Instead, the difficulty associated with integrating an inanimate subject with a verb seems to 
be a localized effect. 
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 A variety of linguistic and psycholinguistic accounts have previously proposed that 
integration of an inanimate subject NP with an action verb is difficult (Cruse, 1973; Dowty, 
1991; Fillmore, 1968; Pustejovsky, 1995; Wolff et al., 2009, 2010).  Depending on the nature of 
the particular subject-verb pair, this difficulty may stem from needing to access a metaphorical 
or metonymic sense of the noun (Frisson & Pickering, 1999; Gibbs, 1990), coercing the noun 
from an object to an event (Pustejovsky, 1995), or perceiving a mismatch between the semantic 
properties of the noun and the thematic properties specified by the verb (Dowty, 1991).  The 
inanimate noun-verb pairs used in the current experiments were taken directly from previous 
research (Traxler et al., 2005; Experiment 3) so as to facilitate comparison of current results to 
those obtained previously.  The heterogeneity of those inanimate noun-verb pairs in that research 
makes it difficult to identify the exact source or sources of the local processing difficulty in 
inanimate subject-verb integration. 
Critically, the difficulty associated with integrating an inanimate subject NP with an 
action verb depended on syntactic structure, with the effect disappearing when the two 
constituents were in different clauses.  This finding is in line with several theoretical accounts 
suggesting that the depth of sentence processing depends to a large extent on the structure of the 
sentence (e.g., Ferreira et al., 2002; Gordon & Hendrick, 1998; Sanford & Sturt, 2002).   
Specifically, work by Ferreira and colleagues (Christianson, Hollingworth, Halliwell, & Ferreira, 
2001; Ferreira, 2003; Ferreira, Christianson, & Hollingworth, 2001; see Ferreira & Patson, 2007 
for a review) has demonstrated that participants who are presented with garden-path sentences or 
passive sentences that contain noncanonical agent-patient roles frequently misinterpret the 
meaning of the sentence.  Similarly, Sanford and colleagues (Sanford, Sanford, Filik, & Molle, 
2005; Sturt, Sanford, Stewart, & Dawydiak, 2004) have used a change-detection paradigm to 
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demonstrate that readers are more likely to notice that a target word has changed from one 
presentation of the text to the next if the word is linguistically focused by the sentence structure 
or is highlighted by a prior discourse context.  Although this previous work provides compelling 
evidence that linguistic representations are often inaccurate or incomplete, the measures used 
combine the influences of both online linguistic processing and offline memory-based retrieval 
of the linguistic information.  In contrast, the current work shows that the online processing time 
associated with integrating an inanimate subject-verb combination is reduced when the two 
constituents appear in separate clauses, showing that the process of interpretation depends 
critically on the structure of the sentence.  
There is previous empirical support for the perspective that sentence structure can have a 
powerful impact on how linguistic representations are processed.  As discussed above, Baker and 
Wagner (1987) demonstrated that readers are less likely to detect false information embedded in 
a sentence when the information appears as part of a subordinate clause, rather than as part of the 
main clause (see also Bredart & Modolo, 1988).  Although the combination of an inanimate 
subject with an action verb does not constitute false information per se, our findings extend 
Baker and Wagner’s results in demonstrating an online disruption in processing that is reduced 
by structural separation. 
Focusing on sentence structure as it relates to the current experiments, it is important to 
note that the purpose of an RC is either to restrict the identity of the head noun or to modify its 
meaning.  In other words, the RC is a modifying clause—an adjunct—and it has been argued that 
adjuncts do not depend heavily on the specifics of the head they modify (e.g., Schütze & Gibson, 
1999).  From this perspective, then, the semantic properties of a subject have a stronger influence 
on subject-verb integration when that subject NP is an argument of the verb, compared to when 
36 
 
the verb is part of an adjunct phrase.  This finding can be explained by acknowledging that an 
RC typically conveys information that is presupposed, or given by the previous discourse context 
(Fox & Thompson, 1990; Gordon & Hendrick, 2005).  Under this view, the RC grounds the head 
NP in information that is presumed to already be familiar to the comprehender , while less 
familiar information is presented in the main clause.  In the case of subject-extracted RCs, such 
as the ones used in Experiment 2, NP1 serves as the subject of both the embedded verb and the 
main-clause verb, thus introducing two subject-verb relationships.  Because the language 
comprehension system is limited, attentional resources must be allocated efficiently.  For this 
reason, we believe that language processing focuses attention on the relationship between the 
head noun and the main verb of the sentence at the expense of the relationship between the head 
noun and the RC verb because such expressions typically convey presumed or contextual 
information.  
In sum, this work demonstrates that there is a processing cost associated with integrating 
an inanimate subject with an action verb, but that this cost does not contribute to the higher-level 
syntactic difficulty associated with processing an ORC.  Importantly, the magnitude of this 
processing difficulty depends on the structure of the sentence—it is larger when the inanimate 
noun is an argument of the action verb compared to when the action verb appears as part of an 
relative clause that identifies or modifies the meaning of the inanimate noun.  We believe that 
this occurs because the depth at which people process relations between parts of a sentence is 
determined by its structure. 
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Transition to Chapter 3 
 
 In Lowder and Gordon (2012), we demonstrated that readers experience greater difficulty 
integrating a subject-verb pair when the subject is inanimate than when it is animate.  As we 
noted, there are a variety of accounts that could in principle explain the source of this difficulty; 
however, the inanimate subject-verb pairs we used (adapted from Traxler et al., 2005) represent a 
heterogeneous set of materials, making it impossible to identify a single source of difficulty (see 
Appendices 1 and 2).  To illustrate this problem, consider the sentences below.     
 The tornado killed Mary. Force of nature 
  The machinery killed Mary. Electric device 
  The stone killed Mary. Projectile 
  The axe killed Mary.  Instrument 
 
Wolff et al. (2010) have proposed that the difficulty associated with interpreting a causal 
construction involving an inanimate subject depends on the inanimate entity’s inherent ability to 
generate its own energy.  Under this account, an action verb like kill describes an event in which 
there is a causal relationship between the verb’s two arguments (i.e., X killed Y).  Critically, 
Wolff et al. propose that an inanimate entity’s ability to create force is a major factor that 
determines how natural it will sound in subject position of a causal construction.  As a result, 
inanimate entities can be conceptualized as lying somewhere on a continuum of force creation.  
On one end of this continuum are natural forces, which are fully capable of creating their own 
energy, even though they lack intention.  On the other end of this spectrum are instruments, 
which derive all of their energy from an animate agent, and therefore often sound unnatural when 
combined with an action verb.  Falling in the middle of this continuum are other types of 
inanimate entities such as electric devices, which do not create their own energy but transform 
energy from one form to another, and projectiles, which might appear as though they create their 
own force even though they acquire energy from an external source.  Preliminary evidence 
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supporting this view comes from Wolff et al. (2009), who showed that English, Korean, and 
Mandarin speakers all rated sentences as significantly less acceptable when the sentence subject 
was an inanimate entity that was “low” in energy generation, compared to one that was “high” in 
energy generation.   
 Thus, inanimate nouns that represent instruments, tools, or weapons may be particularly 
difficult to integrate with an action verb compared to other classes of inanimate nouns.  One 
plausible explanation for this is that constructions such as these may require the reader to engage 
in a process of figurative interpretation.  In the sentence The axe killed Mary, for example, the 
subject NP axe is incapable of performing the action kill on its own.  Thus, one may infer here 
that the weapon is being used as a referential expression to stand for the unnamed animate agent 
(e.g., the one who wielded the axe).  This suggests a type of metonymic construction, where some 
salient characteristic of an entity refers to the entity as a whole.  To the extent that the 
combination of an inanimate subject NP with an action verb represents a figurative expression, 
psycholinguistic theories conflict on the issue of whether literal and figurative meanings are 
processed differently.  Whereas some models propose that a literal interpretation must be 
accessed before a figurative interpretation (e.g., Grice, 1975; Searle, 1979), others propose that 
neither the literal nor the figurative interpretation necessarily takes priority, but rather that the 
reader makes rapid use of the sentence context to immediately choose the intended meaning of 
the figurative expression (e.g., Glucksberg, 1991, 2003).  Although a great deal of work has been 
devoted to better understanding the processing of figurative language in general, very little work 
has examined the processing of metonymy specifically.  One prominent exception is Frisson and 
Pickering (1999), who measured eye movements while participants read sentences containing 
place-for-institution metonymies (e.g., The bright boy was rejected by the college) and place-for-
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event metonymies (e.g., A lot of Americans protested during Vietnam).  In both cases, Frisson 
and Pickering showed that processing the figurative sense of these familiar metonyms was just as 
easy as processing the same words when they were used in their literal sense. 
 Whereas Frisson and Pickering (1999) investigated the processing of place-for-institution 
and place-for-event metonyms, expressions such as axe killed and pistol injured are closer in 
form to what Lakoff and Johnson (1980) termed object-used-for-user metonyms (e.g., The gun 
he hired wanted fifty grand).  The processing of these types of metonyms has been investigated 
by Gibbs (1990), who showed greater whole-sentence reading times when the sentence subject 
was an object-used-for-user metonym (e.g., scalpel to refer to surgeon), compared to both a 
literal condition (e.g., doctor) and a metaphorical condition (e.g., butcher).  This work suggests 
that the integration of an inanimate subject with a verb may in some cases require the reader to 
adopt a figurative interpretation, which can impose a processing cost, though the whole-sentence 
reading time method did not allow this cost to be localized precisely.   
The object-used-for-user metonyms studied by Gibbs (1990) were constructed so that the 
metonym referred to a person (e.g., The scalpel was sued for malpractice).  In contrast, 
constructions like The axe killed Mary can be understood either by inferring that the instrument 
represents a person (e.g., axe to refer to executioner), or by inferring that the instrument 
represents an event (e.g., someone’s swinging of the axe killed Mary).  This perspective has also 
been discussed by Pustejovsky (1995) in his comparison of the two sentences presented in (1) 
below.  Here, the verb kill specifies an action, and so it selects for an animate NP as its subject.  
This requirement is satisfied in (1a), but there is a semantic mismatch in (1b) that must be 
resolved.  Specifically, Pustejovsky proposes that the inanimate subject in (1b) represents a type 
of metonymic construction that requires additional processing in order for it to make sense, and 
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calls the mechanism through which this deeper interpretation occurs coercion.  That is, 
Pustejovsky proposes that the inanimate entity in (1b) makes sense as the subject of the sentence 
because it is coerced from an object (e.g., the gun) into an event involving an animate agent (e.g., 
someone’s shooting of the gun).   
1a.  John killed Mary. 
1b. The gun killed Mary.  
 
Evidence that coercion incurs a processing cost has been found for NPs that syntactically appear 
as direct objects and which refer to entities (e.g., the book) when they follow verbs that require 
an event complement (e.g., began) as compared to those that take a direct object (e.g., write; 
McElree, Traxler, Pickering, Seely, & Jackendoff, 2001; Traxler, Pickering, & McElree, 2002).  
However, psycholinguistic evidence of coercion has not previously been reported for subject 
NPs that do not meet animacy specifications of verbs.   
 These various perspectives suggesting that some combinations of inanimate subject-verb 
pairs may require a figurative interpretation led me to become interested in the processing of 
metonymy and other types of figurative language.  In addition, our results showing that the 
difficulty of integrating an inanimate subject with an action verb depends on sentence structure 
suggests that the processing of other types of complex semantic expressions, such as figurative 
language, may also depend on the structure of the sentence in which the critical constituents 
appear.  In Lowder and Gordon (2013), we examine the effects of sentence structure on the 
processing of metonymy, finding that the relative ease or difficulty of processing this form of 
semantic expression depends critically on whether the metonym appears as an argument of the 
main verb or whether it appears as part of an adjunct phrase. 
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CHAPTER 3:  Lowder and Gordon (2013)
4
 
 
In everyday language comprehension we frequently encounter words that have multiple 
related meanings.  For example, the word college can be used to refer to the physical space 
occupied by an institution of higher education, as in Peter decided to leave the bike path and cut 
through the college, or it can refer to the administration or other governing board of the 
institution, as in Peter decided to petition the college to install more bike racks.  This latter 
example illustrates metonymy, a common type of figurative language in which some entity (e.g., 
the administration of a university) is referred to by some salient characteristic of that entity (e.g., 
college).  Specifically, petition the college constitutes a place-for-institution metonym, where 
college does not refer to the literal, physical place, but rather to the larger institution associated 
with that place (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980).  Other types of metonymy have also been 
documented.  For example, the sentence The ham sandwich is sitting at table 20 contains an 
object-used-for-user metonym, where ham sandwich does not refer to the literal sandwich, but 
rather to the customer who ordered the ham sandwich (Nunberg, 1978). 
 The manner in which metonymic expressions are understood factors into a general debate 
in the psycholinguistic literature over how we process figurative language.  At a broad level, 
accounts of figurative-language processing differ in their predictions regarding the time course 
required to access a word’s literal meaning compared to its figurative meaning.  Psycholinguists 
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have characterized the standard pragmatic model (Grice, 1975; Searle, 1979) as an indirect-
access model of figurative-language processing in which the literal meaning of a figurative 
expression is always accessed before a figurative interpretation is computed.  If there is a 
mismatch between the literal interpretation and the context of the sentence, the literal meaning is 
rejected and a figurative interpretation is adopted instead.  Although this model received some 
early empirical support (e.g., Clark & Lucy, 1975; Janus & Bever, 1985), the strict “literal-first” 
account has been challenged by demonstrations that when there is sufficient context readers can 
access figurative interpretations just as quickly as they can access literal interpretations (e.g., 
Gerrig & Healy, 1983; Inhoff, Lima, & Carroll, 1984; Ortony, Schallert, Reynolds, & Antos, 
1978; Shinjo & Myers, 1987), and by demonstrations that certain figurative interpretations are 
automatically activated, even when an appropriate literal interpretation is available (Gildea & 
Glucksberg, 1983; Glucksberg, Gildea, & Bookin, 1982; Keysar, 1989).  These findings have 
been taken as evidence for a direct-access model (Gibbs, 1994; Gibbs & Gerrig, 1989; 
Glucksberg, 1991, 2003) according to which neither a literal nor a figurative interpretation takes 
priority, but where contextual and lexical information interact immediately, allowing rapid 
selection of the intended meaning of a word.  With increasing evidence that familiar figurative 
expressions are not necessarily more difficult to process than literal expressions (for reviews, see 
Glucksberg, 2001, 2003), researchers have shifted from the indirect-access model and toward the 
direct-access model.     
 Models of figurative-language processing have been based primarily on the 
comprehension of metaphor, with very few experimental studies examining the processing of 
metonymy.  Some evidence suggests that familiar metonyms are no more difficult to process 
than literal expressions.  Frisson and Pickering (1999) conducted two eye-tracking while reading 
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experiments that investigated the processing of familiar versus unfamiliar metonyms that 
appeared in either a literal or figurative context.  In their Experiment 1, participants read 
sentences like those presented in (1).  Here, college is a familiar place-for-institution metonym 
that can easily appear in either a literal context (1a) or a figurative context (1c).  In contrast, 
pyramid has no familiar metonymic sense, and so it can easily appear in a literal context (1b), but 
it has no straightforward interpretation when it appears in a figurative context (1d). 
(1a) The photographer stepped inside the college after he had received an official 
invitation. 
(1b) The photographer stepped inside the pyramid after he had received an official 
invitation. 
(1c) That bright boy was rejected by the college after he had bribed some crooked 
officials. 
(1d) That bright boy was rejected by the pyramid after he had bribed some crooked 
officials. 
Reading times on both the critical noun phrase (NP) and on the postnoun region revealed 
substantial processing difficulty when an unfamiliar metonym appeared in a figurative context 
(1d) compared to the other three conditions.  In contrast, there was only weak evidence that the 
familiar metonym in a figurative context (1c) was more difficult than in a literal context (1a), and 
this effect emerged relatively late in the eye-tracking record.  Frisson and Pickering’s 
Experiment 2 found a similar pattern of results using familiar and non-familiar place-for-event 
metonyms (e.g., Vietnam can refer literally to the country or figuratively to the Vietnam war, 
whereas Finland has no familiar metonymic sense).  Frisson and Pickering interpreted these 
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results as supporting an account of figurative-language processing in which readers do not 
initially distinguish between the literal and figurative meaning of a familiar metonym, but rather 
adopt a single, underspecified meaning and only later activate the intended sense.   This account 
differs from earlier direct-access models (Gibbs, 1994; Gibbs & Gerrig, 1989; Glucksberg, 1991, 
2003): whereas a direct-access account proposes that similar processing patterns for literal and 
figurative expressions are the result of the rapid influence of sentence context, the 
underspecification account instead argues that there is no difference between the processing of 
literal and figurative expressions because the reader does not make a strong initial commitment 
to either interpretation (for further discussion of the underspecification approach, see Frisson, 
2009; Frisson & Pickering, 2001).  Additional work has supported the idea that familiar 
metonymic interpretations are no more difficult to access than literal interpretations for both 
young and older adults (Humphrey, Kemper, & Radel, 2004)  and in cases of producer-for-
product metonyms (Frisson & Pickering, 2007; McElree, Frisson, & Pickering, 2006).   
 In contrast, other studies present evidence that the figurative meaning of a metonym is 
more difficult to access than its literal meaning.  Gibbs (1990) presented participants with short 
narratives (e.g., a story about an incompetent surgeon) where the final sentence contained a 
referring expression that could be literal, metaphoric, or metonymic (e.g., The 
doctor/butcher/scalpel was sued for malpractice).  He found that participants had the least 
difficulty establishing an antecedent in the literal condition compared to the two figurative 
conditions.  However, participants were significantly slower in the metonymic condition 
compared to the metaphoric condition, leading Gibbs to conclude that metonymic referential 
expressions are more difficult to understand than other types of referential expressions (see also 
Onishi & Murphy, 1993).  Frisson and Pickering (1999) noted that Gibbs did not make a 
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distinction between sense selection and sense creation.  That is, the metonym condition in this 
study may have been more difficult than the others because readers are not used to referring to a 
doctor as a scalpel, and so they had to generate this novel sense of the word.  This contrasts with 
a familiar metonym (e.g., college), where readers do not have to generate the meaning, but rather 
select it among several possible senses (see Clark & Gerrig, 1983; Gerrig, 1989).  Additional 
research using neuroimaging (Rapp, Erb, Grodd, Bartels, & Markert, 2011), electrophysiology 
(Weiland, Bambini, & Schumacher, 2012), and speed-accuracy trade-off methodology (Ghio, 
Bott, Schumacher, & Bambini, 2012) has also shown clear differences in the processing of 
metonymic versus literal expressions.  
 In this paper, we propose that metonymic processing is influenced by sentence structure, 
which determines whether processing conforms to predictions derived from the indirect-access 
model or the direct-access model.  This approach is consistent with a variety of psycholinguistic 
perspectives that have proposed that sentence structure guides the depth at which language 
comprehenders interpret referential expressions and relations between parts of a sentence (e.g., 
Baker & Wagner, 1987; Ferreira, Bailey, & Ferraro, 2002; Gordon & Hendrick, 1998; Sanford & 
Sturt, 2002).  In particular, we test the hypothesis that metonyms are more difficult to process 
than literal expressions when they appear as an argument of a verb, but that this processing 
difficulty is reduced when the metonym appears as part of an adjunct phrase.  This hypothesis 
was driven in part by our recent work (Lowder & Gordon, 2012) showing that changes in 
sentence structure affect the processing difficulty associated with integrating an inanimate 
sentence subject with an action verb (this work pertains to questions about how noun animacy 
influences complex-sentence processing: see Gordon & Lowder, 2012, Traxler, Morris, & Seely, 
2002; Traxler, Williams, Blozis, & Morris, 2005;  and questions about how information specified 
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by arguments and adjuncts is processed: Boland & Blodgett, 2006; Clifton, Speer, & Abney, 
1991; Schutze & Gibson, 1999; Speer & Clifton, 1998).  Lowder and Gordon recorded 
participants’ eye movements while they read sentences like those in (2), where the sentence 
subject was either animate or inanimate and where an action verb appeared as either the main 
verb of the sentence or as part of a relative clause (i.e., an adjunct phrase).  Lowder and Gordon 
found substantial processing difficulty at the verb for inanimate subjects versus animate subjects 
in a simple sentence context (2b versus 2a); however, there was no such animacy difference 
when the action verb was embedded in a relative clause (2d versus 2c).
5
  This work demonstrated 
an important role for sentence structure in subject-verb integration.  That is, the pairing of an 
inanimate subject with an action verb (e.g., The pistol injured) is difficult when this relationship 
is focused by virtue of being in the main clause of the sentence.  In contrast, this difficulty is 
reduced when the integration takes place within a relative clause (e.g., The pistol that injured), 
presumably because the structure of the sentence signals to the reader that the information in this 
adjunct phrase is less important and thus requires less attention than the new information being 
asserted in the main clause of the sentence.  This work also suggests that there may be other 
semantic characteristics of a sentence aside from animacy whose ease or difficulty of processing 
depends critically on sentence structure.  
(2a) The cowboy concealed the pistol last night in the saloon. 
(2b) The pistol injured the cowboy last night in the saloon. 
                                                          
5 The greater processing difficulty for sentences like (2b) versus (2a) is unlikely to be due to temporary ambiguity at 
the verb between a main clause interpretation and a reduced-relative clause interpretation.  First, the inanimate 
nouns used in Lowder and Gordon (2012) could not plausibly serve as the patient of an action verb (e.g., The pistol 
injured by the cowboy… is anomalous).  More importantly, the greater difficulty observed in sentences like (2b) 
compared to (2d) was completely localized to the verb.  If readers had entertained the possibility of a reduced-
relative interpretation in (2b), then greater processing difficulty should have been observed on the subsequent, 
unambiguous NP (e.g., the cowboy) for (2b) compared to (2d). 
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(2c) The cowboy that concealed the pistol was known to be unreliable. 
(2d) The pistol that injured the cowboy was known to be unreliable.   
The notion that interactions between semantics and syntax of the sort reported by Lowder 
and Gordon (2012) might extend into research on figurative language is supported by the 
observation that several of the inanimate critical nouns used in that study could be interpreted 
metonymically (although in most cases the metonymic sense of the inanimate noun likely has to 
be created, rather than selected from an established metonymic sense).  For example, an 
inanimate subject-verb pair such as pistol injured in (2b) resembles what Lakoff and Johnson 
(1980) called object-used-for-user-metonyms (e.g., The gun he hired wanted fifty grand), where 
in this case pistol could stand for the man who was holding the pistol or someone’s shooting of 
the pistol (other examples of object-used-for-user metonyms from Lowder and Gordon include 
the revolver shot and the wrench bruised).  In line with this perspective, Pustejovsky (1995) has 
proposed that sentences like (3b) require a metonymic interpretation.  Whereas the animate entity 
John can easily be integrated with an action verb like killed in (3a), Pustejovsky proposes that we 
instead process (3b) by type-shifting the inanimate entity the gun from an object to an event 
involving an animate agent (e.g., someone’s shooting of the gun).  This semantic type-shifting 
process is called coercion.  
(3a) John killed Mary. 
(3b) The gun killed Mary.  
We propose that inanimate subject-verb integration, coercion, metonymic processing, and 
other types of figurative language share a common source of processing difficulty in that they all 
require that a word be given a noncanonical semantic interpretation so that it makes sense in 
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relation to the meanings of other parts of the sentence.  Sentence structure acts as one of several 
factors that can either emphasize or deemphasize the relevant semantic relation and therefore the 
need to make the noncanonical interpretation.  In other words, a reader’s limited attentional 
resources are guided to a large extent by sentence structure, such that certain elements and 
relations are processed deeply at the expense of other elements and relations.  Specifically, when 
these sentential elements appear as arguments of a verb, their interpretation is critical to the 
overall coherence of the sentence, and so they are processed at a deep level, which leads to 
processing difficulty.  In contrast, when these sentential elements are embedded in an adjunct 
phrase, they are seen as being less important to the meaning of the sentence, and so they are 
processed less deeply.  This occurs because adjuncts are modifiers, and their interpretation does 
not depend strongly on the interpretation of the heads they modify (Schutze & Gibson, 1999).  In 
addition, an adjunct phrase may signal to the reader that the information it contains is 
presupposed, and thus is not as important to focus on as the “new” information being asserted in 
the main clause of the sentence.  We address several possible mechanisms that may explain 
differences in depth of processing in the General Discussion.   
Lowder and Gordon’s (2012) finding of greater processing difficulty for (2b) versus (2a) 
demonstrates that noncanonical arguments in the form of inanimate subjects cause processing 
difficulty when combined with an action verb.  Critically, this cost is reduced when the subject-
verb integration takes place in an adjunct phrase.  The current paper extends these findings to 
figurative-language processing by demonstrating that the figurative interpretation of a metonym 
is more difficult to process than a literal expression when the critical word appears as the 
argument of the verb, but that this difference is reduced when the critical word is embedded in an 
adjunct phrase.   
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Experiment 1  
Experiment 1 employed the metonyms and the basic design of Frisson and Pickering 
(1999) but modified their stimulus sentences so that the critical metonym was always an 
argument of the verb.  As discussed above, Frisson and Pickering’s Experiment 1 investigated 
the processing of place-for-institution metonyms as shown in (1; repeated here). 
(1a) The photographer stepped inside the college after he had received an official 
invitation.  (Literal-Familiar) 
(1b) The photographer stepped inside the pyramid after he had received an official 
invitation. (Literal-Unfamiliar) 
(1c) That bright boy was rejected by the college after he had bribed some crooked 
officials. (Metonymic-Familiar) 
(1d) That bright boy was rejected by the pyramid after he had bribed some crooked 
officials. (Metonymic-Unfamiliar) 
The critical NP in (1a) and (1c) is the college.  In (1a), college is interpreted literally (i.e., the 
physical college campus), whereas in (1c), college is interpreted figuratively (i.e., the people who 
make up the admissions committee at the college).  The critical NP in (1b) and (1d) is the 
pyramid.  In (1b), pyramid is interpreted literally; however, there is no familiar metonymic sense 
associated with pyramid, and so (1d) is anomalous.  We use the labels Literal and Metonymic to 
refer to the sentence context in which the critical word appears.  We use the labels Familiar and 
Unfamiliar to refer to whether the target word has a familiar metonymic sense or not.   
Whereas the indirect-access model predicts greater difficulty processing (1c) compared to 
(1a), the direct-access model predicts that there should be no difference.  Frisson and Pickering 
(1999) tested these predictions in an eye-tracking while reading experiment using sentences like 
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in (1).  Across several eye-tracking measures, they found robust context-by-metonym-familiarity 
interactions on the region immediately before the critical NP, on the critical NP itself, and on the 
region immediately following the critical NP.  Follow-up analyses showed that the driving force 
behind these interactions was extreme processing difficulty associated with the Metonymic-
Unfamiliar condition (e.g., rejected by the pyramid), which led Frisson and Pickering to 
conclude that whereas unfamiliar metonyms are difficult to process, familiar metonyms are 
processed very easily whether they appear in a literal or figurative context.  Of particular interest, 
the greater difficulty for the Metonymic-Unfamiliar condition over the other three conditions 
emerged in first-pass reading of the critical NP, suggesting that early stages of lexical access are 
sensitive to metonymic processing.  Whereas lexical access was difficult for a word that was 
used in an unfamiliar metonymic context compared to when it was used in its literal context 
(e.g., rejected by the pyramid versus stepped inside the pyramid), there was no difference when 
the critical word had a familiar metonymic sense (e.g., rejected by the college versus stepped 
inside the college).   This outcome supports the direct-access model in showing that readers used 
the context of the sentence to rapidly determine which sense of a familiar metonym to select; 
because there is no familiar figurative sense associated with pyramid, a process of sense creation 
must take place.  The results also support Frisson and Pickering’s underspecification model, 
where the reader initially activates only an underspecified meaning of a familiar metonym and 
later selects the appropriate sense.      
Notwithstanding this conclusion, Frisson and Pickering (1999) did obtain some evidence 
that Metonymic-Familiar (e.g., rejected by the college) was more difficult than Literal-Familiar 
(stepped inside the college).  Specifically, they found that readers were more likely to regress to 
earlier regions of the sentence after having read the critical NP in the Metonymic-Familiar 
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compared to the Literal-Familiar.  Also, there was evidence for greater total reading times for the 
Metonymic-Familiar condition than for the Literal-Familiar condition on both the critical NP as 
well as the region immediately following it.  Frisson and Pickering acknowledge these 
differences, but note that these effects were relatively weak.  Furthermore, Frisson and Pickering 
point out that the greater difficulty associated with the Metonymic-Unfamiliar condition emerged 
early in the eye-tracking record, whereas the smaller difference between the Metonymic-Familiar 
and Literal-Familiar conditions did not emerge until later processing measures.  Thus, Frisson 
and Pickering claim that their results offer only weak support for the indirect-access model. 
In Experiment 1 we tested the hypothesis that a clear processing difference between 
familiar metonyms used in their literal versus figurative contexts would emerge in a set of 
materials that more carefully controls the sentence position of the critical NP (see 4 for an 
example).  Specifically, we modified Frisson and Pickering’s (1999) materials in two important 
ways.  First, we rewrote the verb phrase of each set of items such that the critical NP would 
always appear as the object of the verb.  Although this was already the case in some of Frisson 
and Pickering’s materials (e.g., the famous drug smuggler provoked the court; the grateful old 
lady thanked the store), it was more often the case that the critical NP appeared as part of an 
adjunct phrase (e.g., the bright boy was rejected by the college; the guards got instructions from 
the headquarters), or at least followed a preposition that intervened between the verb and the 
noun (e.g., the young expert cooperated with the gallery; that blasphemous young woman had to 
answer to the convent).  This variability in sentence structure occurred not only within the 
figurative contexts, as in the above examples, but also in the literal contexts (compare, e.g., those 
angry protestors surrounded the embassy and the cab driver dropped us off at the treasury).  
Second, Frisson and Pickering used different sentence frames within a set of items to evoke the 
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literal versus figurative sense of the critical word (compare 1a and 1b to 1c and 1d).  This was 
done to allow two items within a set to appear on the same experimental list (e.g., 1a and 1d were 
paired together).  We take a similar approach to our design; however, we also constructed 
additional sentences to increase our total number of items.  
(4a) Sometime in August, the journalist photographed the college after he had received 
an official invitation.  (Literal-Familiar) 
(4b) Sometime in August, the journalist photographed the pyramid after he had received 
an official invitation. (Literal-Unfamiliar) 
(4c) Sometime in August, the journalist offended the college after he had bribed some 
crooked officials. (Metonymic-Familiar) 
(4d) Sometime in August, the journalist offended the pyramid after he had bribed some 
crooked officials. (Metonymic-Unfamiliar) 
As discussed above, Lowder and Gordon (2012) demonstrated that sentence structure 
moderates semantic integration, with processing difficulty emerging when a noncanonical 
argument is paired with an action verb.  Similarly, we predicted that readers would experience 
difficulty processing both familiar and unfamiliar metonyms when the critical word appeared as 
an argument of the verb.  Critically, because the metonym involves a noncanonical interpretation 
and is focused by virtue of its being an argument of the verb, this greater difficulty for metonyms 
used in a figurative versus a literal context should emerge early in the eye-tracking record and 
should not depend on familiarity of the metonym.  Based on the results of Frisson and Pickering 
(1999), we also predicted that readers would experience greater difficulty processing unfamiliar 
metonyms compared to familiar metonyms, but we expected this difficulty to emerge relatively 
late in the eye-tracking record.   
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Method 
Participants.  Twenty-eight students at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill 
participated in this experiment in exchange for course credit.  They were all native English 
speakers and had normal or corrected-to-normal vision.   
 Materials.  Each participant was presented with 32 experimental sentences and 92 filler 
sentences.  The experimental sentences were adapted from Frisson and Pickering (1999, 
Experiment 1).  Everything from the critical NP to the end of the sentence was identical to the 
materials used by Frisson and Pickering.  Critically, we changed the verb phrases such that they 
always consisted of only one word, which would then take the critical NP as its object.  This 
required us to change the sentence subject in some cases, but not in others.  Finally, we began 
every sentence with a locative phrase.  See (4) for an example.   
Each set of items was yoked to another set of items that contained the same verbs and 
critical NPs but contained a different locative phrase and a different sentence subject (see 5).  
This was done to allow pairing of items across four lists, but to also maintain tight experimental 
control.  Thus, in constructing our counterbalanced lists, (4a) and (5d) always appeared together, 
as did (4b) and (5c), and so on.  See Appendix A for a full list of materials.   
(5a) Over the summer, the writer photographed the college after he had received an 
official invitation.  (Literal-Familiar) 
(5b) Over the summer, the writer photographed the pyramid after he had received an 
official invitation. (Literal-Unfamiliar) 
(5c) Over the summer, the writer offended the college after he had bribed some crooked 
officials. (Metonymic-Familiar) 
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(5d) Over the summer, the writer offended the pyramid after he had bribed some crooked 
officials. (Metonymic-Unfamiliar) 
 The critical nouns we used (e.g., college versus pyramid) came directly from Frisson and 
Pickering (1999), who had carefully balanced them for frequency and length.  Likewise, we 
selected verbs for the literal and metonymic contexts that did not differ significantly in 
frequency, t(30) = 1.17, p > .24 (SUBTLEXus database, Brysbaert & New, 2009), and that were 
identical in length.  Frisson and Pickering had demonstrated that there were no differences in 
average frequencies of the literal and figurative senses of the familiar metonyms.  
 Plausibility norming.  To test for differences in plausibility among the four conditions, 
we presented the stimuli from Experiment 1 up to and including the critical noun (e.g., Over the 
summer, the writer photographed the college.) to 20 participants who did not participate in the 
eye-tracking experiment.  There were four versions of each list that were counterbalanced into 
the same lists used for the eye-tracking experiment.  Each list also contained filler sentences.  
Participants were instructed to indicate how likely they believed the events described by the 
sentence were on a scale from 1 (highly unlikely) to 7 (highly likely).  Each participant saw the 
sentences in a different random order.  The mean ratings for each condition were 5.5 (Literal-
Familiar), 5.5 (Literal-Unfamiliar), 4.7 (Metonymic-Familiar), and 2.4 (Metonymic-Unfamiliar).  
All pairwise comparisons differed significantly from each other except for the two Literal 
conditions, all ts > 2.6, all ps < .05.  This pattern of plausibility results is identical to the pattern 
obtained by Frisson and Pickering (1999).  Although the Literal-Familiar and Metonymic-
Familiar conditions were significantly different from one another, the magnitude of this 
difference was quite small, especially compared to the larger difference between the Metonymic-
Familiar and Metonymic-Unfamiliar conditions (see also Footnote 6). 
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 Predictability.  A group of 16 participants, none of whom participated in any other aspect 
of the study, were presented with the stimuli from Experiment 1 up to and including the 
determiner before the critical noun (e.g., Over the summer, the writer photographed the …) and 
were instructed to complete each fragment.  The fragments were presented in one of four 
possible orderings.  Participants’ responses were then compared with the actual experimental 
stimuli to assess how predictable the critical words were.  The percentages of responses that 
matched the critical words were extremely low across all conditions:  0.4% (Literal-Familiar), 
0.4% (Literal-Unfamiliar), 1.2% (Metonymic-Familiar), and 0% (Metonymic-Unfamiliar). 
Procedure.  Participants’ eye movements were recorded with an EyeLink 1000 system 
(SR Research) at a sampling rate of 1000 Hz with a headrest used to minimize movement.  At 
the start of each trial, a fixation point was presented near the left edge of the monitor, marking 
the location where the first word of the sentence would appear.  When the participant fixated this 
point, the experimenter pressed a button that replaced the fixation point with the sentence.  After 
reading the sentence, the participant pressed a key, which made the sentence disappear and a 
true-false comprehension question appear.  Participants pressed one key to answer “true,” and 
another key to answer “false.”  A comprehension question followed every sentence. 
Each experimental session began with four filler sentences.  After this warm-up block, 
the remaining 120 sentences were presented in a different random order for each participant.   
Analysis.  Data analysis focused on four standard eye-movement measures.  Gaze 
duration is the sum of all initial fixations on a region; it begins when the region is first fixated 
and ends when gaze is directed away from the region, either to the left or right.  Right-bounded 
reading time (also called quasi-first pass time) is similar to gaze duration, except it ends when 
gaze is directed away from the region to the right.  This measure is not discussed as often as the 
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others reported here, but it has nevertheless been used in several eye-tracking while reading 
studies (e.g., Betancort, Carreiras, & Sturt, 2009; Gordon, Hendrick, Johnson, & Lee, 2006; Lee, 
Lee, & Gordon, 2007; Traxler et al., 2002).  Regression-path duration (also called go-past time) 
is the sum of all fixations beginning with the initial fixation on a region and ending when the 
gaze is directed away from the region to the right.  Thus, regression-path duration includes right-
bounded reading time, but also includes any regressive fixations to earlier parts of the sentence.  
Total time is the sum of all fixations on a word or region.  For our analyses of these measures, we 
excluded 0-ms times, which occur when a critical region is skipped during first pass (e.g., 
Frisson & Pickering, 1999; Pickering & Traxler, 1998, 2001).  Throughout the paper, we use 
gaze duration to assess the earliest stages of processing, right-bounded reading time and 
regression-path duration to assess intermediate stages of processing, and total time to assess 
global processing difficulty. 
We report reading times for three regions of interest.  The prenoun region consisted of 
the subject of the sentence (bare noun only) and the main verb (e.g., journalist 
photographed/journalist offended).  The critical NP consisted of the target word along with the 
determiner (e.g., the college/the pyramid).  The postnoun region consisted of the three words 
following the critical NP in most cases (e.g., after he had).  Note that these words are the same 
across the literal and metonymic conditions.   In four of our item sets, only two words remained 
constant between conditions.  Following Frisson and Pickering (1999), the postnoun region for 
those items consisted of only those two words.  When two or more consecutive regions were 
skipped during first pass, the trial was excluded.  
An automatic procedure in the Eyelink software combined fixations that were shorter 
than 80 ms and within one character of another fixation into one fixation.  Additional fixations 
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shorter than 80 ms and longer than 1,000 ms were removed.  For all reading-time measures, we 
set minimum cutoff values at 120 ms.  Maximum cutoff values were set at 1,500 ms for gaze 
duration and 3,000 ms for all other measures (for similar approaches see, e.g., Frisson & 
McElree, 2008; Frisson & Pickering, 2007; McElree et al., 2006; Tooley, Traxler, & Swaab, 
2009; Traxler, 2009; Traxler & Tooley, 2008).  This procedure eliminated 1.6% of the data. 
Results 
Comprehension-question accuracy.  Mean comprehension-question accuracies for each 
condition were as follows: Literal-Familiar (97%), Literal-Unfamiliar (95%), Metonymic-
Familiar (94%), Metonymic-Unfamiliar (90%).  Because these values were all extremely close to 
the upper limit of the distribution, the data were arcsine-transformed prior to calculation of 
inferential statistics (Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003; for a similar approach, see, e.g., 
Johnson, Lowder, & Gordon, 2011).  The analysis revealed a main effect of context that was 
only significant in the subject analysis, F1(1, 27) = 8.60, MSE = .10, p < .01; F2(1, 31) = 2.32, 
MSE = .30, p > .13.  Although this difference was unexpected, we do not attribute it to 
differences in the processing of literal versus figurative expressions.  Rather, it is important to 
note that the comprehension questions following sentences in the literal condition were different 
from the questions following sentences in the metonymic condition due to the differences in 
sentence frames.  Furthermore, the questions following sentences in the metonymic condition 
never probed the reader’s interpretation of the critical word.  For example, the question following 
(5c) and (5d) was, “True or False: The writer was of the highest morals.”  It thus seems possible 
that differences in the difficulty of the questions between the literal and figurative conditions are 
responsible for the slight differences in accuracy.  However, because this effect did not approach 
significance in the item analysis and because accuracy was very high across all conditions, we do 
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not place much weight on this finding.  The main effect of metonym familiarity and the 
interaction between context and familiarity were not significant.   
Prenoun region.  Mean reading times for the three regions of interest are displayed in 
Table 4.  Reading times from all trials were included, regardless of whether the comprehension 
question was answered correctly.  No statistically significant main effects or interactions were 
observed in the prenoun region for gaze duration, right-bounded reading time, or regression-path 
duration, demonstrating that processing difficulty for the four conditions did not differ prior to 
encountering the critical NP.   
In contrast, the prenoun region showed a robust main effect of context for total time, such 
that there were longer reading times on the prenoun region for the metonymic contexts compared 
to the literal contexts, F1(1, 27) = 26.91, MSE = 20,276, p < .001; F2(1, 31) = 19.52, MSE = 
29,707, p < .001.  There was no main effect of metonym familiarity, F1(1, 27) = 1.94, MSE = 
46,948, p > .15; F2(1, 31) = 1.16, MSE = 62,835, p > .25, nor was there any evidence of a 
context-by-familiarity interaction, F1(1, 27) < 1; F2(1, 31) < 1.  This pattern suggests that readers 
experienced processing difficulty when they encountered a noun that had to be interpreted 
figuratively, causing them to go back and reread earlier parts of the sentence.   
Critical NP.  Measures assessing early and intermediate stages of processing on the 
critical NP showed that metonyms were more difficult to process than literal expressions, 
regardless of metonym familiarity.  Analysis of gaze duration on the critical NP revealed a 
significant main effect of context, F1(1, 27) = 8.77, MSE = 3,526, p < .01; F2(1, 31) = 5.91, MSE 
= 5,922, p < .05, with longer reading times for the metonymic contexts compared to the literal 
contexts.  There was no main effect of metonym familiarity, F1(1, 27) < 1; F2(1, 31) < 1, nor was 
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there a context-by-familiarity interaction, F1(1, 27) = 1.19, MSE = 3,906, p > .28; F2(1, 31) = 
1.13, MSE = 6,716, p > .29.   
Table 4 
Results of Experiment 1. 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Measure (in milliseconds)     Prenoun region      Critical NP  Postnoun region 
     Literal-Familiar       journalist photographed        the college                after he had 
     Literal-Unfamiliar      journalist photographed     the pyramid     after he had 
     Metonymic-Familiar       journalist offended      the college      after he had 
     Metonymic-Unfamiliar   journalist offended     the pyramid     after he had 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Gaze duration   
     Literal-Familiar  543        363                   377 
     Literal-Unfamiliar  558        369           385 
     Metonymic-Familiar 546        409                     400 
     Metonymic-Unfamiliar 517        390                   389 
 
Right-bounded reading time 
     Literal-Familiar  596        459           435 
     Literal-Unfamiliar  641        444           416 
     Metonymic-Familiar 607        504           450 
     Metonymic-Unfamiliar 606        505           483 
 
Regression-path duration 
     Literal-Familiar  642        588           568 
     Literal-Unfamiliar  676        548           469 
     Metonymic-Familiar 649        636           547 
     Metonymic-Unfamiliar 654        661           613  
   
Total time 
     Literal-Familiar  1,086        709           632 
     Literal-Unfamiliar  1,119        702           661 
     Metonymic-Familiar 1,201        749           655 
     Metonymic-Unfamiliar 1,283        918            705  
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Note.  NP = noun phrase. 
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The main effect of context was also significant in both right-bounded reading time, F1(1, 
27) = 10.04, MSE = 7,934, p < .005; F2(1, 31) = 5.40, MSE = 14,024, p < .05, and in regression-
path duration, F1(1, 27) = 5.80, MSE = 31,365, p < .05; F2(1, 31) = 6.30, MSE = 27,093, p < .05.  
These two measures showed no main effects of metonym familiarity and no context-by-
familiarity interaction, all Fs < 1.2.  Thus, analysis of gaze duration, right-bounded reading time, 
and regression-path duration at the critical NP all suggest greater processing difficulty when the 
critical NP appeared in a metonymic context compared to a literal context, and there was no 
evidence that familiar metonyms were easier to process than unfamiliar metonyms.
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In contrast, analysis of total time on the critical NP revealed a significant context-by-
familiarity interaction, F1(1, 27) = 12.27, MSE = 17,169, p < .005; F2(1, 31) = 7.78, MSE = 
26,210, p < .01.  Follow-up analyses with planned comparisons showed that the Metonymic-
Unfamiliar condition was more difficult than the Literal-Unfamiliar condition, t1(27) = 5.64, p < 
.001; t2(31) = 5.31, p < .001, but that there was no difference between the Metonymic-Familiar 
condition and the Literal-Familiar condition, t1(27) = 1.23, p > .20; t2(31) = 1.19, p > .20. 
Postnoun region.  No statistically significant main effects or interactions were observed 
for gaze duration in the postnoun region.  Analysis of right-bounded reading time in the postnoun 
region revealed a significant main effect of context, F1(1, 27) = 7.84, MSE = 6,028, p < .01; F2(1, 
31) = 6.90, MSE = 9,479, p < .05 and a marginally significant context-by-familiarity interaction, 
F1(1, 27) = 3.33, MSE = 5,847, p < .08; F2(1, 31) = 3.89, MSE = 7,998, p < .06.  The context-by-
familiarity interaction was fully significant for regression-path duration, F1(1, 27) = 8.23, MSE = 
                                                          
6
 To determine whether the greater processing difficulty associated with familiar metonyms compared to literal 
expressions could be explained by plausibility differences between these two conditions, we correlated the 
difference in reading times between items in the Metonymic-Familiar and Literal-Familiar conditions with the 
difference in their plausibility ratings.  This correlation was performed for all regions of interest on every eye-
tracking measure that showed an effect of context.  There was no indication that plausibility differences had any 
influence on reading times, all rs < .18, all ps > .32. 
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23,113, p < .01; F2(1, 31) = 6.71, MSE = 32,664, p < .05.  Planned comparisons showed that the 
Metonymic-Unfamiliar condition was more difficult than the Literal-Unfamiliar condition, t1(27) 
= 4.12, p < .001; t2(31) = 3.51, p < .005, but that there was no difference between the 
Metonymic-Familiar condition and the Literal-Familiar condition, t1(27) < 1; t2(31) = < 1.  For 
total time on the postnoun region, there was a main effect of metonym familiarity that was 
significant only in the subjects analysis, F1(1, 27) = 4.44, MSE = 9,878, p < .05; F2(1, 31) = 2.66, 
MSE = 19,544, p > .10.  There was no significant main effect of context, F1(1, 27) = 2.11, MSE = 
14,464, p > .15; F2(1, 31) = 1.99, MSE = 24,605, p > .15, nor was there a context-by-familiarity 
interaction, F1(1, 27) < 1; F2(1, 31) < 1.   
Discussion 
 The results of Experiment 1 show that both familiar and unfamiliar metonyms cause 
processing difficulty, but that the difficulty caused by unfamiliar metonyms is more prolonged 
than that for familiar metonyms.  Measures reflecting early and intermediate stages of processing 
(gaze duration, right-bounded reading time, and regression-path duration) on the critical NP 
showed that figurative expressions were more difficult than literal expressions, regardless of the 
familiarity of the metonym.  The greater overall difficulty for figurative expressions over literal 
expressions persisted in right-bounded reading time on the postnoun region, and total time on the 
prenoun region.   
We also found evidence that the Metonymic-Unfamiliar condition (e.g., offended the 
pyramid) was more difficult than the Metonymic-Familiar condition (e.g., offended the college); 
however, this effect did not emerge until relatively late in the eye-tracking record (regression-
path duration on the postnoun region and total time on the critical NP).  This pattern contrasts 
with the results reported by Frisson and Pickering (1999), who demonstrated that greater 
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difficulty processing their Metonymic-Unfamiliar condition (e.g., rejected by the pyramid) 
compared to their Metonymic-Familiar condition (e.g., rejected by the college) emerged early 
(i.e., in gaze duration on the critical NP).   
The overall pattern of the results of Experiment 1 is consistent with the indirect-access 
model of figurative-language processing.  According to this model, the literal meaning of a 
figurative expression is always accessed before the figurative meaning, which results in early 
processing difficulty when a metonym is first encountered—even if the figurative meaning of the 
metonym is well-established.  However, the model also predicts that readers should experience 
longer-lasting difficulty with an unfamiliar metonym compared to a familiar metonym (Frisson 
& Pickering, 1999).  Presumably this occurs because whereas the figurative sense of a familiar 
metonym can be selected among its various possible meanings, the figurative sense of an 
unfamiliar metonym must be created, which requires additional processing time.   
We propose that the discrepant findings between the current study and Frisson and 
Pickering (1999) can be explained by taking sentence structure into consideration.  Whereas the 
critical NPs in our Experiment 1 always appeared as an argument of the main verb of the 
sentence, the critical NPs used by Frisson and Pickering varied in their syntactic role, sometimes 
occurring as an argument of the verb, but more often appearing as part of an adjunct phrase, 
which may have reduced the processing difficulty associated with the metonym.  We believe that 
this occurs because the structure of our sentences focused the reader’s attention on this 
noncanonical semantic relationship, leading to deeper interpretation compared to a sentence 
where the metonym and the verb, while related in the sentence, have greater separation within 
the structure of the sentence.  This notion is consistent with Lowder and Gordon (2012), who 
showed that inanimate subject-verb integration is difficult when the subject is an argument of the 
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main verb of the sentence (e.g., the pistol injured), but that this difficulty is reduced when the 
verb is embedded in an adjunct phrase (e.g., the pistol that injured).  This latter finding of 
Lowder and Gordon leads to the prediction that metonymic processing difficulty should be 
reduced when the metonym appears as part of an adjunct phrase compared to when it is an 
argument.   
Experiment 2 
 Experiment 2 tested the hypothesis of Lowder and Gordon (2012) that sentence structure 
guides the depth to which readers interpret meaningful relations between parts of sentences by 
examining whether the processing difficulty found in Experiment 1 for familiar metonyms would 
be reduced when they appeared as part of an adjunct phrase compared to when they appeared as 
an argument of the verb.  Specifically, Experiment 2 examined the processing of sentences like 
those presented in (6).  A comparison of (6c) versus (6d) provides a test of the hypothesis that 
metonymic processing depends on sentence structure.  Support for this hypothesis would help 
reconcile conflicting results on whether there is a processing cost associated with interpretation 
of metonyms (Frisson & Pickering, 1999, 2007; Ghio et al., 2012; Gibbs, 1990; Humphrey et al., 
2004; McElree et al., 2006; Rapp et al., 2011; Weiland et al., 2012).  In addition Experiment 2 
tested whether interpreting familiar metonyms imposes a processing cost when compared to a 
different baseline.  Whereas place-for-institution metonyms (e.g., offended the college) refer 
indirectly to people (e.g., the individuals who make up the administration of the college), these 
metonyms can be substituted with an NP that refers directly to a person or a group of people 
(e.g., offended the leader; see 6a and 6b).  This comparison offers an additional test of models of 
figurative-language processing.  Again, whereas the indirect-access model predicts that readers 
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will encounter difficulty with a metonymic expression compared to a literal expression, the 
direct-access model instead predicts that there should be no difference. 
(6a) Sometime in August, the journalist offended the leader after he had published that 
negative article.  (Person-Argument) 
(6b) Sometime in August, the journalist offended the honor of the leader after he had 
published that negative article. (Person-Adjunct) 
(6c) Sometime in August, the journalist offended the college after he had bribed some 
crooked officials. (Metonym-Argument) 
(6d) Sometime in August, the journalist offended the honor of the college after he had 
bribed some crooked officials. (Metonym-Adjunct) 
It should be noted that our manipulation of sentence structure also introduces changes in 
the semantic content of the sentences in the Argument conditions compared to the Adjunct 
conditions.  That is, whereas all conditions contain a verb (e.g., offended) that indicates the need 
for an animate patient or an entity that can be interpreted as having animate qualities, the 
Adjunct conditions also contain an additional content word (e.g., honor) that may further cue the 
reader that the target word should be interpreted as an animate entity.  We return to this issue in 
the Discussion. 
Method 
 Participants.  Forty-four students at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill 
participated in this experiment in exchange for course credit.  They were all native English 
speakers and had normal or corrected-to-normal vision.   
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 Materials.  Each participant was presented with 32 experimental sentences and 92 filler 
sentences.  The experimental sentences were modified versions of the experimental sentences 
used in Experiment 1.  See (6) for an example.  The critical NPs for the metonymic condition 
were the same familiar metonyms as those used in Experiment 1 (e.g., the college).  In addition 
to the metonymic condition, we introduced a condition that directly named a person (e.g., the 
leader).  The critical NPs could appear as the object of the verb, as in Experiment 1, or as part of 
an adjunct phrase.  The adjunct condition was constructed by selecting a new NP that could serve 
as the object of the verb and that could be attributed either to a person or to an institution via a 
prepositional phrase (e.g., the honor of the leader or the honor of the college).  The initial 
locative phrase and sentence subject were the same as in Experiment 1.  In most cases, the 
postnoun region of the sentence was the same as in Experiment 1, but modifications had to be 
made in some cases to keep the sentence coherent.  See Appendix B for a full list of materials.  
The critical nouns used for the person condition (e.g., leader) versus the metonymic condition 
(e.g., college) did not differ in frequency, t(30) < 1 (SUBTLEXus database, Brysbaert & New, 
2009) or length, t(30) < 1. 
 Plausibility norming.  As in Experiment 1, we collected plausibility ratings for the items 
used in Experiment 2.  Twenty participants who did not participate in any other portion of this 
study were presented with the critical sentences up to and including the critical noun.  There 
were four versions of each list that matched the counterbalancing used for the eye-tracking 
experiment.  Each list also contained filler sentences.  Participants were instructed to indicate 
how likely they believed the events described by the sentence were on a scale from 1 (highly 
unlikely) to 7 (highly likely).  Each participant saw the sentences in a different random order.  
The mean ratings for each condition were 5.4 (Person-Argument), 5.3 (Person-Adjunct), 5.3 
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(Metonym-Argument), and 5.3 (Metonym-Adjunct).  There were no significant differences 
between any condition, all ts < 1.2, all ps > .25.  Thus, any differences in reading times between 
sentences with people NPs versus metonyms and any influence of sentence structure on these 
reading times cannot be attributed to differences in plausibility. 
Predictability.  The stimuli from Experiment 2 were assessed for predictability of the 
critical noun just as described in Experiment 1.  Sixteen participants provided sentence 
completions.  As in Experiment 1, the percentages of responses that matched the critical words 
were extremely low across all conditions:  2.7% (Person-Argument), 1.6% (Person-Adjunct), 
0.8% (Metonym-Argument), and 1.6% (Metonym-Adjunct). 
 Procedure.  All aspects of the eye-tracking procedure were identical to Experiment 1. 
 Analysis.  As in Experiment 1, data analysis of Experiment 2 focused on measures of 
gaze duration, right-bounded reading time, regression-path duration, and total time.  We defined 
three regions of interest—the prenoun region, critical NP, and postnoun region—just as we did in 
Experiment 1.  Finally, we employed the same data-exclusion criteria that were adopted in 
Experiment 1, again eliminating 1.6% of the data. 
Results 
Comprehension-question accuracy.  Mean comprehension-question accuracies for each 
condition were as follows: Person-Argument (95%), Person-Adjunct (95%), Metonym-Argument 
(94%), Metonym-Adjunct (93%).  As in Experiment 2, data were arcsine-transformed before 
calculating inferential statistics.  There were no significant main effects or interactions. 
Prenoun region.  Mean reading times for the three regions of interest are displayed in 
Table 5.  Reading times from all trials were included, regardless of whether the comprehension 
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question was answered correctly.  No statistically significant main effects or interactions were 
observed in the prenoun region for gaze duration, right-bounded reading time, or regression-path 
duration, demonstrating that processing difficulty for the four conditions did not differ prior to 
encountering the critical NP.   
In contrast, there was a main effect of NP type for total time that was significant in the 
subject analysis and marginal in the item analysis, F1(1, 43) = 7.56, MSE = 22,131, p < .01; F2(1, 
31) = 3.16, MSE = 43,626, p < .09, indicating that there were longer reading times on the 
prenoun region when the critical NP was a metonym compared to when it was a person.  There 
was no main effect of sentence structure, F1(1, 43) = 1.67, MSE = 28,403, p > .20; F2(1, 31) = 
2.26, MSE = 17,095, p > .14, nor was there an interaction between NP type and sentence 
structure, F1(1, 43) = 1.22, MSE = 29,218, p > .25; F2(1, 31) = 1.56, MSE = 19,425, p > .20. 
Critical NP.  Analysis of gaze duration on the critical NP revealed no significant main 
effects or interactions, all ps > .10.  
There was a main effect of NP type in right-bounded reading time, F1(1, 43) = 20.73, 
MSE = 5,946, p < .001; F2(1, 31) = 5.67, MSE = 16,560, p < .05,with longer reading times on 
metonymic NPs compared to NPs that named people.  The main effect of sentence structure was 
not significant, F1(1, 43) < 1; F2(1, 31) < 1.  However, the interaction between NP type and 
sentence structure was marginally significant in the subject analysis and fully significant in the 
item analysis, F1(1, 43) = 2.70, MSE = 6,746, p = .10; F2(1, 31) = 5.56, MSE = 2,785, p < .05.  
Follow-up comparisons revealed that metonymic NPs were more difficult to process than people 
NPs when they appeared as an argument of the verb, t1(43) = 5.24, p < .001; t2(31) = 3.04, p < 
.01, but that there was no difference when the critical NP appeared as part of an adjunct phrase, 
t1(43) = 1.67, p > .10; t2(31) = 1.33, p > .19.   
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Table 5 
Results of Experiment 2. 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Measure (in milliseconds)     Prenoun region     Critical NP      Postnoun region 
     Person-Argument        journalist offended      the leader         after he had 
     Person-Adjunct            journalist offended  (the honor of)   the leader          after he had 
     Metonym-Argument    journalist offended         the college          after he had 
     Metonym-Adjunct       journalist offended  (the honor of)   the college          after he had 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Gaze duration   
     Person-Argument       520               341          404  
     Person-Adjunct       522             349            368  
     Metonym-Argument       536                    362     378 
     Metonym-Adjunct       551                    364          376 
 
Right-bounded reading time 
     Person-Argument       620                    398     439 
     Person-Adjunct       620                    411     408  
     Metonym-Argument      635                    471     462 
     Metonym-Adjunct       645             444     429 
 
Regression-path duration 
     Person-Argument       664                    515     481 
     Person-Adjunct       661                    583     476  
     Metonym-Argument      670                    585     570  
     Metonym-Adjunct       699             590     477 
 
Total time 
     Person-Argument       1,032                   597     629 
     Person-Adjunct       1,093                   602     590 
     Metonym-Argument      1,122                   724     677 
     Metonym-Adjunct       1,126            669     601 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Note.  NP = noun phrase. 
Regression-path duration on the critical NP did not show significant main effects of 
sentence structure or NP type.  Again, however, the interaction between these two factors was 
significant in the item analysis, F1(1, 43) = 1.77, MSE = 25,147, p > .15; F2(1, 31) = 4.95, MSE = 
10,778, p < .05.  Follow-up contrasts again showed that metonymic NPs were more difficult to 
process than people NPs when they appeared as an argument of the verb, t1(43) = 2.21, p < .05; 
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t2(31) = 2.01, p = .05, but that there was no difference when the critical NP appeared as part of 
an adjunct phrase, ts < 1. 
Analysis of total time on the critical NP revealed a robust effect of NP type, such that 
metonymic NPs were more difficult than people NPs, F1(1, 43) = 35.49, MSE = 11,686, p < .001; 
F2(1, 31) = 8.21, MSE = 38,248, p < .01.  Once again, there was a marginally significant 
interaction between NP type and sentence structure, F1(1, 43) = 2.89, MSE = 13,383, p < .10; 
F2(1, 31) = 3.35, MSE = 8,923, p < .08.  Metonymic NPs were more difficult than people NPs 
regardless of whether the NP appeared as an argument of the verb, t1(43) = 4.71, p < .001; t2(31) 
= 3.08, p < .005, or as part of an adjunct, t1(43) = 3.31, p < .005; t2(31) = 2.00, p = .05.  In 
contrast, there was evidence (in the subject analysis) that metonymic NPs were more difficult as 
arguments than adjuncts, t1(43) = 2.10, p < .05; t2(31) = 1.46, p > .15, but there was no such 
difference for people NPs, ts < 1. 
Thus, measures of right-bounded reading time and total time on the critical NP showed 
main effects of NP type such that familiar metonyms were more difficult to process than NPs 
that named people.  These main effects were qualified by interactions in measures of right-
bounded reading time, regression-path duration, and total time on this region showing that 
metonyms were more difficult to process when they appeared as the argument of the verb than 
when they appeared as part of an adjunct phrase, but that there was no such effect of sentence 
structure on the processing of people NPs. 
Postnoun region. Analysis of gaze duration on the postnoun region revealed a main effect 
of sentence structure (marginal in the item analysis), F1(1, 43) = 4.15, MSE = 3.782, p < .05; 
F2(1, 31) = 3.46, MSE = 5,821, p < .08, with longer reading times on arguments than adjuncts.  
There was no main effect of NP type; however, the interaction between NP type and sentence 
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structure was marginally significant in the subject analysis, F1(1, 43) = 3.52, MSE = 3,911, p < 
.07; F2(1, 31) < 1.  This pattern was driven by longer gaze durations in the condition where a 
person NP appeared as an argument of the verb, relative to the other three conditions.
7
 
Right-bounded reading time showed a main effect of sentence structure on the postnoun 
region, such that arguments were overall more difficult than adjuncts, F1(1, 43) = 6.01, MSE = 
7,622, p < .05; F2(1, 31) = 5.16, MSE = 8,535, p < .05.  The main effect of NP type and the 
interaction between NP type and sentence structure were not significant. 
There was a fully significant interaction between NP type and sentence structure in 
regression-path duration on the postnoun region, F1(1, 43) = 4.29, MSE = 19,457, p < .05; F2(1, 
31) = 4.25, MSE = 15,445, p < .05.  Follow-up contrasts revealed that metonymic NPs were more 
difficult to process than people NPs when they appeared as the object of the verb, t1(43) = 2.62, p 
< .05; t2(31) = 2.87, p < .01, but not when they appeared as part of an adjunct phrase, ts < 1.  
Furthermore, metonymic NPs were more difficult to process as arguments than adjuncts, t1(43) = 
2.81, p < .01; t2(31) = 2.86, p < .01, whereas there was no such difference for people NPs, ts < 1.  
                                                          
7 The pattern observed on this gaze-duration measure is reversed when the more encompassing measure of 
regression-path duration is explored, a change which suggests differences across conditions in the likelihood that the 
eyes moved forward after first-pass reading of the postnoun region.  This suggestion was born out by the finding that 
the proportion of trials with first-pass regressions from this region was lowest in the Person-Argument condition 
(i.e., 9%, compared with 21%, 11%, and 14% in the Metonym-Argument, Person-Adjunct, and Metonym-Adjunct 
conditions, respectively).  Further, both the number of first-pass fixations on the postnoun region and their summed 
durations were greater on trials followed by progressive saccades than by regressive saccades [number of fixations: 
F1(1, 43) = 27.36, MSE = 0.55, p < .001; F2(1, 31) = 68.74, MSE = 0.21, p < .001;  gaze duration: F1(1, 43) = 13.88, 
MSE = 44,479, p < .01; F2(1, 31) = 40.62, MSE =16,054, p < .001].  This difference is readily explained as due to 
readers prematurely terminating their first-pass reading of the postnoun region in order to return to an earlier region 
of text when they experienced difficulty understanding the meaning of those earlier regions.  This difficulty was 
least likely to be experienced in the Person-Argument condition, which could have the paradoxical effect of 
elevating average gaze durations for that region relative to the others.  This account was tested by analyzing gaze 
duration on the postnoun region only for those trials where the eyes progressed after first-pass reading of the 
postnoun region.  Restricting the analysis in this way completely eliminated the interaction between NP type and 
sentence structure, F1(1, 43) < 1; F2(1, 31) < 1. 
 We also analyzed skipping rates on the critical NP to examine the possibility that the longer gaze durations 
in the postnoun region for the Person-Argument condition may have been the result of different fixation patterns for 
this condition compared to the other conditions.  Skipping rates were as follows: Person-Argument (2%), Metonym-
Argument (3%), Person-Adjunct (4%), Metonym-Adjunct (5%).  There were no significant main effects or 
interactions. 
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Thus, participants were more likely to experience processing difficulty in the region immediately 
following the critical NP when the NP was a metonym that appeared as an argument, compared 
to the other three conditions. 
Total time on the postnoun region showed a main effect of sentence structure, such that 
arguments were more difficult than adjuncts, F1(1, 43) = 11.17, MSE = 12,956, p < .005; F2(1, 
31) = 7.23, MSE = 15,984, p < .05.  The main effect of NP type and the interaction between NP 
type and sentence structure were not significant. 
Discussion 
 Experiment 2 replicated the finding from Experiment 1 that metonyms are harder to 
process than literal expressions.  Whereas Experiment 1 compared familiar metonyms that were 
used in their figurative sense (e.g., offended the college) versus their literal sense (e.g., 
photographed the college), Experiment 2 compared familiar metonyms to nouns that referred 
directly to people (e.g., offended the leader).   
Critically, Experiment 2 also demonstrated that the degree of processing difficulty 
depends on sentence structure.  Readers experienced greater difficulty with metonymic nouns 
than nouns that named people when the critical NP appeared as the object of the verb.  In 
contrast, when the critical NP appeared as part of an adjunct phrase, the processing difference 
between metonyms and people was reduced or eliminated completely.   There was evidence for 
this interaction effect on the critical NP itself in right-bounded reading time, regression-path 
duration, and total time; however, the effect was strongest in regression-path duration on the 
postnoun region, indicating a tendency for participants to experience greater processing difficulty 
for the Metonym-Argument condition than the other three conditions in the region immediately 
following the metonym and then spend extra time going back to reread earlier parts of the 
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sentence.  Our finding of reduced difficulty for the processing of metonyms that appear as part of 
an adjunct phrase is consistent with the pattern of effects predicted by a direct-access model of 
figurative-language processing.   
We propose that metonyms are especially difficult to process when they appear as the 
argument of a verb because this position is focused by the sentence structure.  Given the verb 
offended, the reader needs to understand who offended whom in order to obtain a basic 
understanding of the sentence.  In this case, the “whom” is an inanimate noun used 
metonymically (college), which requires a noncanonical interpretation, leading to extra 
processing.  In contrast, when the object of the verb is a noun that represents a human 
characteristic (honor), this becomes a focus of the sentence, whereas the adjunct phrase (of the 
college) is less important and thus is not processed as deeply.  As noted above, the Adjunct 
condition contained two sources of semantic information that pointed to the need to interpret the 
critical NP as having animate qualities (e.g., offended the honor of the college), whereas the 
Argument condition contained only one (e.g., offended the college).  It could be argued that this 
extra semantic material—not the difference in sentence structure—causes the reduction in 
processing difficulty.  Although the current experiment does not rule out this possibility, it is not 
obvious how the mere presence of two sources of semantic information should lead to easier 
processing.  In fact, it could also be argued that two sources of semantic information would have 
the opposite effect, leading the reader to more strongly expect an animate patient, thereby 
highlighting the incongruity of a metonymic target word rather than facilitating its figurative 
interpretation.  The presence of additional semantic material might aid figurative-language 
processing in cases where it helps identify the needed figurative interpretation rather than simply 
reinforcing the need for such an interpretation.  That sort of facilitation may be operating in the 
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Adjunct condition, where the structure of the sentence serves to direct the reader’s attention 
toward a particular feature of the metonym (e.g., honor), while deemphasizing the metonym 
itself.      
General Discussion 
 This study produced three main findings.  First, Experiment 1 showed that familiar 
metonyms are more difficult to process when they appear in a figurative context (e.g., offended 
the college) than when they appear in a literal context (e.g., photographed the college)—an 
effect that emerged early in the eye-tracking record.  Differences in the processing of familiar 
metonyms versus unfamiliar metonyms (e.g., offended the pyramid) did not emerge until late in 
the eye-tracking record.  Second, Experiment 2 showed that the difficulty associated with 
processing a familiar metonym (e.g., offended the college) also emerges when compared against 
a noun that explicitly names a person (e.g., offended the leader).  Finally, our results demonstrate 
that the difficulty of processing a familiar metonym was reduced when it appeared as part of an 
adjunct phrase (e.g., offended the honor of the college) compared to when it appeared as an 
argument of the verb.  These findings show that the pattern of performance predicted by the 
indirect-access model of figurative-language processing is found for metonyms that are 
arguments but that the pattern of performance predicted by the direct-access model of figurative-
language processing is found for metonyms that are adjuncts. 
  Findings on Metonymic Processing   
Previous research on the processing of metonymy has produced inconsistent results, with 
some studies showing that familiar metonyms are no more difficult to process than literal 
expressions and others showing that they are more difficult.  While these studies have employed 
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a variety of different methods and have used stimuli that differ on a number of dimensions, we 
believe that the moderating effect of sentence structure on metonymic processing offers a new 
perspective on how figurative language is processed and helps explain previous inconsistencies 
in the literature.  As discussed previously, Frisson and Pickering (1999) found only weak 
evidence that familiar metonyms (e.g., rejected by the college) are more difficult to process than 
literal expressions (e.g., stepped inside the college), but their target words sometimes appeared as 
an argument of the verb and sometimes appeared as part of an adjunct phrase.  The results of the 
current study suggest that the weak effects reported by Frisson and Pickering, and of other 
experiments using the same materials (Humphrey et al., 2004), might be due to structural 
variation within their materials.  In sentences where the critical word was an argument, 
metonymic interpretation may have been more difficult than literal interpretation, whereas it was 
not so in sentences where the critical word was an adjunct, with this second type of sentence 
structure diluting the impact of the first.  Variation in sentence structure might also account for 
the absence of differences in the processing of literal expressions and familiar place-for-event or 
producer-for-product metonyms (Frisson & Pickering, 1999, Experiment 2; Frisson & Pickering, 
2007).  In contrast, studies demonstrating greater difficulty in the processing of metonymic and 
literal expressions (Gibbs, 1990; Rapp et al., 2011; Weiland et al., 2012) have tended to use 
target nouns as arguments of the predicates that induced the metonymic or literal interpretation 
(e.g., The scalpel was sued for malpractice; The glove at third base has to be replaced; Gibbs, 
1990).   
Nonetheless, it is important to note that using the same method as the current studies, 
eye-tracking during reading, McElree et al. (2006) found no evidence of difficulty in 
comprehension of producer-for-product metonyms (e.g., The gentleman read Dickens…) as 
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compared to literal controls (e.g., The gentleman spotted Dickens…) even though the critical 
word consistently appeared as the object of the context-providing verb.  The discrepancy 
between this finding and those reported here is unlikely to be due to the use of different types of 
metonyms (producer-for-product versus place-for-institution) as studies using other methods 
have shown difficulty in processing producer-for-product metonyms that appear as arguments 
(Rapp et al., 2011; Weiland et al., 2012).  One possible explanation is that the discrepancy is due 
to greater difficulty in processing the literal sentences in McElree et al.’s study as compared to 
those reported here.  McElree et al.’s literal condition consisted of people interacting with 
famous deceased writers (e.g., The educated slave greeted Aristotle…; The retired professor 
welcomed Freud…), whereas those in the current study involved conventional action-place 
pairings (e.g., photographed the college; entered the academy; Experiment 1) or human role 
terms that matched the metonyms in length and frequency (offended the leader; addressed the 
secretary; Experiment 2).  Further research will be needed to determine whether this explanation 
is valid or whether the discrepancy has some other basis.  Though they found no evidence of 
difficulty in metonymic processing, McElree et al. did find greater difficulty when understanding 
required object-for-event coercion (e.g., The gentleman started Dickens…versus The gentleman 
read Dickens…).  Thus, the McElree et al. pattern of results presents a challenge to our proposal 
that comprehension of figurative language, whether it involves coercion or metonymy, is 
difficult because of the need to derive a noncanonical interpretation of a word that allows it to 
make sense in the context.  The degree of processing difficulty might vary with the type of 
figurative language or for particular expressions, but this processing difficulty should be present 
to some degree when the figurative expression appears as a sentential argument. 
Sentence Structure and Metonymic Processing 
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 Several psycholinguistic accounts have proposed that sentence structure is one important 
cue that helps guide language processing and indicates to the comprehender which elements of 
the sentence should be processed more deeply than others (e.g., Baker & Wagner, 1987; Ferreira 
et al., 2002; Gordon & Hendrick, 1998; Sanford & Sturt, 2002).  We have argued that the pairing 
of an inanimate subject with an action verb (e.g., the pistol injured) or the use of a metonym as 
the object of a verb (e.g., offended the college) cause processing difficulty because the structure 
of the sentence promotes deep interpretation of a verbal predicate in relation to its arguments, 
which in these examples requires a noncanonical semantic interpretation of the argument.  In 
particular, a verb such as offend typically requires an object that is human—capable of 
perceiving some wrongdoing and experiencing a negative emotional reaction.  When instead an 
inanimate place such as the college appears as the object, the comprehender must search for an 
alternate meaning of this word that satisfies the semantic requirements of the verb.  Accordingly, 
the comprehender comes to interpret the college not as a literal physical place, but rather as an 
institution made of humans who experienced offense.  Importantly, this search for an appropriate 
meaning of offended the college requires additional processing time in comparison to when the 
object is a human (e.g., offended the leader) or when the verb selects an argument that is 
consistent with the literal meaning of the metonym (e.g., photographed the college).  Similarly, 
honor can easily serve as the object of offended.  Although not animate per se, honor refers to a 
human value that can suffer offense.  Thus, in the phrase offended the honor of the college, the 
word honor becomes closely tied to the action offend, whereas of the college is a modifier of 
honor that is not tightly bound to the main verb of the sentence, and so it is processed less 
deeply.   
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In sum, we propose that syntactic structure is an important aspect of a sentence that 
guides processing and provides cues as to which constituents are more important than others.  
When the structure of the sentence places a metonym in a focused position, such as the object of 
the verb, the comprehender will experience enhanced semantic difficulty due to the need to 
derive a noncanonical interpretation of this word.  In contrast, adjunct phrases are not as 
important to the overall meaning of the sentence, and so a metonym in an adjunct phrase is 
typically not processed at a deep semantic level. 
We believe that there are several possible mechanisms that might account for this pattern 
of effects.  First, in line with Frisson and Pickering’s account (Frisson, 2009; Frisson & 
Pickering, 1999, 2001), it may be that when a metonym appears in an adjunct phrase the reader 
does not fully distinguish between literal and figurative interpretations initially, but rather adopts 
a semantically underspecified representation and, if necessary, selects the intended meaning at a 
later stage of processing.   Because the information contained in an adjunct phrase is seen as less 
important to the overall meaning of the sentence, it is possible that an underspecified 
interpretation is sufficient in most cases.  A second possibility is that explicit mention of a 
feature of the metonym (e.g., honor in offended the honor of the college) makes that feature 
particularly salient, thereby reducing focus on the metonym itself.  From this perspective, honor 
is a known but not usually a primary characteristic of a college.  By promoting this property to a 
prominent position in the sentence, the comprehender becomes particularly focused on this now-
salient aspect of college at the expense of processing the information in the adjunct.  Finally, the 
basic structure of an adjunct seems to indicate that the information it conveys is presupposed.  
That is, a phrase such as of the college implies that the college has already been brought into the 
discourse (i.e., is “given”) and is now appearing in the sentence simply to modify a new entity 
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(e.g., the honor).  The use of a definite rather than an indefinite article may further suggest that 
the critical word is presupposed; however, the definite article was also used in the Argument 
conditions.  Thus, any influence from the article indicating that the critical word was 
presupposed was consistent across all conditions.  We propose that the structure of the adjunct 
phrase is an additional source of information that may cue the reader that the information it 
conveys is presupposed, as it is being presented not as a focal point of the sentence, but rather as 
a modifier.  Underspecification of meaning, promotion of a relevant property, and presupposition 
are all ways that sentence structure may cause a noncanonical semantic interpretation to be 
processed less deeply.  These explanations are not necessarily mutually exclusive; each may 
explain some aspect of reduction in depth of processing. 
Conclusion 
Debates over how figurative language is processed have shifted from accounts where a 
literal interpretation must be accessed before a figurative interpretation (e.g., Clark & Lucy, 
1979; Grice, 1975; Janus & Bever, 1985; Searle, 1979) to accounts where familiar figurative 
expressions do not require extra processing effort (e.g., Gerrig & Healy, 1983; Gibbs, 1994; 
Gibbs & Gerrig, 1989; Gildea & Glucksberg, 1983; Glucksberg, 1991, 2003; Glucksberg et al., 
1982; Keysar, 1989; Inhoff et al., 1984; Ortony et al., 1978; Shinjo & Myers, 1987), with most of 
this research  investigating the processing of metaphor.  More recent studies investigating other 
types of language have provided growing evidence that figurative expressions often tend to be 
more difficult to process than literal expressions.  These include studies on the processing of 
idioms (Cacciari & Tabossi, 1988), proverbs (Honeck, Welge, & Temple, 1998; Temple & 
Honeck, 1999), and irony (Dews & Winner, 1999; Giora, Fein, & Schwartz, 1998; Filik & 
Moxey, 2010; Schwoebel, Dews, Winner, & Srinivas, 2000).  Even in the realm of metaphor, 
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several recent studies using electrophysiology have suggested that the processing of 
metaphorical expressions is more effortful than the processing of literal expressions (Coulson & 
Van Petten, 2002, 2007; De Grauwe, Swain, Holcomb, Ditman, & Kuperberg, 2010; Lai, Curran, 
& Menn, 2009; Tartter, Gomes, Dubrovsky, Molholm, & Stewart, 2002).  The results of the 
current study corroborate and extend these previous findings in demonstrating that metonyms—
both familiar and unfamiliar—are more difficult to process than literal expressions when they are 
arguments of the predicate that induces the metonymic interpretation.  Importantly, the difficulty 
associated with processing a familiar metonym was reduced when it appeared in a position that is 
less central to the structure of the sentence.  These findings indicate that sentence structure is a 
key factor to consider in developing psycholinguistic models that explain the processing of 
figurative language. 
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Transition to Chapter 4 
 
 As discussed above, the processing difficulty associated with integrating an inanimate 
subject with an action verb (e.g., The pistol injured the cowboy; Lowder & Gordon, 2012) could 
have multiple possible sources.  Expressions like these have been proposed to require a 
metonymic interpretation (Gibbs, 1990; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980), in which the inanimate object 
is used figuratively to refer to the person who was using the object (e.g., “The pistol” to refer to 
“The man who was carrying the pistol”).  However, other work has proposed that successful 
interpretation of these expressions requires a process of subject-type coercion (Pustejovsky, 
1995; Pustejovsky, Anick, & Bergler, 1993), in which the inanimate subject is type-shifted from 
an entity to an event (e.g., “The pistol” to refer to “Someone’s shooting of the pistol”).   
 Closely related to the notion of subject-type coercion is complement coercion, which has 
been described as a linguistic phenomenon which allows an event-selecting verb (e.g., begin, 
finish, enjoy) to combine with a complement NP that represents an entity (e.g., began the book) 
rather than an event (e.g., began the hike).  Many experiments implementing a wide array of 
methodologies have demonstrated that expressions requiring complement coercion are more 
difficult to process than a variety of controls (e.g., Kuperberg et al., 2010; McElree et al., 2001; 
Pylkkӓnen & McElree, 2007; Scheepers et al., 2008; Traxler et al., 2002).  Importantly, however, 
previous studies on the processing of complement coercion have only considered sentences in 
which the entity-denoting NP whose meaning must be coerced is the direct object of the event-
selecting verb (e.g., The author finished the book; The secretary began the memo).  Given that 
this sort of complex semantic construction has similarities to inanimate subject-verb integration 
and metonymy, it may also be the case that its processing difficulty is modulated in ways that are 
similar to what we have observed previously (Lowder & Gordon, 2012, 2013). 
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 In our previous work (Lowder & Gordon, 2012, 2013), we showed that inanimate 
subject-verb integration is difficult when the two constituents appear together in the same clause 
of a sentence (e.g., The sheriff that the pistol injured; The pistol injured the cowboy) but that this 
difficulty is reduced when the subject and target verb appear in separate clauses (e.g., The pistol 
that injured the cowboy).  Similarly, we showed that the figurative sense of a metonym is 
difficult to process when it appears as the object of the context-inducing verb (e.g., The 
journalist offended the college) but that this difficulty is reduced when the metonym appears as 
part of an adjunct phrase (e.g., The journalist offended the honor of the college).  In Lowder and 
Gordon (under review), we investigate whether sentence structure moderates the magnitude of 
the coercion cost in the same way that it moderates the processing difficulty associated with 
these other types of complex semantic expressions.  In addition, we test whether the effect of 
sentence structure on the magnitude of the coercion cost depends on structural emphasis or 
deemphasis of specific constituents or on the structural relationship between the critical linguistic 
elements that require complex semantic interpretation.    
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CHAPTER 4:  Lowder and Gordon (under review) 
 
Sometimes the intended meaning of a sentence cannot be composed from the meanings 
of its words and the syntactic relations between them but instead must be attained in a less well 
specified manner such as adopting a figurative interpretation.  Psycholinguists have extensively 
debated how the processing of such semantically complex expressions is related to the processing 
of more literal language.  An early account of figurative-language processing was the standard 
pragmatic model (Grice, 1975; Searle, 1979), which was characterized by psycholinguists as an 
indirect-access model (e.g., Clark & Lucy, 1975; Janus & Bever, 1985; for reviews, see 
Glucksberg, 1991, 2001, 2003).  According to the indirect-access model, the processing of 
semantically complex expressions involves the following steps: (1) the comprehender computes 
the literal meaning of an expression using the stored meanings of lexical entries; (2) the 
comprehender determines whether the literal meaning of the expression seems appropriate in the 
broader sentence context or whether it instead seems “defective” (Searle, 1979); and (3) if the 
literal meaning is defective, the comprehender searches for an alternative meaning.  The indirect 
access model thus predicts longer processing times for nonliteral or noncanonical expressions, 
compared to literal expressions.    
Although the indirect-access model received some early empirical support, later studies 
found that semantically complex meanings can be computed rapidly given a sufficiently 
supportive context (Gerrig & Healy, 1983; Frisson & Pickering, 1999; Inhoff, Lima, & Carroll, 
1984; Ortony, Schallert, Reynolds, & Antos, 1978; Shinjo & Myers, 1987) and in some cases 
may be activated before a literal interpretation (Gildea & Glucksberg, 1983; Glucksberg, Gildea, 
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& Bookin, 1982; Keysar, 1989).  Given these findings, the indirect-access model was challenged 
by a direct-access model (Gibbs, 1994; Gibbs & Gerrig, 1989; Glucksberg, 1991, 2003), 
according to which comprehenders use contextual information to immediately select the intended 
meaning of a word or expression, so that priority in processing is not necessarily given to either 
the literal or semantically complex interpretation.  While these findings led many psycholinguists 
to see the indirect-access model as discredited, a number of studies investigating a variety of 
figurative language forms have continued to produce patterns of results that are consistent with 
its prediction that semantically complex expressions should take more time to process than literal 
expressions (e.g., Coulson & Van Petten, 2002, 2007; De Grauwe, Swain, Holcomb, Ditman, & 
Kuperberg, 2010; Dews & Winner, 1999; Filik & Moxey, 2010; Giora, Fein, & Schwartz, 1998; 
Honeck, Welge, & Temple, 1998; Lai, Curran, & Menn, 2009; Lowder & Gordon, 2012, 2013; 
Schwoebel, Dews, Winner, & Srinivas, 2000; Tartter, Gomes, Dubrovsky, Molholm, & Stewart, 
2002; Temple & Honeck, 1999).  These findings indicate that evidence about processing time 
does not necessarily lead to a rejection of the indirect-access model (cf. Gluscksberg, 1991, 
2003), though they do leave open the possibility that other mechanisms might account for the 
effects.  Further, the key features of the indirect-access model have been incorporated into 
explanations of a different type of semantic complexity – complement coercion.    
Complement Coercion 
Complement coercion occurs when a verb that requires an event-denoting complement 
(e.g., began, finish, enjoy) is paired with a noun phrase (NP) that refers to an object or other 
entity rather than an event (Jackendoff, 1997; Pustejovsky, 1995).  For example, the complement 
NP the hike in (1a) represents an event, and so it matches the semantic requirements of the verb 
began.  In contrast, the complement NP the book in (1b) represents an entity, and thus constitutes 
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a semantic mismatch.  Complement coercion is the process in which this entity comes to be 
interpreted as an event so as to satisfy the semantic constraints of the verb.  Note that the 
meaning of (1b) could plausibly correspond to any of the meanings depicted in (1c). 
1a. Mary began the hike. 
1b. Mary began the book. 
1c. Mary began [reading, writing, reviewing, publishing, translating, editing] the book. 
In an early experiment on the processing of complement coercion, Traxler, Pickering, and 
McElree (2002) recorded participants’ eye movements as they read sentences like those in (2).  
In this design, (2a) contains the expression that must undergo coercion, whereas (2b) and (2c) are 
control sentences representing both a preferred and non-preferred interpretation.  Traxler et al. 
showed that there was substantial processing difficulty associated with the coercion condition 
(2a) compared to the other conditions (2b and 2c) as shown by longer regression-path durations 
on the region immediately following the complement NP, as well as in later measures reflecting 
more rereading of the verb, the complement NP, and the post-noun region.  
2a. The secretary began the memo about the new office policy.   (coercion) 
2b. The secretary wrote the memo about the new office policy.   (preferred) 
2c. The secretary typed the memo about the new office policy.    (non-preferred) 
Traxler et al. further showed that the cost of complement coercion did not result simply from 
pairing an event-selecting verb with an NP regardless of the semantic relationship between the 
two constituents; that is, greater processing difficulty was observed when an event-selecting verb 
took an entity NP as its complement (e.g., The boy started the puzzle) as compared to a neutral-
verb condition (e.g., The boy saw the puzzle), but there was no evidence of processing difficulty 
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when the event-selecting verb combined with an NP that represented an event (e.g., The boy 
started the fight) compared to the control condition (e.g., The boy saw the fight).   
Additional experimental research has consistently demonstrated that complement 
coercion imposes an online processing cost in comparison to a variety of control conditions (for 
reviews, see Pylkkӓnen, 2008; Pylkkӓnen & McElree, 2006), with coercion costs seen using a 
broad range of methods:  self-paced reading (McElree, Traxler, Pickering, Seely, & Jackendoff, 
2001), eye-tracking during reading (Frisson & McElree, 2008; McElree, Frisson, & Pickering, 
2006; Pickering, McElree, & Traxler, 2005; Traxler, McElree, Williams, & Pickering, 2005; 
Traxler, Pickering, & McElree, 2002), eye-tracking in the visual-world paradigm (Scheepers, 
Keller, & Lapata, 2008), speed-accuracy trade-off (McElree, Pylkkӓnen, Pickering, & Traxler, 
2006), electrophysiology (Baggio, Choma, van Lambalgen, & Hagoort, 2010; Kuperberg, Choi, 
Cohn, Paczynski, & Jackendoff, 2010), magnetoencephalography (Pylkkӓnen & McElree, 2007), 
and functional MRI (Husband, Kelly, & Zhu, 2011).   
Accounts of the difficulty in processing complement coercion build on the linguistic 
proposal that the combination of an event-selecting verb and an entity-denoting NP (e.g., began 
the memo) constitutes a semantic mismatch that requires that the entity-denoting NP be 
interpreted instead as an event (type-shifted) to satisfy the semantic constraints of the verb 
(Jackendoff, 1997; Pustejovsky, 1995).  Traxler, McElree, et al. (2005, p. 4) propose that this 
occurs through the following sequence of processing operations: (1) access of the stored lexical 
entry for the complement noun (e.g., memo) and an initial attempt to integrate its meaning with 
the unfolding meaning of the sentence; (2) detection of a mismatch between the stored semantic 
characteristics of the noun and the thematic properties of the verb, which triggers the coercion 
process; (3) an attempt to resolve the semantic mismatch by using the context of the sentence to 
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infer an action that could plausibly be performed on the noun; and (4) reconfiguration of the 
semantic properties of the complement to allow for an event interpretation.  Although not 
explicitly characterized as such, Traxler et al.’s account of the processing of coercion closely 
resembles the indirect-access model of figurative-language processing, which likewise involves 
an initial attempt to establish meaningful relations based on stored senses of a word, detection of 
a semantic mismatch (a “defect” in Searle’s terminology) when this initial interpretation fails, 
and a process of using contextual information to resolve the mismatch and ultimately arrive at 
the intended meaning.   
A slightly different account put forth by Pylkkӓnen and McElree (2006; see also 
Pylkkӓnen, 2008) emphasizes that the type mismatch between the properties of the noun and 
verb effectively blocks the application of basic compositional operations, thereby triggering the 
costly type-shifting process of coercion.  Further, Pylkkӓnen and McElree argue that this account 
helps explain why processing costs are observed for expressions requiring complement coercion 
but not for other types of complex semantic expressions such as metonymy, which are proposed 
to involve a mismatch of “sorts” rather than a mismatch of “types” (see Pylkkӓnen, 2008; 
Pylkkӓnen & McElree, 2006, for a discussion).  However, as we discuss below, the claim that 
familiar metonymic expressions are no more difficult to process than literal expressions (e.g., 
Frisson & Pickering, 1999, 2007; Humphrey, Kemper, & Radel, 2004) has been disputed on the 
grounds that previous studies on the processing of metonymy have failed to adequately control 
for sentence structure, which can have a strong moderating effect on the difficulty associated 
with processing complex semantic expressions. 
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Sentence Structure and Interpretation of Semantic Relationships 
Our recent work (Lowder & Gordon, 2012, 2013) has shown that the difficulty of 
complex semantic interpretation is moderated by the structural relation between the expressions 
that together create the need for complex semantic interpretation; processing difficulty is 
observed when those expressions appear in a within-clause predicate-argument relationship but 
not when they are related by a prepositional phrase or by modification with a relative clause.  
This effect was demonstrated first in studies on subject-verb integration that compared reading 
times for an action verb paired with an animate subject (e.g., The sheriff injured the cowboy) as 
compared to an inanimate subject (e.g., The pistol injured the cowboy) (Lowder & Gordon, 
2012).  Readers experienced greater difficulty processing the verb when the sentence subject was 
inanimate versus animate, with this effect emerging both when the subject-verb pair appeared 
together in the main clause of the sentence as well as when the two constituents appeared 
together inside a relative clause (e.g., The sheriff that the pistol injured versus The sheriff that the 
cowboy injured).  However, this processing difficulty was reduced or eliminated when the action 
verb was embedded in a relative clause that modified the inanimate subject (e.g., The pistol that 
injured the cowboy versus The sheriff that injured the cowboy). 
Lowder and Gordon (2013) found a comparable effect for the processing of metonymy, a 
figurative form where reference to an entity is made through the name of some other entity that 
is intimately associated with it.  When a familiar place-for-institution metonym appeared as the 
object of a verb in a figurative context (e.g., The journalist offended the college), readers 
experienced greater processing difficulty than when the metonym appeared in a literal context 
(e.g., The journalist photographed the college) or when the object of the verb was animate (e.g., 
The journalist offended the leader).  However, this processing difficulty was reduced when the 
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metonym appeared as part of an adjunct phrase (e.g., The journalist offended the honor of the 
college).  Previous work suggesting that familiar metonyms are no more difficult to process than 
literal expressions (Frisson & Pickering, 1999, 2007; Humphrey et al., 2004) had evaluated sets 
of stimuli that included cases where the metonym was the object of the verb, as well as cases 
where the metonym was in a locative or other adjunct phrase, with this mix of sentence types 
possibly reducing the sensitivity of the experiments in detecting the processing difficulty 
associated with familiar metonyms.   
The pattern of results in these two studies (Lowder & Gordon, 2012, 2013) shows that 
complex semantic expressions are difficult to process when there is a within-clause predicate-
argument relationship between the relevant constituents.  These results are consistent with the 
basic predictions of the indirect-access model, according to which an initial attempt is made to 
integrate stored lexical entries with the unfolding meaning of the sentence, which leads to 
detection of a semantic mismatch and a search for an alternative meaning.  A “semantic 
mismatch” under this account could be due to a mismatch that occurs when an inanimate subject 
is paired with an action verb that requires an animate subject (e.g., The pistol injured the cowboy; 
Lowder & Gordon, 2012), a mismatch that occurs when a psychological verb that requires an 
experiencer object is paired with an object that refers to a non-human place (e.g., The journalist 
offended the college; Lowder & Gordon, 2013), or a mismatch that occurs when a verb that 
requires an event NP is paired with an NP that refers to an entity (e.g., The secretary began the 
memo; McElree et al., 2001; Traxler et al., 2002).  When a complex semantic expression is 
established across a clause boundary or with a prepositional phrase, processing difficulty is 
reduced (Lowder & Gordon, 2012, 2013)—an effect that may be related to the likelihood of 
detecting the mismatch, the process of searching for an alternative meaning, or both.  These 
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possibilities are consistent with a range of findings showing that sentence structure influences the 
depth at which language is processed (e.g., Baker & Wagner, 1987; Ferreira, Bailey, & Ferraro, 
2002; Gordon & Hendrick, 1998; Sanford & Sturt, 2002).   
Current Experiments 
The indirect-access model outlines a process where an initial literal interpretation is 
evaluated and altered if necessary.  This general process can be applied to different types of 
complex semantic relationships even though the precise mechanisms that allow for detection and 
resolution of different types of semantic mismatches are likely to vary.  Like inanimate subject-
verb integration and metonymy, complement coercion involves mismatch in the meanings of 
expressions that should be related in order for a sentence to be understood.  Indeed, some 
combinations of inanimate entities with action verbs of the sort studied by Lowder and Gordon 
(2012) (e.g., The pistol injured the cowboy) have been analyzed as requiring a process of subject-
type coercion (Pustejovsky, 1995; Pustejovsky, Anick, & Bergler, 1993), in which the inanimate 
subject is type-shifted from an entity (e.g., The pistol) to an event (e.g., Someone’s shooting of 
the pistol).  Further, the stimuli used in psycholinguistic research on complement coercion have 
exclusively involved sentences in which the entity-denoting NP whose meaning must be coerced 
is the direct object of the verb that requires an event as its complement (Baggio et al, 2009; 
Frisson & McElree, 2008; Husband et al., 2011; Kuperberg et al., 2010; McElree et al., 2001; 
McElree, Frisson, & Pickering, 2006; McElree, Pylkkӓnen, et al., 2006; Pickering et al., 2005; 
Pylkkӓnen & McElree, 2007; Scheepers et al., 2008; Traxler, McElree, et al., 2005; Traxler, 
Pickering, & McElree, 2002).  The current experiments investigate whether sentence structure 
moderates the magnitude of coercion cost in the same way that it moderates the processing 
difficulty associated with other types of complex semantic expressions (Lowder & Gordon, 
90 
 
2012, 2013).  Obtaining this pattern would be consistent with our prediction that sentence 
structure moderates the basic process of detecting and/or resolving a semantic mismatch for a 
range of semantic complexities that includes coercion and metonymy.  In addition, these 
experiments test whether the effect of sentence structure on the magnitude of the coercion cost 
depends on structural emphasis or deemphasis of specific constituents or on the structural 
relationship between the critical linguistic elements that require complex semantic interpretation. 
Experiment 1 
Linguistic expressions in a defocused portion of a sentence, such as a relative clause or 
other adjunct phrase, are processed at a shallower level than information presented in the main 
clause of the sentence.  For example, false information is detected more readily when it is 
presented in a sentence’s main clause rather than in a subordinate clause (Baker & Wagner, 
1987; see also Bredart & Modolo, 1988).  Thus, the coercion cost might be reduced when the 
critical verb and complement NP appear together in an embedded clause compared to when they 
appear together in a simple one-clause sentence.  Experiment 1 tested this possibility by varying 
whether the critical verbs and complement NPs appeared in the main clause of the sentence (e.g., 
3a and 3b) or were in a subject-extracted relative clause (SRC; e.g., 3c and 3d).   
3a. The secretary began the memo about the new office policy shortly after being hired.  
 (Simple Sentence, Coercion) 
3b. The secretary wrote the memo about the new office policy shortly after being hired. 
 (Simple Sentence, Control) 
3c. The secretary that began the memo about the new office policy had just been hired. 
 (SRC, Coercion) 
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3d. The secretary that wrote the memo about the new office policy had just been hired.  
 (SRC, Control) 
Lowder and Gordon (2012, Experiment 1) showed that the processing of subject-verb integration 
is more difficult when an inanimate subject combines with an action verb, compared to when the 
subject is animate, even when both constituents appear together inside a relative clause.  
However, Lowder and Gordon did not directly assess whether the size of this processing cost 
differed when the two critical constituents appeared together in the main clause of the sentence 
compared to when they were embedded together in an RC.  The current experiment allows the 
size of the coercion cost to be compared as a function of whether the critical verb and 
complement NP appear in the main clause of a simple-sentence context or are embedded in an 
RC.  In addition, it allows for a direct test of whether readers in general spend more time 
processing linguistic information when it is in a main clause compared to when it is embedded in 
a subordinate clause.  If sentence structure prompts shallower processing of semantic relations 
within embedded clauses, the coercion cost in the SRC condition (e.g., the difference between 3d 
and 3c) should be smaller than the coercion cost in the Simple-Sentence condition (e.g., the 
difference between 3b and 3a).  Alternatively, while less time in general may be spent reading 
the constituents in the embedded as compared to the main clause, the process of computing the 
relationship between the verb and complement within the same clause may be the same 
regardless of the type of clause, leading to a constant coercion cost across the types of sentence 
structure.        
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Method 
 Participants.  Thirty-six students at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill 
participated in this experiment in exchange for course credit.  They were all native English 
speakers and had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. 
 Materials.  Each participant was presented with 36 experimental sentences and 78 filler 
sentences.  The experimental sentences (see example 3) were adapted from Traxler, Pickering, 
and McElree (2002, Experiment 1).  In constructing the simple-sentence versions of each item, 
we used the same subject NP, verb, and complement NP used by Traxler et al. (e.g., The 
secretary began/wrote the memo).  Whereas Traxler et al. had included verbs that represented the 
coercion, preferred, and non-preferred interpretation of each item (see example 2), we only 
included the coercion and preferred verbs.  The sentence material following the complement NP 
was sometimes identical to the material used by Traxler et al., but was sometimes altered.  The 
SRC versions of each item were created by inserting the complementizer that between the 
subject NP and verb and then rewriting the remainder of the sentence so that the meaning 
corresponded as closely as possible to the meaning of the simple-sentence versions.  See 
Appendix A for the full set of experimental stimuli.   
 As noted by Traxler et al. (2002), the verbs in the coercion condition were longer on 
average than the verbs in the control condition.  However, supplementary analyses that they 
conducted showed that this difference in length was not responsible for the different processing 
times observed for these two conditions.  The two classes of verbs did not differ in frequency.  In 
addition, Traxler et al. showed that their items did not differ in plausibility and that predictability 
of the complement NP was low across conditions.   
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 The experimental sentences were counterbalanced across four lists so that each 
participant saw only one version of each item and so that each participant saw the same number 
of sentences from each of the four conditions. 
 Procedure.  Participants’ eye movements were recorded with an EyeLink 1000 system 
(SR Research) at a sampling rate of 1000 Hz, which was calibrated at the beginning of each 
session.  A chinrest was used to minimize head movement.  Participants were instructed to read 
at a natural pace.  At the start of each trial, a fixation point was presented near the left edge of the 
monitor, marking the location where the first word of the sentence would appear.  When the 
participant’s gaze was steady on this point, the experimenter initiated presentation of the 
sentence.  After reading the sentence, the participant pressed a button, which caused the sentence 
to disappear and a true-false comprehension question to appear in its place.  Participants pressed 
one button to answer “true,” and another key to answer “false.”  After the participant answered 
the comprehension question, the fixation point for the next trial appeared.   
 Participants were first presented with four of the filler sentences.  After this warm-up 
block, the remaining 110 sentences were presented in a different random order for each 
participant. 
 Analysis.  Data analysis focused on four standard eye-movement measures (see Clifton, 
Staub, & Rayner, 2007; Rayner, 1998).  Gaze duration is the sum of all initial fixations on a 
region; it begins when the region is first fixated and ends when gaze is directed away from the 
region, either to the left or right (for multiword regions, this measure is commonly referred to as 
first-pass reading time).  Regression-path duration (also called go-past time) is the sum of all 
fixations beginning with the initial fixation on a region and ending when the gaze is directed 
away from the region to the right.  Thus, regression-path duration includes time spent rereading 
94 
 
earlier parts of the sentence before the reader is ready to proceed with the rest of the sentence.  
Second-pass duration is the time spent rereading a region after the eyes have exited the right 
boundary of this region.  Unlike the other measures, second-pass duration includes zeroes (i.e., 
trials when the reader did not reread this region).  Total time is the sum of all fixations on a word 
or region. 
 We report reading times for three regions of interest.  The verb region was the main verb 
in the Simple-Sentence conditions and the embedded verb in the SRC conditions (e.g., began or 
wrote).  The target NP consisted of the determiner and noun that followed the verb (e.g., the 
memo).  The postnoun region consisted of the three words following the target NP in most cases 
(e.g., about the new).  For four of our items, there were only two words that remained constant 
following the target NP between the Simple-Sentence and SRC conditions.  For these four items, 
the postnoun region consisted of only those two words.   
 An automatic procedure in the Eyelink software combined fixations that were shorter 
than 80 ms and within one character of another fixation into one fixation.  Additional fixations 
shorter than 80 ms and longer than 800 ms were removed.  We set maximum cutoff values at 
1,500 ms for gaze duration and second-pass duration and 2,500 ms for regression-path duration 
and total time.  This procedure is similar to other data-exclusion procedures that have been 
employed in eye-tracking experiments on complement coercion (Frisson & McElree, 2008; 
McElree, Frisson, & Pickering, 2006; Traxler, McElree, et al., 2005).  This procedure eliminated 
0.3% of the data. 
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Results 
 Comprehension-question accuracy.  Mean comprehension-question accuracies for each 
condition were as follows: Simple-Coercion (94%), Simple-Control (96%), SRC-Coercion 
(95%), SRC-Control (94%).  There were no significant differences between conditions. 
 Verb region.  Mean reading times for the three regions of interest are presented in Table 
6.  At the verb, significant main effects of sentence structure emerged in gaze duration, F1(1, 35) 
= 4.20, MSE = 2,029, p < .05; F2(1, 35) = 4.02, MSE = 2,036, p = .05, and in total time (marginal 
in the item analysis), F1(1, 35) = 7.45, MSE = 13,344, p < .02; F2(1, 35) = 3.51, MSE = 25,400, p 
< .07.  For both measures, reading times were longer in the Simple-Sentence condition than the 
SRC condition, indicating that readers tended to spend more time processing the verb when it 
was the main verb of the sentence than when it was embedded in an SRC.  In addition, strong 
main effects of verb type were observed in both second-pass duration, F1(1, 35) = 52.54, MSE = 
9,329, p < .001; F2(1, 35) = 28.64, MSE = 17,052, p < .001, and in total time, F1(1, 35) = 55.45, 
MSE = 13,253, p < .001; F2(1, 35) = 30.21, MSE = 26,202, p < .001, with longer times in the 
Coercion condition than in the Control condition.  The interaction between verb type and 
sentence structure was not significant on any measure. 
 Target NP.  Analysis of all four reading-time measures on the target NP revealed main 
effects of verb type such that the Coercion condition was more difficult to process than the 
Control condition.  The effect was marginally significant in gaze duration , F1(1, 35) = 3.85, 
MSE = 3,657, p < .06; F2(1, 35) = 4.24, MSE = 3,654, p < .05, but fully significant in regression-
path duration, F1(1, 35) = 17.55, MSE = 5,503, p < .001; F2(1, 35) = 8.62, MSE = 10,930, p < 
.01, second-pass duration, F1(1, 35) = 9.90, MSE = 7,389, p < .005; F2(1, 35) = 5.51, MSE = 
12,843, p < .03, and total time, F1(1, 35) = 14.40, MSE = 14,583, p < .005; F2(1, 35) = 10.58, 
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MSE = 19,866, p < .005.  In addition, there was a marginally significant main effect of sentence 
structure in the total time data, F1(1, 35) = 3.41, MSE = 17,447, p < .08; F2(1, 35) = 2.89, MSE = 
19,541, p < .10, such that there were longer reading times for the target NP in the Simple-
Sentence condition compared to the SRC condition.  The interaction between verb type and 
sentence structure was not significant on any measure. 
Table 6 
Results of Experiment 1. 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Measure (in milliseconds)  Verb  Target NP        Postnoun region 
     Simple-Coercion   began  the memo          about the new … 
     Simple-Control   wrote  the memo          about the new … 
     SRC-Coercion     (that) began  the memo          about the new … 
     SRC-Control     (that) wrote  the memo          about the new … 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Gaze duration 
     Simple-Coercion   264  316   400 
     Simple-Control   255  286   406 
     SRC-Coercion   254  295   412 
     SRC-Control   234  286   414 
Regression-path duration 
     Simple-Coercion   342  445   534 
     Simple-Control   335  387   487 
     SRC-Coercion   329  409   577 
     SRC-Control   329  363   480 
Second-pass duration 
     Simple-Coercion   332  271   204 
     Simple-Control   218  227   203 
     SRC-Coercion   318  250   239 
     SRC-Control   198  205   232 
Total time 
     Simple-Coercion   647  634   674 
     Simple-Control   503  561   660 
     SRC-Coercion   593  597   747 
     SRC-Control   452  517   694 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Note.  NP = noun phrase; SRC = subject-extracted relative clause. 
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 Postnoun region.  Regression-path duration on the postnoun region showed a significant 
main effect of verb type, F1(1, 35) = 12.49, MSE = 14,833, p < .005; F2(1, 35) = 9.65, MSE = 
21,000, p < .005, with longer times seen in the Coercion condition than the Control condition.  In 
addition , there was a main effect of sentence structure that was marginal in the analysis of 
second-pass duration, F1(1, 35) = 3.20, MSE = 11,470, p < .09; F2(1, 35) = 3.20, MSE = 9,973, p 
< .09, and fully significant in the analysis of total time, F1(1, 35) = 7.38, MSE = 13,824, p < .02; 
F2(1, 35) = 5.99, MSE = 17,124, p < .03.  These measures of later processing showed longer 
reading times on the postnoun region in the SRC condition compared to the Simple-Sentence 
condition, a pattern that reverses the effect found for the earlier target verb and target NP 
regions.  Although the words in this three-word region were identical across all conditions, the 
subsequent words depended on sentence structure, and included the matrix verb for sentences in 
the SRC condition.  Thus, this effect likely reflects the difficulty associated with processing the 
SRC matrix verb, with readers being more likely to go back and reread the preceding material in 
the SRC condition.  The interaction between verb type and sentence structure was not significant 
on any measure. 
Discussion 
 The results of Experiment 1 replicated previous reading-time studies in demonstrating the 
online costs associated with processing complement coercion (Frisson & McElree, 2008; 
McElree et al., 2001; McElree, Frisson, & Pickering, 2006; Pickering et al., 2005; Traxler, 
Pickering, & McElree, 2002; Traxler, McElree, et al., 2005).  In line with these previous studies, 
the greater difficulty in processing coerced compared to control expressions emerged in 
regression-path duration on both the target NP and the postnoun region, as well as in second-pass 
duration and total time on both the verb and target NP.  In addition, there was some evidence that 
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the difficulty with coercion emerged as early as gaze duration on the target NP; effects of 
coercion have occasionally been observed this early in the eye-tracking record (see Frisson & 
McElree), though it is not typical.   
Critically, Experiment 1 showed no evidence that embedding the verb and complement 
NP in a relative clause reduced the magnitude of the coercion cost.  Although readers did spend 
less time overall on critical words in the SRC condition compared to the same words in the 
Simple-Sentence condition (i.e., gaze duration and total time on the verb, as well as total time on 
the target NP), this effect did not depend on verb type.  The finding that a coercion cost emerges 
when the critical words appear together in an RC is consistent with our previous work on 
inanimate subject-verb integration (Lowder & Gordon, 2012, Experiment 1) and suggests that 
the embedding manipulation does not influence the depth at which readers compute the 
relationship between the constituents in a complex semantic expression.  In contrast, Lowder and 
Gordon’s Experiment 2 showed that the difficulty associated with inanimate subject-verb 
integration was reduced when the two constituents appeared in separate clauses.  Thus, we 
predicted that embedding the event-selecting verb and complement NP in separate clauses would 
deemphasize their relationship, which would result in a reduction in the magnitude of the 
coercion cost.   
Experiment 2 
 Experiment 2 tested whether placing the critical constituents in separate clauses would 
reduce the coercion cost.  As shown below (4a and 4b), the complement NP was positioned as 
the main clause subject and the head noun of an object-extracted relative clause (ORC) that 
contained the critical verb.  The magnitude of the coercion cost in this configuration was 
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compared to that found for SRC sentences (4c and 4d) where both critical expressions were 
embedded in the relative clause. 
4a. The memo that the secretary began announced that there would be pay raises for all 
 the employees. (ORC, Coercion) 
4b. The memo that the secretary wrote announced that there would be pay raises for all 
 the employees. (ORC, Control) 
4c. The secretary that began the memo announced that there would be pay raises for all 
 the employees. (SRC, Coercion) 
4d. The secretary that wrote the memo announced that there would be pay raises for all 
 the employees. (SRC, Control) 
In previous work, we showed that the magnitude of the processing difficulty associated with 
other complex semantic relationships is reduced when the structure of the sentence deemphasizes 
the noncanonical relationship (Lowder & Gordon, 2012, 2013).  Specifically, we demonstrated 
that when the integration of an inanimate subject with an action verb occurred across a clause 
boundary (e.g., The pistol that injured), or when a metonym appeared in an adjunct phrase rather 
than as the object of the verb that elicited the figurative interpretation (e.g., offended the honor of 
the college), processing difficulty was reduced.  In line with these previous findings, the cost of 
complement coercion should be reduced when integration of the verb and complement NP 
occurs across a clause boundary (e.g., The memo that the secretary began), such that the entity 
NP undergoes coercion as a filler at the post-verbal gap site.  This reduction in the cost of 
coercion should occur because the structure of the sentence directs the reader’s attention toward 
the proposition being asserted in the main clause of the sentence (e.g., The memo announced that 
there would be pay raises), whereas the additional proposition contained in the relative clause 
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(e.g., The memo that the secretary wrote/began) is seen as less important to comprehending the 
sentence.  Because the relationship between the complement NP and verb is deemphasized by 
the ORC, we propose that readers will interpret this noncanonical relationship less deeply than 
when the relationship between the two constituents is focused, as is the case when the two 
constituents appear together in the same clause of an SRC (see General Discussion).     
 The current experiment also provides an opportunity to examine factors that influence the 
difficulty of processing ORC sentences as compared to SRC sentences, though its design 
presents some challenges for localizing the effect within the sentences.  Whereas many previous 
experiments have examined differences in reading times on the RC region for ORCs versus 
SRCs (e.g., Gordon, Hendrick, Johnson, & Lee, 2006; Johnson, Lowder, & Gordon, 2011; 
Lowder & Gordon, 2012, in press; Traxler, Morris, & Seely, 2002; Traxler, Williams, Blozis, & 
Morris, 2005; see Gordon & Lowder, 2012 for a review), the ORCs in the current experiment 
always contained an embedded noun that was animate, whereas the embedded noun in the SRCs 
was almost always inanimate (e.g., the secretary wrote versus wrote the memo).  This covariation 
of animacy with sentence structure renders comparison of the RC-region inappropriate.  
However, all four conditions are identical at the matrix verb (e.g., announced), which is another 
region of the sentence where ORC-SRC differences are typically observed (e.g., Gordon, 
Hendrick, & Johnson, 2001, 2004; Gordon et al., 2006; Johnson et al., 2011; King & Just, 1991; 
Lowder & Gordon, 2012, in press; Traxler et al., 2002, 2005; Wells, Christiansen, Race, 
Acheson, & MacDonald, 2009).  Thus, the comparison of (4b) versus (4d) at the matrix verb 
allows us to test whether ORCs are more difficult than SRCs in the Control condition, whereas 
the comparison of (4a) versus (4c) at the matrix verb allows us to test whether the ORC-SRC 
asymmetry is reduced or eliminated in the case of complement coercion.  
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Method 
Participants.  Forty students at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill 
participated in this experiment in exchange for course credit.  They were all native English 
speakers and had normal or corrected-to-normal vision.  No participants had taken part in 
Experiment 1. 
 Materials.  Each participant was presented with 36 experimental sentences and 90 filler 
sentences.  The experimental sentences (see example 4) were adapted from the materials used in 
Experiment 1.  The SRCs were identical to the SRCs used in Experiment 1 up to and including 
the target NP (e.g., The secretary that began the memo).  The ORCs were created by positioning 
the target NP as the sentence subject and embedding the agent inside the RC along with the verb 
(e.g., The memo that the secretary began).  The remainder of the sentence was rewritten to 
include a matrix verb and post-verb material that could be attributed to either the animate head 
NP in the SRCs or the inanimate head NP in the ORCs.  See Appendix B for the full set of 
experimental stimuli. 
 Predictability.  Twenty-four participants, none of whom participated in any other aspect 
of the study, were presented with initial fragments of the stimuli used in Experiment 2 and 
instructed to continue each fragment to make a complete sentence.  The SRCs for both the 
Coercion and Control conditions were presented up to and including the determiner before the 
critical noun (e.g., The secretary that began/wrote the…), whereas the ORCs were presented up 
to the end of the embedded NP (e.g., The memo that the secretary…).  Participants’ responses 
were then compared with the actual experimental stimuli to assess the predictability of the 
critical words.  Mean proportion of correct completions are presented in Table 7.  There was a 
significant main effect of verb type, F(1, 23) = 124.64, p < .001, such that completions in the 
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Control condition were more accurate than completions in the Coercion condition.  A similar 
effect was reported by Traxler, Pickering, and McElree (2002), whose stimuli were the basis of 
those used here; analyses by Traxler et al. suggested that this difference in predictability was 
unlikely to explain the processing costs reported in their experiments.  The main effect of 
sentence structure was not significant; however, there was a significant interaction between verb 
type and sentence structure, F(1, 23) = 28.87, p < .001, with a larger discrepancy in correct 
completion rates between the Control and Coercion conditions for the ORCs than for the SRCs.  
Thus, the upcoming word in the Coercion condition was more predictable in SRCs than ORCs, a 
pattern of predictability that is the opposite of the predicted patterns for reading times.   
Table 7 
Predictability results from Experiment 2 completion study. 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
     SRC-Coercion  The secretary that began the ________. 
     SRC-Control  The secretary that wrote the ________. 
     ORC   The memo that the secretary ________. 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 Predictability of target word       Categorization of completions 
Condition  Proportion correct  Condition  Event rating 
     SRC-Coercion      .08         SRC-Coercion      .33 
     SRC-Control      .25         SRC-Control      .05 
     ORC-Coercion      .00         ORC       .01 
     ORC-Control      .35 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Note.  SRC = subject-extracted relative clause; ORC = object-extracted relative clause.  
Participants completed SRC fragments with a noun phrase (NP) and ORC fragments with a verb.  
“Predictability of target word” on the left displays the mean proportion of correct completions 
for each of the four conditions.  “Categorization of completions” on the right displays the mean 
event rating for the two SRC conditions and for the single ORC condition (note that the ORC 
fragment was identical for the ORC-Coercion and ORC-Control conditions).  For SRC 
fragments, a score of “0” represented an entity NP, whereas a score of “1” represented an event 
NP.  For ORC fragments, a score of “0” represented an entity-selecting verb, whereas a score of 
“1” represented an event-selecting verb. 
In addition, two independent raters, who were naïve to the purposes of the study, were 
presented with the NPs supplied in the completion of each SRC and assigned the code of “0” to 
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NPs referring to entities and “1” to NPs referring to events.   Agreement between raters was 
91%.  Each verb provided for ORC fragments was also coded as “0” for entity-selecting and “1” 
for event-selecting.  Table 7 shows mean event ratings for the two SRC conditions and for the 
ORCs.  Mean scores were higher for the SRC-Coercion condition than the SRC-Control 
condition, t(23) = 9.38, p < .001, reflecting participants’ greater tendency to provide event NP 
completions when the verb provided in the fragment was an event-selecting verb.  In addition, 
mean scores for the SRC-Control condition were significantly higher than mean scores for the 
ORC condition, t(23) = 2.35, p < .03.  This difference reflects the fact that participants were 
extremely unlikely to complete an ORC fragment with an event-selecting verb.  Thus, any 
reduction in the magnitude of the coercion effect for ORCs compared to SRCs cannot be 
attributed to readers’ being more likely to predict an event-selecting verb in the ORCs than an 
event NP in the SRCs. 
 Procedure.  The sentences were counterbalanced across four lists, as in Experiment 1.  
All aspects of the eye-tracking procedure were identical to the procedure described in 
Experiment 1. 
 Analysis.  The different word orders of the two types of RCs posed some challenges to 
analyzing these data.  Experiment 1 showed coercion effects early in the sentence (i.e., gaze 
duration and regression-path duration at the target NP).  However, for this experiment the earliest 
region of the sentence where a process of complement coercion could begin involved different 
words for SRCs and ORCs (i.e., the embedded NP in SRCs and the embedded verb in ORCs).  
Therefore, gaze duration and regression-path duration at this initial coercion cue were analyzed 
separately for the two types of RCs.  At the matrix verb, the word orders of SRCs and ORCs are 
identical, and so the two structures were analyzed together relying on the same reading-time 
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measures used in Experiment 1.  Second-pass duration on the target NP and embedded verb was 
defined as the time spent rereading after the eyes had gotten past the initial coercion cue during 
first-pass reading.  For example, rereading of the target NP in the ORCs (e.g., The memo) was 
incorporated into second-pass duration if the reader had gotten past the embedded verb (e.g., 
began), and thus had encountered the cue to engage in coercion.  As in Experiment 1, total time 
on the target NP and embedded verb were analyzed.  The same data-exclusion criteria used in 
Experiment 1 were also employed here, eliminating 0.4% of the data. 
Results 
 Comprehension-question accuracy.  Mean comprehension-question accuracies for each 
condition were as follows: SRC-Coercion (96%), SRC-Control (93%), ORC-Coercion (92%), 
ORC-Control (92%).  Accuracy tended to be higher for SRCs than for ORCs, although the main 
effect of sentence structure was significant only in the subject analysis, F1(1, 39) = 5.33, MSE = 
52.21, p < .03; F2(1, 35) = 1.29, MSE = 194.98, p > .25.  Neither the main effect of verb type nor 
the interaction between sentence structure and verb type was significant.   
 Initial coercion cue.  Reading times are presented in Table 8.  To determine whether 
there was any early evidence of processing difficulty associated with coercion, we analyzed gaze 
duration on the initial coercion cue (i.e., the target NP in the SRCs and the embedded verb in the 
ORCs).  For SRCs, there was a marginally significant effect of coercion in the subject analysis, 
t1(39) = 1.79, p = .08; t2(35) = 1.56, p > .12.  There was no evidence of a coercion cost in gaze 
duration on the embedded verb for the ORCs, ts < 1.  Analysis of regression-path duration on the 
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initial coercion cue revealed a significant effect of coercion for the SRCs, t1(39) = 2.24, p < .05; 
t2(35) = 2.67, p < .02, but no indication of a difference for the ORCs, ts < 1.
8
 
 Matrix verb.  The Coercion condition was more difficult than the Control condition at the 
matrix verb.  These significant main effects of verb type emerged in analysis of regression-path 
duration, F1(1, 39) = 16.27, MSE = 34,887, p < .001; F2(1, 35) = 33.41, MSE = 15,785, p < .001, 
second-pass duration, F1(1, 39) = 18.25, MSE = 7,298, p < .001; F2(1, 35) = 12.23, MSE = 
10,063, p < .005, and total time, F1(1, 39) = 27.19, MSE = 16,039, p < .001; F2(1, 35) = 18.72,  
MSE = 22,986, p < .001.  In addition, regression-path duration on the matrix verb showed a main 
effect of sentence structure (in the subject analysis), F1(1, 39) = 7.03, MSE = 13,888, p < .02; 
F2(1, 35) = 2.46, MSE = 24,459, p > .12, such that times were longer in ORCs than SRCs.  
Critically, analysis of regression-path duration showed a significant interaction between these 
two factors, F1(1, 39) = 7.76, MSE = 12,668, p < .01; F2(1, 35) = 5.15, MSE = 21,675, p < .05.  
Follow-up contrasts revealed that whereas there was a robust coercion effect in the SRCs (169 
ms), t1(39) = 4.68, p < .001; t2(35) = 5.68, p < .001, the effect was much weaker in the ORCs (70 
ms), and only reached significance in the subject analysis, t1(39) = 2.12, p < .05; t2(35) = 1.96, p 
< .06.  In addition, whereas the Control conditions showed a typical ORC-SRC asymmetry, with 
                                                          
8 We also tested for differences in gaze duration and regression-path duration in the reverse contrasts (i.e., the target 
NP in ORCs and the embedded verb in SRCs).  As would be expected, gaze durations on the target NP did not differ 
between the Coercion and Control conditions in the ORCs, ts < 1.  Because this region came at the very beginning 
of the sentence in the ORCs, analysis of regression-path duration is not appropriate.  There was a significant 
difference in gaze duration on the embedded verb in the SRCs (marginal in the item analysis), t1(39) = 2.14, p < .05; 
t2(35) = 1.98, p < .07, such that reading times were longer on the Coercion verbs than the Control verbs.  This 
difference was not expected, given that the target NP had not yet been fixated and given that we used the exact same 
verbs in Experiment 1 and found no evidence of a difference in gaze duration.  However, as noted above, the verbs 
in the Coercion condition were on average longer than the verbs in the Control condition (see Experiment 1 
Methods), and it is well-known that increases in word length tend to inflate gaze duration (e.g., Rayner, 1998; 
Rayner & McConkie, 1976; Rayner, Sereno, & Raney, 1996).  The notion that this difference in gaze duration 
reflects differences in verb length rather than differences related to complement coercion is bolstered by the fact that 
regression-path duration did not differ between these two conditions, ts < 1. 
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ORCs being more difficult than SRCs, t1(39) = 4.56, p < .001; t2(35) = 3.37, p < .005, the ORC-
Coercion and SRC-Coercion conditions were identical to one another.    
Table 8 
Results of Experiment 2. 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
     SRC-Coercion  The secretary that began the memo announced …   
     SRC-Control  The secretary that wrote the memo announced …   
     ORC-Coercion  The memo that the secretary began announced …      
     ORC-Control  The memo that the secretary wrote announced …  
 
Measure (in milliseconds)      Embedded verb  Target NP           Matrix verb 
              (e.g., began vs. wrote)        (e.g., the memo)      (e.g., announced) 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Gaze duration 
     SRC-Coercion   271   348   324  
     SRC-Control   251   327   314 
     ORC-Coercion       284   441   333 
     ORC-Control   276   446   339 
Regression-path duration 
     SRC-Coercion   348   456   539 
     SRC-Control   335   400   370 
     ORC-Coercion       363   ––   539 
     ORC-Control   353   ––    469  
Second-pass duration 
     SRC-Coercion   300   297   214  
     SRC-Control   181   190   146 
     ORC-Coercion       277   274   189 
     ORC-Control   141   222   141 
Total time 
     SRC-Coercion   644   712   626 
     SRC-Control   472   575   499 
     ORC-Coercion       581   772   605 
     ORC-Control   438   739   523 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Note.  NP = noun phrase, SRC = subject relative clause, ORC = object relative clause 
 
Embedded verb.  Measures of later processing revealed robust coercion costs on the 
embedded verb.  These main effects of verb type were seen in second-pass duration, F1(1, 39) = 
82.75, MSE = 7,802, p < .001; F2(1, 35) = 38.51, MSE = 14,631, p < .001, as well as in total 
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time, F1(1, 39) = 61.33, MSE = 16,211, p < .001; F2(1, 35) = 30.94, MSE = 28,913, p < .001.  In 
addition, these measures revealed main effects of sentence structure such that reading times were 
longer for SRCs than for ORCs.  These effects were marginally significant in second-pass 
duration, F1(1, 39) = 4.06, MSE = 9,828, p < .06; F2(1, 35) = 4.01, MSE = 9,428, p < .06, and 
fully significant in total time, F1(1, 39) = 4.13, MSE = 23,259, p < .05; F2(1, 35) = 5.75, MSE = 
17,052, p < .05.  Although the interaction between sentence structure and verb type was not 
significant, the reversal observed for the ORC-SRC asymmetry can be explained by examining 
the contrasts separately for the Coercion and Control conditions.  Total time on the embedded 
verb was significantly longer for the SRC-Coercion condition than the ORC-Coercion condition, 
t1(39) = 2.06, p < .05; t2(35) = 2.33, p < .05; however, there was no difference between the SRC-
Control and ORC-Control conditions, t1(39) = 1.35, p > .18; t2(35) = 1.36, p > .18.  Thus, it 
seems that the reversal in the ORC-SRC asymmetry was driven primarily by readers’ enhanced 
difficulty processing the coerced expressions in the SRCs relative to the ORCs.    
 Target NP.  Measures of later processing also revealed coercion costs on the target NP.  
These main effects of verb type were significant for second-pass duration, F1(1, 39) = 20.56, 
MSE = 12,242, p < .001; F2(1, 35) = 30.25, MSE = 7,248, p < .001, as well as for total time, F1(1, 
39) = 13.87, MSE = 20,606, p < .005; F2(1, 35) = 13.40, MSE = 17,682, p < .005.  In addition, 
there was a main effect of sentence structure for total time, F1(1, 39) = 11.95, MSE = 41,999, p < 
.005; F2(1, 35) = 27.06, MSE = 15,680, p < .001, such that ORCs were more difficult than SRCs.  
Critically, these two factors interacted.  Analysis of second-pass duration revealed a marginally 
significant interaction between verb type and sentence structure, F1(1, 39) = 3.66, MSE = 8,514, 
p < .07; F2(1, 35) = 2.48, MSE = 10,782, p > .12, with the coercion cost for the SRCs (107 ms), 
t1(39) = 4.14, p < .001; t2(35) = 4.08, p < .001, being over twice as large as the coercion cost for 
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the ORCs (52 ms), t1(39) = 2.68, p < .02; t2(35) = 2.77, p < .01.  The interaction was fully 
significant in total time, F1(1, 39) = 8.21, MSE = 13,334, p < .01; F2(1, 35) = 5.86, MSE = 
16,788, p < .03.  Follow-up contrasts revealed a robust coercion effect for the SRCs, t1(39) = 
4.23, p < .001; t2(35) = 3.97, p < .001, with no effect at all for the ORCs, t1(39) = 1.26, p > .21; 
t2(35) = 1.03, p > .30.  In addition, ORCs were more difficult than SRCs in the Control 
condition, t1(39) = 4.08, p < .001; t2(35) = 6.31, p < .01, whereas this difference was only 
marginally significant in the Coercion condition, t1(39) = 1.77, p < .09; t2(35) = 1.66, p > .10.      
Discussion 
 Experiment 2 demonstrated that the processing cost associated with complement coercion 
is reduced when the verb and complement NP appear in separate clauses.  The results of the 
predictability study (see Methods section) make it unlikely that this reduction was driven by 
expectations about the sentences, since completions of ORC fragments (e.g., The memo that the 
secretary…) very rarely included an event-selecting verb and never included the event-selecting 
verb that was actually used in the stimuli.  Sentence structure led to a reduction in the processing 
cost of coercion as early as regression-path duration on the first region of the sentence that 
signaled the need to engage in coercion.  Whereas the Coercion condition was more difficult than 
the Control condition at the target NP in SRCs, there was no difference at the embedded verb for 
the ORCs.  This difference in processing difficulty carried over onto the matrix verb.  
Regression-path duration on this region showed a coercion effect that was more than twice as 
large in the SRCs than in the ORCs.  The coercion cost was also larger for SRCs than for ORCs 
in second-pass duration on the target NP, and analysis of total time on the target NP showed a 
strong coercion cost for the SRCs and no evidence of a coercion cost at all for the ORCs.  
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Coercion costs also emerged in later processing measures on both the embedded verb and the 
matrix verb.  These effects did not interact with sentence structure. 
 There was greater difficulty at the matrix verb for ORCs than for SRCs in the Control 
condition—an effect that has been documented by several previous eye-tracking studies (Gordon 
et al., 2006; Johnson et al., 2011; Lowder & Gordon, 2012, in press; Traxler, Morris, & Seely, 
2002; Traxler, Williams, et al., 2005).  This difference was eliminated completely in the 
Coercion condition due to the substantial processing difficulty associated with the SRC-Coercion 
condition.  This pattern provides a nice parallel to the findings on structural separation and 
inanimate subject-verb integration reported by Lowder and Gordon (2012), in which we argued 
that the effects of animacy on RC processing that had been documented previously (Gennari & 
MacDonald, 2008, 2009; Traxler et al., 2002, 2005) could be explained by patterns of enhanced 
difficulty when integration occurs within the same clause, as in ORCs (e.g., The sheriff that the 
pistol injured), and reduced difficulty when integration occurs across a clause boundary, as in 
SRCs (e.g., The pistol that injured the cowboy).  The current experiment produced similar 
findings with regard to complement coercion, although in this case the structural separation 
contributes to enhanced difficulty with SRCs (e.g., The secretary that began the memo) and 
reduced difficulty with ORCs (e.g., The memo that the secretary began).   
 Interpretation of these results is complicated by the differences in word order that exist 
between SRCs and ORCs.  Whereas the critical words of the SRC appear in the same order as 
they do in a simple sentence (i.e., agent NP, verb, target NP), the structure of the ORC places the 
target NP at the beginning of the sentence (i.e., target NP, agent NP, verb).  Thus, it may not be 
the structural separation between the verb and target NP that contributes to the reduction in 
processing difficulty, but rather the order in which the constituents appear.  To address this 
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concern, we conducted Experiment 3, which manipulates the presence or absence of a structural 
separation between the verb and complement NP but also keeps the order of the content words 
constant across conditions.   
Experiment 3 
 Experiment 3 further tested the hypothesis that the coercion cost would be reduced when 
the verb and complement NP appeared in separate clauses.  Whereas Experiment 2 did this using 
different types of relative clauses, Experiment 3 uses different types of cleft constructions (see 
example 5).  The clause structure of the clefts in (5a) and (5b) resembles that of the SRCs used in 
Experiments 1 and 2.  That is, integration of the critical verb-NP pair occurs within the same 
clause.  In contrast, the clause structure of the pseudoclefts in (5c) and (5d) imposes a boundary 
between the verb and complement NP, as was the case with the ORCs in Experiment 2.  
Importantly, the order of the content words is the same across the two types of clefts. 
 5a. It was the secretary that began the memo about the new office policy shortly after 
 being hired. (Cleft, Coercion) 
 5b. It was the secretary that wrote the memo about the new office policy shortly after 
 being hired. (Cleft, Control) 
 5c. What the secretary began was the memo about the new office policy shortly after 
 being hired. (Pseudocleft, Coercion) 
 5d. What the secretary wrote was the memo about the new office policy shortly after 
 being hired. (Pseudocleft, Control) 
 Cleft structures such as those in (5) have been used previously to examine the processing 
of linguistic information that is focused versus that which is nonfocused.  The clefts in (5a) and 
(5b) place linguistic focus on the secretary, as they seem to answer the implied question, Who 
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wrote the memo?  In contrast, the pseudoclefts in (5c) and (5d) place linguistic focus on the 
memo, as they seem to answer the implied question, What did the secretary write?  As such, the 
structure of these sentences signals to the reader that some new piece of information is being 
asserted in contrast to information that is presented as presupposed.  Previous work using 
structures like these as focus cues has shown that focused linguistic information enjoys a variety 
of processing benefits.  For example, compared to nonfocused information, focused information 
attracts attention more quickly and more effectively (Carpenter & Just, 1977; Hornby, 1974; 
Langford & Holmes, 1979; Sturt, Sanford, Stewart, & Dawydiak, 2004; Zimmer & Engelkamp, 
1981), is remembered better (Birch, Albrecht, & Myers, 2000; Birch & Garnsey, 1995; Singer, 
1976), better facilitates anaphor resolution (Almor, 1999; Foraker & McElree, 2007), and leads 
to enhanced detection of false information (Bredart & Modolo, 1988).  In addition, readers tend 
to spend more time processing focused compared to nonfocused information (Birch & Rayner, 
1997; Price & Sanford, 2012, cf. Birch & Rayner, 2010).  Thus, the complement NP should 
attract more attention and show longer processing times when it appears in a pseudocleft as 
compared to a cleft.  However, pseudoclefts also impose a structural separation between the 
complement NP and the critical verb thereby dissociating the effects of focus on the complement 
and the effects of structural separation on the complex semantic processing that occurs with 
coercion.  On the one hand, if the strong linguistic focus placed on the complement NP by the 
pseudocleft leads to enhanced relational processing, such that the reader engages in deep 
interpretation of the verb-complement relationship, then a larger coercion effect should occur for 
pseudoclefts compared to clefts.  On the other hand, if the separation of the verb and complement 
NP into different clauses serves to deemphasize their relationship, then a smaller coercion effect 
should occur for pseudoclefts compared to clefts. 
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 Whereas Experiment 1 showed that deemphasis of both constituents had no effect on the 
magnitude of the coercion cost, the design of the current experiment allows us to determine 
whether effects of sentence structure on the magnitude of the coercion cost stem from structural 
emphasis or deemphasis of the complement NP or on structural separation between the critical 
verb-complement pair. 
Method  
Participants.  Forty-eight students at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill 
participated in this experiment in exchange for course credit.  They were all native English 
speakers and had normal or corrected-to-normal vision.  No participants had taken part in 
Experiments 1 or 2. 
 Materials.  Each participant was presented with 36 experimental sentences and 110 filler 
sentences.  The experimental sentences (see example 5) were adapted from the materials used in 
Experiments 1 and 2.  The same agent NPs (e.g., the secretary), verbs (e.g., wrote versus began), 
and target NPs (e.g., the memo) that had been used in the previous experiments were also used 
here.  These words were inserted into cleft and pseudocleft structures, and the post-target 
material was rewritten to form a coherent sentence.  See Appendix C for the full set of 
experimental stimuli. 
 Predictability.  Twenty-four participants, none of whom participated in any other aspect 
of the study, were presented with fragments of the stimuli used in Experiment 3 and instructed to 
continue each fragment to make a complete sentence.  Fragments for all four conditions were 
presented up to and including the determiner before the critical noun (e.g., It was the secretary 
that wrote/began the…; What the secretary wrote/began was the…).  Participants’ responses 
were then compared with the actual experimental stimuli to assess the predictability of the 
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critical words.  Mean proportion of correct completions are presented in Table 9.  There was a 
significant main effect of verb type, F(1, 24) = 39.09, p < .001, such that completions in the 
Control condition were more accurate than completions in the Coercion condition.  Neither the 
main effect of sentence structure nor the interaction between verb type and sentence structure 
was significant (Fs < 1.05, ps > .30). 
 As in Experiment 2, two independent raters coded the event status of the NPs supplied in 
the completions (entity NPs were coded as “0,” and event NPs were coded as “1”).  Agreement 
between raters was 90%.  Table 9 shows mean event ratings for the four conditions.  There was a 
significant main effect of verb type, F(1, 24) = 118.05, p < .001, indicating participants’ greater 
tendency to provide entity NPs for the Control fragments and event NPs for the Coercion 
fragments.  Neither the main effect of sentence structure nor the interaction between verb type 
and sentence structure was significant (Fs < 1.22, ps > .28) indicating that any effects of sentence 
structure on the magnitude of the coercion cost are unlikely to be due to readers’ expectations 
about the stimulus sentences. 
Table 9 
Predictability results from Experiment 3 completion study. 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
     Cleft-Coercion  It was the secretary that began the ________. 
     Cleft-Control  It was the secretary that wrote the ________. 
     Pseudocleft-Coercion What the secretary began was the ________. 
     Pseudocleft-Control What the secretary wrote was the ________. 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
  
    Proportion correct  Event rating 
     Cleft-Coercion   .05          .43 
     Cleft-Control   .25          .05 
     Pseudocleft-Coercion  .05          .36 
     Pseudocleft-Control  .22          .05 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Note.  For the event ratings, a score of “0” was assigned to entity NPs, whereas a score of “1” 
was assigned to event NPs. 
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 Procedure.  The sentences were counterbalanced across four lists, as in Experiments 1 
and 2.  All aspects of the eye-tracking procedure were identical to the procedure described in 
Experiment 1. 
 Analysis.  One of the items contained an animate target NP (i.e., The lawyer 
defended/endured the defendant), that could not be readily adapted to the pseudocleft structure 
used for the rest of the items.  This was addressed by constructing a different type of pseudocleft 
(i.e., The one who the lawyer defended/endured was the defendant).  However, this item elicited 
extreme processing difficulty relative to the other pseudoclefts and was excluded from all 
analyses.  Three regions of interest were defined as described in Experiment 1.  For each of these 
regions, we analyzed gaze duration, regression-path duration, second-pass duration, and total 
time.  The same data-exclusion criteria used in Experiments 1 and 2 were also employed here, 
eliminating 0.3% of the data. 
Results 
  Comprehension-question accuracy.  Mean comprehension-question accuracies for each 
condition were as follows: Cleft-Coercion (95%), Cleft-Control (95%), Pseudocleft-Coercion 
(96%), Pseudocleft-Control (95%).  There were no significant differences between conditions. 
Verb region.  Mean reading times for the three regions of interest are presented in Table 
10.  Analysis of regression-path duration showed a significant main effect of sentence structure, 
such that times were longer for the Pseudocleft compared to the Cleft conditions, F1(1, 47) = 
14.40, MSE = 7,295, p < .001; F2(1, 34) = 10.01, MSE = 6,344, p < .005.  The verb in the Cleft 
condition immediately follows the complementizer that, which serves as a cue to the reader that 
the following information is less important relative to the focused information at the beginning of 
the sentence.  Later processing measures also showed significant main effects of sentence  
115 
 
Table 10 
Results of Experiment 3. 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Measure (in milliseconds)      Verb  Target NP        Postnoun region 
     Cleft-Coercion       began  the memo          about the new … 
     Cleft-Control       wrote  the memo          about the new … 
     Pseudocleft-Coercion          began      (was) the memo          about the new … 
     Pseudocleft-Control          wrote       (was) the memo          about the new … 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Gaze duration 
     Cleft-Coercion       257   321   431 
     Cleft-Control       240   313   432  
     Pseudocleft-Coercion      242   310   423  
     Pseudocleft-Control      249   314   436 
Regression-path duration 
     Cleft-Coercion       322   409   630 
     Cleft-Control       309     366   483 
     Pseudocleft-Coercion      366   502   614 
     Pseudocleft-Control      359   472   547 
Second-pass duration 
     Cleft-Coercion       238   225   186 
     Cleft-Control       146   140   152 
     Pseudocleft-Coercion      291   211   176 
     Pseudocleft-Control      190   184   165 
Total time 
     Cleft-Coercion       503   579   693 
     Cleft-Control       398   478   615 
     Pseudocleft-Coercion      583   586   681 
     Pseudocleft-Control      473   555   659 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Note.  NP = noun phrase. 
 
structure in second-pass duration, F1(1, 47) = 12.29, MSE = 8,952, p < .005; F2(1, 34) = 11.35, 
MSE = 7,825, p < .005, and total time, F1(1, 47) = 17.80, MSE = 16,121, p < .001; F2(1, 34) = 
13.76, MSE = 12,850, p < .005, such that times were longer in the Pseudocleft compared to the 
Cleft conditions.  However, this effect is likely due to more rereading of the verb after hitting the 
target NP in the Pseudocleft condition (see below).  In addition, there were robust coercion costs 
on this region, with main effects of verb type emerging in second-pass duration, F1(1, 47) = 
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60.27, MSE = 7,370, p < .001; F2(1, 34) = 25.39, MSE = 12,322, p < .001, and total time, F1(1, 
47) = 41.04, MSE = 13,340, p < .001; F2(1, 34) = 18.16, MSE = 21,525, p < .001.  The 
interaction between sentence structure and verb type was not significant on any measure. 
Target NP.  Readers spent more time processing the target NP when it was focused by 
virtue of being in a pseudocleft compared to when it was in a cleft.  This main effect of sentence 
structure was observed in regression-path duration, F1(1, 47) = 31.23, MSE = 15,276, p < .001; 
F2(1, 34) = 44.74, MSE = 7,898, p < .001, and total time, F1(1, 47) = 5.39, MSE = 15,879, p <  
.03; F2(1, 34) = 7.37, MSE = 10,069, p < .02.  In addition, there was a significant main effect of 
verb type in regression-path duration (marginal in the item analysis), F1(1, 47) = 7.78, MSE = 
13,055, p < .05; F2(1, 34) = 2.80, MSE = 17,755, p = .10, second-pass duration, F1(1, 47) = 
31.03, MSE = 4,852, p < .001; F2(1, 34) = 6.33, MSE = 16,600, p < .02, and total time, F1(1, 47) 
= 16.95, MSE = 12,385, p < .001; F2(1, 34) = 3.89, MSE = 33,464, p < .06, such that the 
Coercion condition was more difficult than the Control condition.   
For regression-path duration, the interaction between sentence structure and verb type 
was not significant, though planned contrasts indicated a coercion effect for the Cleft condition, 
t1(47) = 2.26, p < .03; t2(34) = 1.94, p = .06, but not for the Pseudocleft condition, t1(47) = 1.15, 
p > .25; t2(34) < 1.  For second-pass duration, the interaction between sentence structure and verb 
type was significant, F1(1, 47) = 5.81, MSE = 6,881, p < .03; F2(1, 34) = 3.97, MSE = 6,733, p = 
.05.   Planned contrasts showed a strong coercion effect for the Cleft condition, t1(47) = 5.26, p < 
.001; t2(34) = 3.29, p < .005, whereas the coercion effect for the Pseudocleft condition did not 
reach significance, t1(47) = 1.80, p > .07; t2(34) = 1.02, p > .31.  In addition, there was a 
significant effect of sentence structure for the Control condition, such that the Pseudocleft-
Control condition was more difficult than the Cleft-Control condition, t1(47) = 2.97, p < .01; 
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t2(34) = 2.28, p < .05, but there was no difference between the Pseudocleft-Coercion condition 
and the Cleft-Coercion condition, ts < 1.  For total time, the interaction between sentence 
structure and verb type was again significant, F1(1, 47) = 4.91, MSE = 11,892, p < .05; F2(1, 34) 
= 3.72, MSE = 11,434, p = .06.  Whereas there was a strong coercion effect for the Cleft 
condition, t1(47) = 4.56, p < .001; t2(34) = 2.96, p < .01, the effect was eliminated altogether in 
the Pseudocleft condition, t1(47) = 1.37, p > .17; t2(34) < 1.  In addition, there was a significant 
effect of sentence structure for the Control condition, such that the Pseudocleft-Control condition 
was more difficult than the Cleft-Control condition, t1(47) = 3.16, p < .005; t2(34) = 3.60, p < 
.005, but there was no difference between the Pseudocleft-Coercion condition and the Cleft-
Coercion condition, ts < 1. 
Postnoun region.  There were no significant main effects of sentence structure in the 
postnoun region.  In contrast, main effects of verb type emerged in analysis of regression-path 
duration, F1(1, 47) = 34.28, MSE = 16,117, p < .001; F2(1, 34) = 11.59, MSE = 32,592, p < .005, 
and total time (significant in the subject analysis), F1(1, 47) = 5.71, MSE = 20,731, p < .03; F2(1, 
34) = 1.81, MSE = 39,581, p > .18.  For regression-path duration, the interaction between 
sentence structure and verb type was significant, F1(1, 47) = 4.90, MSE = 15,600, p < .04; F2(1, 
34) = 5.71, MSE = 9,757, p < .03, with the coercion effect for the Cleft condition (147 ms), t1(47) 
= 5.89, p < .001; t2(34) = 3.88, p < .001 being over twice as large as the coercion effect for the 
Pseudocleft condition (67 ms), t1(47) = 2.55, p < .02; t2(34) = 1.98, p < .06.  In addition, there 
was a significant effect of sentence structure for the Control condition, such that the Pseudocleft-
Control condition was more difficult than the Cleft-Control condition, t1(47) = 2.84, p < .01; 
t2(34) = 2.71, p < .02, but that there was no difference between the Pseudocleft-Coercion 
condition and the Cleft-Coercion condition, ts < 1.  For total time, the interaction between 
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sentence structure and verb type was marginally significant, F1(1, 47) = 2.91, MSE = 13,037, p < 
.10; F2(1, 34) = 2.31, MSE = 12,271, p > .13.  Planned contrasts showed evidence of a coercion 
effect for the Cleft condition, t1(47) = 3.21, p < .005; t2(34) = 1.97, p < .06, and no difference 
between the Pseudocleft-Coercion and Pseudocleft-Control conditions, ts < 1. 
Discussion 
 In line with the results of Experiment 2, Experiment 3 demonstrated that the processing 
cost associated with complement coercion is reduced when the verb and complement NP appear 
in separate clauses.  Evidence for this reduction in difficulty was seen at the complement NP in 
measures of regression-path duration, second-pass duration, and total time, and also on the 
postnoun region in measures of regression-path duration and total time.  A similar reduction in 
coercion cost was observed in Experiment 2, but differences in word order between those SRCs 
and ORCs made it difficult to determine whether the reduction was due to structural separation 
or to some other factor associated with the different word orders.  In contrast, the cleft and 
pseudocleft structures in the current experiment presented the content words in the same order, 
which reinforces the notion that these patterns of effects are due to differences in emphasis on 
the relationship between the verb and complement NP that structural separation affords.  When 
the verb and complement NP appeared together in the same clause (e.g., It was the secretary that 
began the memo…), robust coercion costs were observed across several regions of the sentence 
but this effect was reduced substantially when the verb and complement NP appeared in separate 
clauses (e.g., What the secretary began was the memo…). 
 The results of this experiment also demonstrate that while the amount of processing on 
the complement NP is increased by linguistic focus, linguistic focus does not increase the cost of 
coercion.  This finding shows that the difficulty of understanding complex semantic expressions 
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is due to noncanonical relationships among multiple elements in the sentence, with sentence 
structure guiding the reader’s limited attention to some relationships but not others.  When a 
complex semantic relationship is particularly salient, by virtue of all its components appearing 
together in a single clause, readers are more likely to focus on the relationship among these 
words and engage in a process of deep interpretation.  When instead the various elements that 
constitute a complex expression appear in separate clauses, the relationship is seen as being less 
important to the overall interpretation of the sentence, leading to shallower processing that does 
not fully address the semantic mismatch that is the source of the complexity.  
General Discussion 
 Taken together, the three experiments reported in this paper demonstrated that the 
processing cost associated with complement coercion was reduced when the event-selecting verb 
and entity NP appeared in different clauses.  Experiment 1 compared the magnitude of the 
coercion cost in a simple-sentence context (e.g., The secretary began the memo) to a sentence 
context where the critical verb and complement appeared together inside an RC (e.g., The 
secretary that began the memo).  Readers spent less time on the critical words when they were in 
an RC compared to when they were in the main clause; however the magnitude of the coercion 
cost was unaffected, suggesting that readers still computed the complex relationship between 
these constituents when both of them were deemphasized.  In contrast, when the complement NP 
appeared as the main-clause head and the event-selecting verb was embedded in an RC in 
Experiment 2 (e.g., The memo that the secretary began), difficulty was reduced relative to when 
both constituents appeared together inside the RC (e.g., The secretary that began the memo).  
Finally, the cleft and pseudocleft structures used in Experiment 3 allowed for a direct test of 
whether placing linguistic focus on the complement NP (i.e., the element that needs to be type-
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shifted) leads to enhanced processing difficulty or whether structural separation of the verb and 
complement leads to reduced difficulty.  Readers spent more time processing the complement 
NP when it was focused by the pseudocleft (e.g., What the secretary wrote/began was the memo) 
compared to when the cleft focused a different NP (e.g., It was the secretary that wrote/began 
the memo), suggesting that the structural properties of the pseudocleft did draw readers’ attention 
to the complement.  However, the magnitude of the coercion cost was reduced when the verb and 
complement appeared in separate clauses in the pseudoclefts compared to when they appeared in 
the same clause in the clefts.  This pattern of effects may seem counterintuitive.  That is, given 
that the pseudocleft highlights the complement as the most important element of the sentence, 
one might expect that this would also cause the reader to relate it to the other elements of the 
sentence in a deep and meaningful way, which would result in a larger coercion cost for the 
pseudoclefts than the clefts.  The fact that the opposite pattern of effects was obtained, combined 
with the finding from Experiment 1 that deemphasis of both constituents had no effect on the 
coercion cost, underscores the importance of considering how sentence structure influences the 
relationships between various constituents in the sentence and how emphasis or deemphasis of a 
single element may change its relation to other elements in the sentence.  
 The processing cost of coercion has been explained as arising from detection of a 
mismatch between the semantic characteristics of the verb and complement that then triggers an 
effortful process of reconfiguring the entity interpretation into an event interpretation (Traxler, 
McElree, et al., 2005).  In other words, a straightforward combination of the literal meanings of 
the verb and complement results in a defective interpretation, which requires the comprehender 
to derive a more appropriate meaning of the expression (Searle, 1979).  Accounts of the coercion 
cost have not typically been considered alongside accounts of figurative language processing and 
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other types of complex semantic expressions; however, we propose that they are similar in the 
sense that they involve a semantic mismatch and require greater processing as compared to more 
literal control expressions.  The findings reported here and in our previous work (Lowder & 
Gordon, 2012, 2013) support a basic prediction of the indirect access model for determining the 
meaning of complex semantic relations in sentences where there is a close structural relationship 
between the overt expressions that convey the mismatched meanings.  In particular, processing 
time on the critical expressions was longer for complex semantic relations than for a variety of 
control conditions.  Differences in time to comprehend complex versus control meanings have 
been commonly used in tests of the indirect access model (e.g., Clark & Lucy, 1975; Gerrig & 
Healy, 1983; Gildea & Glucksberg, 1983; Glucksberg, Gildea, & Bookin, 1982; Frisson & 
Pickering, 1999; Inhoff, Lima, & Carroll, 1984; Janus & Bever, 1985; Keysar, 1989; Ortony, 
Schallert, Reynolds, & Antos, 1978; Shinjo & Myers, 1987; for reviews, see Glucksberg, 2001, 
2003).  According to the indirect access model, the difference in reading times is due to the time 
necessary to detect the semantic mismatch and to undertake the additional processing required 
for meaningful interpretation.  We propose that the need to detect and resolve the semantic 
mismatch is common across different types of complex semantic relations but that the 
mechanisms for detection and resolution of the semantic mismatch are likely to differ depending 
on the type of expression.  For example, it has been argued that the cost of complement coercion 
reflects the time needed to mentally construct semantic representations that are not explicitly 
licensed by the syntax of the sentence (e.g., Frisson & McElree, 2008; Traxler et al., 2002, 
2005).  In contrast, it could be argued that for familiar metonyms resolution of the mismatch 
reflects operations involved in selecting the figurative sense of the word after initial 
consideration of its non-metonymic sense—a process that would be similar to finding the 
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contextually appropriate meaning of a homonym (e.g., Duffy, Morris, & Rayner, 1988; Rayner 
& Duffy, 1986; Rayner & Frazier, 1989; Sereno, Pacht, & Rayner, 1992).  The greater 
magnitude and broader distribution of the coercion cost as compared to the metonymy cost (see 
Lowder & Gordon, 2013) support the idea of a difference in the interpretation of complement 
coercion and metonymy.  This view is consistent with the interpretation offered by McElree, 
Frisson, & Pickering (2006) that “…there is a straightforward process of accessing a familiar 
metonym, but…a more complex process of enriched composition is involved in the resolution of 
[coercion]” (p. 189) in conceptualizing interpretation of complement coercion as more complex 
than interpretation of familiar metonyms.  However, our characterization differs from that of 
McElree et al. in that interpreting a familiar metonym is not regarded as completely 
straightforward (see Lowder & Gordon, 2013, for a discussion).   
Our findings further show that the difference in time spent processing complex semantic 
relations as compared to control conditions is eliminated or reduced when there is a distant 
structural relationship between the overt expressions that convey the mismatched meanings.  The 
indirect access model does not predict this moderating effect of sentence structure but it 
identifies two stages of processing where it might occur.  When the overt expressions that 
convey the mismatched meanings are structurally separated readers might be less likely to detect 
a semantic mismatch or they might interpret semantic relationships at a shallow level which does 
not lead to the extra processing required for full understanding.  This perspective highlights the 
importance of sentence structure as a powerful cue to language comprehension—one that 
indicates not only that particular constituents should be processed more deeply than others but 
also that particular relationships should be processed more deeply than others.  We propose that 
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there are several underlying mechanisms that may further explain the moderating effect of 
sentence structure. 
One possibility is that when an expression (e.g., a verb and complement) must be 
integrated across a clause boundary, readers compute the syntactic relationship between these 
two constituents but leave the semantic relationship underspecified.  Traditional notions of 
sentence processing propose that the meaning of a sentence is composed through a 
straightforward process that involves computing syntactic relationships among the words in the 
sentence and then using corresponding semantic operations to methodically assemble individual 
word meanings into an overall sentence meaning.  Complement coercion, as an example of 
enriched composition, challenges standard views of sentence processing by showing that 
language conveys meanings derived from the relation between expressions that are not explicitly 
licensed by syntax (see Pylkkӓnen & McElree, 2006, for a discussion).  When expressions 
requiring complement coercion are embedded in a syntactically complex sentence, readers may 
be particularly concerned with gaining a basic understanding of how the various nouns and verbs 
combine structurally and may not be as concerned with deriving a complete interpretation of the 
meaning of the relation between expressions.  For example, given a sentence like The memo that 
the secretary began announced …, readers may process the relations between the main clause 
and relative clause at a level where they understand that the secretary had something to do with 
the memo, but they do not fully distinguish the relationship until a later processing stage or 
perhaps not at all (for further discussion of underspecification, see Frisson, 2009; Frisson & 
Pickering, 1999, 2001; Lowder & Gordon, 2013).  This perspective is similar to the notion of 
good-enough processing (Ferreira et al., 2002; Ferreira & Patson, 2007), which proposes that 
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comprehenders often fail to arrive at a complete and accurate representation of a sentence, but 
rather derive an interpretation that is deemed “good enough” for the particular task at hand.   
 A second, potentially related possibility is that structural cues in the sentence may 
indicate to the reader that the relation conveyed should be interpreted as presupposed or given, 
and is thus not as important as relations that are asserted within a clause.  For example, in The 
memo that the secretary began announced …, the implication is that the secretary’s relation to 
the memo is background knowledge and is less important than understanding what information 
was contained in the memo.  Similarly, the phrase What the secretary began presupposes that 
some event has already occurred.  When the entity NP is asserted as that event (e.g., the memo), 
the strong presupposition due to sentence structure that an appropriate event has already taken 
place reduces the likelihood that the semantic mismatch between the entity NP and needed event 
will be detected and therefore reduces the processing cost of coercion.  In this way, structural 
manipulations that indicate to the reader which relationships should be focused on as opposed to 
those that are simply background knowledge may cue the reader to adopt an underspecified 
representation of a noncanonical relationship and instead focus deeply on the more prominent 
relations in the sentence. 
 The idea that structural manipulations mark a semantic relationship as presupposed might 
also explain the moderating effects of sentence structure on inanimate subject-verb integration 
(Lowder & Gordon, 2012) and metonymy (Lowder & Gordon, 2013).  For example, in the 
sentence The pistol that injured the cowboy remained in the saloon, the relationship between the 
sentence subject and the embedded verb seems to serve as background information relative to the 
information being asserted in the main clause of the sentence.  Indeed, this analysis highlights 
the role of the relative clause as a modifier, or adjunct phrase, as it serves to restrict the identity 
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of the head noun or further modify its meaning.  In a similar way, embedding a metonym in an 
adjunct phrase (e.g., The journalist offended the honor of the college) seems to mark it as 
presupposed, as though the college had already been brought into the discourse and is now being 
presented as background knowledge so that the more important relationships between the verb 
and its arguments can occupy the focus of the sentence.  Previous work has suggested that 
presupposed sentential information is less likely to attract attention and be evaluated deeply 
compared to information that is newly asserted (e.g., Baker & Wagner, 1987; Bredart & Modolo, 
1988; Engelkamp & Zimmer, 1982; Hornby, 1974); however, this work has tended to focus on 
the presupposition or assertion of particular words in the sentence rather than the relationship 
between multiple constituents.   
Conclusion 
The psycholinguistic literature on complement coercion, inanimate subject-verb 
integration, metonymy, and other types of figurative language has tended to characterize these 
phenomena as distinct.  Although the precise mechanisms that lead to successful interpretation of 
these forms may vary, we believe that they are all similar in that they involve a semantic 
mismatch at the level of literal meaning.  Critically, the structure of the sentence influences the 
likelihood that the mismatch will be detected and the degree to which additional processing that 
establishes meaningful relations is performed. 
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CHAPTER 5:  Corpus Study 
Experimental work in psycholinguistics is often supplemented by corpus analyses that 
provide information about the rates of occurrence for a given type of linguistic expression in 
samples of naturally occurring language.  Frequency patterns in corpus data can be compared to 
reading patterns during online sentence processing in order to determine whether ease of 
processing is correlated with frequency of occurrence.  The experimental work presented in this 
dissertation (Lowder & Gordon, 2012, 2013, under review) demonstrates that complex semantic 
expressions are difficult to process when the critical constituents that represent the expression all 
appear in the same clause of the sentence, but that this difficulty is reduced when one constituent 
appears in the main clause of the sentence and another appears in a relative clause or another 
adjunct phrase.  The goal of the corpus analyses is to determine whether a corresponding 
frequency pattern emerges in naturally occurring language.  Finding that the constituents of a 
complex semantic expression occur more frequently across clause boundaries or as part of an 
adjunct phrase than together in the same clause of the sentence would provide evidence that 
patterns of language usage correspond with patterns of online processing difficulty.  However, 
because such results are correlational, they do not identify a cause.  That is, this outcome could 
imply that our relative ease of processing complex semantic expressions when they appear across 
a clause boundary is driven by our greater experience with these expressions in these types of 
sentence structures.  On the other hand, it may be the case that the relative ease of 
comprehending these constructions causes people to produce them more frequently, or that both 
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frequency of production and ease of understanding are themselves the consequence of some 
other factor.  Even without knowing the direction of causality, finding such a relationship 
between the experimental results and the results of the corpus analyses would provide 
compelling evidence that the processes responsible for both comprehension and production of 
complex semantic expressions reflect common constraints. 
Alternatively, there may be no relationship between ease of comprehension and 
frequency patterns, or even the opposite pattern of effects such that the more difficult 
expressions are the ones that appear more frequently.  This outcome would suggest that 
producers of figurative language and other complex semantic expressions do not bury them in 
defocused sentence positions but instead position them prominently in the sentence.  One 
possible explanation for this pattern would be that when we choose to produce figurative 
language, we want it to have a noticeable rhetorical effect.  Thus, language producers may tend 
to place these expressions in focused sentence positions, even though the comprehender may 
have to work a little harder in order to arrive at the intended interpretation. 
Corpus 
The corpus analyses reported here were conducted using the Corpus of Contemporary 
American English (COCA; Davies, 2008), a web-based corpus containing over 450 million 
words sampled from a wide variety of sources (e.g., fiction, magazines, newspapers, academic 
journals) from 1990-2012 (http://corpus.byu.edu/coca/).  COCA has been used frequently in 
previous linguistic and psycholinguistic studies to investigate a wide variety of linguistic 
phenomena (e.g., Allen, Pereira, Botvinick, & Goldberg, 2012; Choi & Gordon, 2013; Kuperman 
& Van Dyke, 2013; Lowder, Choi, & Gordon, 2013; Lowder & Gordon, 2012; Mack, Clifton, 
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Frazier, & Taylor, 2012; Ramscar, Matlock, & Dye, 2010; Rayner, Slattery, Drieghe, & 
Liversedge, 2011).
9
  
Metonymy and Sentence Structure 
Lowder and Gordon (2013) showed that the figurative sense of a familiar place-for-
institution metonym (e.g., The journalist offended the college) is more difficult to process than 
the literal sense of the metonym (e.g., The journalist photographed the college) or a noun that 
refers directly to a person (e.g., The journalist offended the leader) when the target word 
appeared as an argument of the verb.  This difficulty was reduced when the metonym appeared 
as part of an adjunct phrase (e.g., The journalist offended the honor of the college).  To 
supplement these experimental findings, a corpus analysis was conducted on a sample of place-
for-institution metonyms.  The 16 familiar metonyms (e.g., college, consulate) used in Lowder 
and Gordon came directly from Frisson and Pickering (1999), who had performed their own 
corpus analysis on the target words, coding each occurrence as “literal” or “figurative.”  Frisson 
and Pickering showed that across their set of items, there was no difference in how frequent the 
literal versus the figurative sense appeared, although there was a great deal of variability across 
individual items (i.e., some metonyms appeared much more often in a literal context than a 
figurative context, whereas other metonyms showed the reverse pattern).  Importantly, Frisson 
and Pickering did not code their metonyms on syntactic role, which Lowder and Gordon showed 
to be a key factor that modulates metonymic processing.  The current corpus analysis examines 
patterns of naturally occurring language to determine whether the syntactic role of a metonym is 
                                                          
9
 Before consulting COCA, I first attempted to conduct the corpus analyses using the Penn Treebank project 
(Marcus, Marcinkiewicz, & Santorini, 1993), which consists of several corpora (Brown, Wall Street Journal, and 
Switchboard) that have been carefully parsed and annotated.  However, the relatively small size of these corpora 
(fewer than 5 million words in total) made it impossible to obtain enough tokens to perform the analyses.  For 
example, the metonym convent occurs only 12 times in these corpora, and the metonym consulate does not occur at 
all.  In addition, there were very few instances of relative clauses with embedded event-selecting verbs (e.g., The 
memo that the secretary began…).   
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related to the context in which it appears (i.e., whether it is more likely to be used literally or 
figuratively). 
Method 
 As a first step, the corpus was randomly sampled for 500 instances of each of the 16 
words that can be used as familiar metonyms (i.e., academy, college, consulate, convent, court, 
embassy, gallery, headquarters, hospital, institute, palace, prison, school, store, treasury, 
university).  The sentences were then presented to two native-English-speaking linguistics 
students who were naïve as to the purpose of the study.  These coders judged the syntactic role of 
each metonym according to whether it was an argument of the verb, part of an adjunct phrase, or 
neither.  The coders made a further distinction regarding the specific type of argument (subject, 
direct object, or indirect object) or adjunct phrase (prepositional phrase or subordinate clause).  A 
token was coded as “neither” if it was used as a modifier (e.g., college campus, college 
administration) or if it otherwise could not be classified as an argument or adjunct.  Such a large 
number of tokens was sampled because many of these metonyms are very frequently used as 
modifiers (e.g., a majority of the uses of treasury are as pre-nominal modifiers: treasury rates, 
treasury department, treasury secretary, treasury bonds, treasury notes, treasury securities, 
etc.).   
 The distinction between arguments and adjuncts is not always obvious.  For example, in 
the sentence John put the book in the room, the prepositional phrase in the room is an argument 
because the sentence is incomplete without it (i.e., John put the book).  In contrast, in the 
sentence John saw the book in the room, the prepositional phrase in the room is an adjunct 
because the sentence is complete without it (i.e., John saw the book).  In samples of naturally 
occurring language, this distinction can be even more difficult to make.  Rules of thumb for 
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making these judgments have been provided by Schütze and Gibson (1999).  The coders were 
taught these rules and went through several examples before they began coding of the actual 
materials.  For the most part, the coders were presented with different sets of sentences to code, 
although a randomly selected subset of sentences for each of the metonyms was presented to 
both coders to assess reliability.  Agreement between raters for these items was 88%, and items 
on which coders disagreed were eliminated.   
The tokens that had been labeled as arguments or adjuncts were again randomly sampled 
to yield 30 arguments and 30 adjuncts for each of the 16 metonyms.  These were then presented 
to the coders, who were instructed to code each according to whether the metonym was being 
used literally or figuratively.  Again, this judgment is not always easy to make, but in general 
these decisions can be made by paying close attention to the verb phrase.  If the relationship 
between the metonym and the verb can easily be extended to an animate noun and that verb, then 
the metonym is likely being used in its figurative sense.  For example, in the phrases The White 
House announced a new strategy, The applicants consulted with the university, or The patient 
threatened to sue the hospital, we can easily swap out the metonym for an animate noun.  Here, 
the figurative sense of the metonym is being evoked by the context.  On the other hand, if the 
relationship between the metonym and the verb cannot easily be extended to an animate noun 
and that verb, then the metonym is likely being used in its literal sense.  For example, in the 
phrases The terrorists stormed into the White House, The applicants strolled through the 
university, or The patient was admitted to the hospital, the sentence becomes awkward or 
anomalous if we try to swap out the metonym for an animate noun.  Here, the context of the 
sentence is evoking the sense of the metonym associated with the literal, physical place.  Coders 
were given several clear examples and several more ambiguous examples to train on and discuss 
131 
 
before coding of the critical items began.  Again, the coders were presented with different sets of 
sentences to code, although a randomly selected subset of sentences for each of the metonyms 
was presented to both coders to assess reliability.  Agreement between raters for these items was 
89%, and items on which coders disagreed were eliminated and replaced.   
Examples from the corpus of metonyms used in both literal and figurative senses at each 
sentence position are presented in Table 11. 
Analysis 
 Given that the dependent variable was binomial (i.e., literal or figurative), the data were 
modeled using logit mixed effects models.  This approach allows for analysis of binomial data 
while simultaneously considering the influence of fixed and random factors (Jaeger, 2008).  The 
data were analyzed in R using the lme4 package for linear mixed effects modeling (Baayen, 
Davidson, & Bates, 2008; Bates & Sarkar, 2007). 
Results 
 Table 12 shows the frequency of literal and figurative senses of metonyms by 
grammatical role.  Collapsing across grammatical role, there were 581 instances of metonyms 
being used literally (61%) and 379 instances of metonyms being used figuratively (39%).  
Modeling these data with only the random effect of metonym (entered as random intercepts) 
showed a marginally significant difference, β = -0.54, SE = 0.29, z = -1.85, p < .07.  There was a 
great deal of variability in sense frequency across the various metonyms.  For example, palace 
was used literally in 93% of sentences and figuratively in only 7%, whereas academy was used 
literally in 23% of sentences and figuratively in 77%.  For 10 of the metonyms, the literal sense 
was the most frequent; for the remaining six, the figurative sense was the most frequent.  These 
patterns are consistent with Frisson and Pickering (1999), who used a different corpus but still 
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showed that there was not a reliable difference in the overall frequencies of the literal versus the 
figurative senses of metonyms when grammatical role was not taken into account.   
Table 11 
Examples of literal and figurative senses of metonyms by grammatical role 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Literal 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Arguments    
Subjects The convent was immaculate and smelled strongly of floor wax and 
furniture polish.  
Direct objects Kta and Yoshikawa rushed to the consulate and, tuning in to Radio Tokyo, 
heard a weather forecast that included the phrase “East wind, rain”—a 
prearranged signal that war against the United States was imminent.  
     Indirect objects So they brought them all to the U.S. Embassy, where hundreds wait in line 
   for help.   
 
Adjuncts    
     Prep. phrases We often don’t have enough drugs in the hospital. 
     Sub. clauses     C.A. was a blunt, sociable Ohio boy who left Allegheny College after two 
years, impatient with formal study, to take a job as a salesman in 
preparation for partnership in his father’s maple-syrup cannery in 
Garrettsville.  
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Figurative 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Arguments    
Subjects The convent hadn’t absorbed her completely.   
Direct objects According to Tracy, Aramco provided arrested employees with lawyers 
and informed the consulate of the arrest.   
     Indirect objects According to a highly placed U.S. official, the speech was outlined by 
Constant’s old CIA contact, Kambourian, and handed over to the U.S. 
embassy, which in turn dictated it to Constant, who apparently accepted it 
without his usual bravado.    
 
Adjuncts    
Prep. phrases But the couple’s battle with the hospital fueled suspicions that they were 
trying to delay the criminal investigation. 
Sub. clauses     He was asked what he sees as the greatest challenge facing City College 
as it nears the 21st century. 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
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Table 12 
Counts of literal and figurative senses of metonyms by grammatical role.  Percentages in 
parentheses represent percentage of tokens classified as literal or figurative within a given row. 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
         Literal         Figurative           Total 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Arguments   257 (54%)  223 (46%)  480 
     Subjects        50  (26%)  143  (74%)  193   
     Direct objects  163 (70%)  69 (30%)  232       
     Indirect objects  44 (80%)  11 (20%)  55  
 
Adjuncts   324 (68%)  156 (32%)  480 
     Prepositional phrases 199 (67%)  100 (33%)  299 
     Subordinate clauses     125 (69%)  56 (31%)  181  
 
Total    581 (61%)  379 (39%)  960 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
     
An additional model was run that incorporated grammatical role (i.e., whether the 
metonym appeared in an argument or as part of an adjunct phrase) as a fixed effect and metonym 
as a random effect.  The effect of grammatical role was highly significant, β = 0.77, SE = 0.15, z 
= 5.02, p < .001.  Although metonyms that appeared as arguments did not differ with respect to  
whether they were used literally or figuratively, β = -0.17, SE = 0.36, z = -0.48, p > .60, 
metonyms that appeared as adjuncts were significantly more likely to be used literally than 
figuratively, β = -0.87, SE = 0.26, z = -3.33, p < .001.  In addition, a metonym used in its 
figurative sense was more likely to appear as an argument than as part of an adjunct phrase, β = 
0.36, SE = 0.10, z = 3.43, p < .001, whereas a metonym appearing in its literal sense was more 
likely to appear as part of an adjunct phrase than as an argument, β = -0.23, SE = 0.08, z = -2.77, 
p < .01. 
       The effect of grammatical role on metonym sense was examined further by considering the 
specific type of argument or adjunct.  First, the proportion of figurative uses was analyzed only 
for arguments with grammatical role (i.e., subject, direct object, or indirect object) as a fixed 
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effect and metonym as a random effect.  There was a robust effect of grammatical role, β = -
1.63, SE = 0.21, z = -7.82, p < .001, reflecting the greater tendency for metonyms to be used 
figuratively than literally when they appeared as subjects (74% figurative versus 26% literal), but 
a reversal of this trend when metonyms appeared as direct objects (70% literal versus 30% 
figurative) or indirect objects (80% literal versus 20% figurative).  A similar model was 
computed for adjuncts with grammatical role (i.e., prepositional phrase or subordinate clause) as 
a fixed effect and metonym as a random effect.  There was no effect of grammatical role, β = -
0.06, SE = 0.22, z = -0.27, p > .75, reflecting the greater tendency for metonyms to be used 
literally than figuratively when they appeared either in a prepositional phrase (67% literal versus 
33% figurative) or as part of a subordinate clause (69% literal versus 31% figurative).     
Discussion 
 The results of the corpus analysis show that in general a metonym used in its figurative 
sense is more likely to appear as an argument than an adjunct, whereas a metonym used in its 
literal sense is more likely to appear as part of an adjunct phrase than as an argument.  This 
pattern is particularly interesting given that readers tend to experience enhanced online difficulty 
when encountering the figurative sense of a metonym when it appears as an argument, 
suggesting perhaps that language producers tend to position figurative expressions prominently 
in the sentence rather than bury them in a defocused sentence position.  Figurative expressions 
and other complex semantic expressions can be very effective rhetorical devices, and so it seems 
plausible that language producers may want to highlight these expressions, even though 
comprehenders may need to exert more processing resources to interpret them. 
 Closer examination of the data revealed that the greater tendency for figurative uses of 
metonyms to appear in arguments than adjuncts was driven entirely by metonyms that appeared 
as sentence subjects.  In contrast, metonyms that appeared as direct objects or indirect objects 
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patterned with adjuncts in having a higher proportion of literal than figurative uses.  Thus, the 
frequency data cannot be easily reconciled with the processing patterns reported by Lowder and 
Gordon (2013), where the arguments we used were always direct objects and the adjunct phrases 
we used were always prepositional phrases.  Whereas the corpus data reported here show that 
direct objects and prepositional phrases pattern together in proportions of figurative versus literal 
senses of a metonym, Lowder and Gordon demonstrate different processing patterns for 
figurative versus literal senses depending on its sentence structure.  I return to this point in the 
next chapter.  
Complement Coercion and Sentence Structure 
Lowder and Gordon (under review) showed that the processing difficulty associated with 
complement coercion is reduced when the event-selecting verb and entity NP appear in separate 
clauses (e.g., The memo that the secretary began) compared to when they appear in the same 
clause (e.g., The secretary that began the memo).  Lowder and Gordon also reported the results 
of a separate completion experiment where participants were presented with sentence fragments 
(e.g., The secretary that began the…; The memo that the secretary…) and were instructed to 
make a complete sentence.  The NPs were coded as to whether they corresponded to entities or 
events, whereas the verbs were coded as to whether they were entity-selecting or event-selecting.  
Results showed that participants completed the subject-relative clauses (e.g., The secretary that 
began the…) with a mix of entity NPs (e.g., memo) and event NPs (e.g., meeting), whereas 
participants almost always completed the object-relative clauses (e.g., The memo that the 
secretary…) with an entity-selecting verb (e.g., wrote) and very rarely provided an event-
selecting verb (e.g., began).  Interestingly, this pattern is the opposite of the pattern we obtained 
in the reading-time data (i.e., readers experience reduced difficulty with a construction like The 
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memo that the secretary began, even though they almost never provide an event-selecting verb 
as the embedded verb in this construction).  The current corpus analysis was conducted to 
determine whether patterns of natural language correspond more closely to the results we 
obtained in the reading-time study or the predictability study.  Instances of event-selecting verbs 
embedded in relative clauses were obtained, and their complement NPs were coded according to 
whether they referred to entities or events. 
Method 
As a first step, the corpus was randomly sampled for 1,000 instances of each of the 10 
event-selecting verbs used in Lowder and Gordon (under review) (i.e., attempted, began, 
endured, enjoyed, finished, mastered, preferred, resisted, started, tried) that appeared in a 
sentence where it was preceded by a complementizer (i.e., that, who, which, or whom).  The 
sentences were then presented to two native-English-speaking linguistics students who were 
naïve as to the purpose of the study.  These coders judged whether the target word served as the 
embedded verb of a subject-extracted relative clause (SRC), the embedded verb of an object-
extracted relative clause (ORC), or neither.  Such a large number of tokens was sampled because 
these fairly general search criteria returned many hundreds of constructions that were not 
actually RCs.  These included sentences where the complementizer and target verb appeared in 
separate clauses (e.g., They constitute the first West Point student body that contains no cadets 
enrolled before communism began to crumble), sentences where the complementizer was used as 
a demonstrative pronoun (e.g., Everyone agreed to this, and that was how the adventure began), 
and sentences where the complementizer introduced a clause that was not an RC (e.g., He said 
that he began to have anxiety attacks when he went on stage).  In addition, SRCs or ORCs where 
the target verb combined with another verb phrase (e.g., began to write, began writing) or where 
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the target verb was used intransitively (e.g., The play that began last night was enjoyed by all) 
were excluded.  Thus, the goal was to obtain a sample of SRCs and ORCs that contained the 
target verb in the embedded verb position and that also combined with a complement NP, similar 
to the stimuli used in Lowder and Gordon.  The coders were taught these rules and went through 
several examples before coding of the actual materials began.  For the most part, the coders were 
presented with different sets of sentences to code, although a randomly selected subset of 
sentences for each of the target verbs was presented to both coders to assess reliability.  
Agreement between raters for these items was 95%, and items on which coders disagreed were 
eliminated.  Examples from the corpus of valid SRCs and ORCs are presented in Table 13. 
Table 13 
Examples of SRCs and ORCs 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
SRCs 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Can you help a man who attempted suicide and beat a child? 
Bushehr was built largely with equipment from Siemens, the German industrial giant that began 
the reactors in the 1970s but later pulled out of the project. 
Joan, who had just endured many months of torment, was watching Kate with real concern. 
Donny, who enjoyed a good cigar from time to time, poured himself another half-cup of coffee. 
Rose, who on Monday finished a five-month prison term for tax felonies, was banned from 
baseball. 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
ORCs 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
But both are necessary ingredients in the genre that Ms. Lippman has mastered in the last 
decade. 
Social preferences were closely tied to church involvement, which older adults preferred over 
other activities. 
Bazerman and Loewenstein favor an approach that the accounting industry has fiercely resisted. 
Marc found a diary, his mother's diary, which she started in 1909 when she was 23. 
My daughter vetoed a number of the books that we tried early on because she felt they were -- 
though she didn't use this word -- too moralizing. 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
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 The tokens that had been labeled as valid RCs were again randomly sampled to yield 20 
SRCs and 20 ORCs for each of the 10 target verbs.  The complement NPs for each of these were 
then presented to the coders without their corresponding sentence contexts (e.g., suicide, the 
reactors, the genre, church involvement).  Coders were instructed to decide whether each NP 
more accurately referred to an entity or an event.  This judgment is not always easy to make, but 
coders were told to code an NP as an “entity” if it represented something that existed or that a 
person might possess and to code an NP as an “event” if it represented something that could 
happen and that could be defined by temporal boundaries.  Coders were given several examples 
of entities (e.g., banana, money, ability, sense of humor) and of events (e.g., war, race, hike, 
meeting).  Coders assigned a value of “0” to NPs referring to entities and “1” to NPs referring to 
events.  Both coders independently judged all of the NPs.  Agreement between coders was 86%. 
Analysis 
Judgments from the coders were averaged together such that each NP received a “0” if 
both coders rated it an entity, a “1” if both coders rated it an event, and “0.5” if the coders 
disagreed.  Note that this is the same approach we took in analyzing the data for the 
predictability studies in Lowder and Gordon (under review, Experiments 2 and 3).  The ratings 
were analyzed according to whether the NP had appeared in an SRC or an ORC.    
Results 
 The mean event rating for NPs that appeared in SRCs was 0.63, whereas the mean event 
rating for NPs that appeared in ORCs was 0.34.  This was a highly reliable difference, F(1, 9) = 
28.72, p < .001, reflecting a greater tendency for complement NPs that appear in SRCs with an 
event-selecting verb to refer to events than entities and a greater tendency for complement NPs 
that appear in ORCs with an event-selecting verb to refer to entities than events.  This pattern 
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was remarkably consistent across all 10 of the event-selecting verbs sampled from the corpus 
(see Table 14).  The overall pattern suggests that expressions requiring complement coercion 
(e.g., began the memo) are more likely to appear in ORCs (e.g., The memo that the secretary 
began) than in SRCs (e.g., The secretary that began the memo). 
Table 14 
Mean event ratings for NPs appearing in SRCs or ORCs, across different event-selecting verbs 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
         SRC     ORC            
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Verbs sampled from corpus  
 attempted  0.80  0.40 
 began   0.88  0.48 
 endured  0.88  0.75 
 enjoyed  0.53  0.20 
 finished  0.90  0.25 
 mastered  0.28  0.15 
 preferred  0.23  0.13 
 resisted  0.55  0.23 
 started   0.65  0.35 
 tried   0.40  0.13 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Note. A score of “0” was assigned to entity NPs, whereas a score of “1” was assigned to event 
NPs. 
Discussion 
The results of the corpus analysis show that expressions requiring complement coercion 
consisting of an event-selecting verb and an entity-denoting NP are more likely to appear across 
the clause boundary of an ORC than with both constituents embedded together in an SRC.  This 
pattern is consistent with the reading-time results of Lowder and Gordon (under review), where 
we showed that the online cost of complement coercion is reduced when integration takes place 
across a clause boundary compared to when integration takes place within the same clause.  This 
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pattern indicates that at least part of the reason that readers experience reduced difficulty for 
coercion expressions when the critical constituents appear in separate clauses may stem from the 
tendency to produce sentences where an entity-denoting NP and event-selecting verb appear in 
separate clauses, as opposed to positioning them in the same clause.   
Interestingly, the results of the corpus analysis do not align with the results of the 
predictability studies conducted in Lowder and Gordon (under review).  In the predictability 
study that accompanied Experiment 2, participants were extremely unlikely to ever complete a 
stem like The memo that the secretary… with an event-selecting verb, yet participants frequently 
completed stems like The secretary that began the… with an entity-denoting NP.  Comparing 
rates of verb completions with rates of NP completions here is potentially problematic; however, 
Experiment 3 controlled for this issue by presenting participants with fragments representing 
clefts (e.g., It was the secretary that began the…) and pseudoclefts (e.g., What the secretary 
began was the…) and coding the collected NPs according to whether they were events or entities.  
There was no indication here that event scores differed across cleft type.  
 A possible explanation for why the corpus analysis showed different entity/event scores 
for NPs in ORCs compared to NPs in SRCs may have to do with basic differences in what types 
of NPs tend to appear in main clauses versus relative clauses.  Note that the complement NPs 
extracted from ORCs always appeared in the main clause of the sentence (e.g., Marc found a 
diary, his mother’s diary, which she started in 1909 when she was 23.), whereas the complement 
NPs extracted from SRCs were always embedded within the RC (e.g., Donny, who enjoyed a 
good cigar from time to time, poured himself another half-cup of coffee.).  It may be the case that 
inanimate NPs that serve as the head of an RC are more likely to be entities than events simply 
because they are more likely to modify entities than events with RCs.  For example, an entity 
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like “the memo” may need to be differentiated from many other memos (e.g., Which memo 
announced the new pay cuts? The memo that the secretary began).  In contrast, it may be less 
likely that we need to modify an event NP with an RC in order to differentiate it from other 
events.  For example, a sentence like “The coffee break that the secretary began lasted five 
minutes” suggests that this coffee break needs to be singled out from other coffee breaks.  It may 
be the case that the broader discourse of natural language has already clarified what sort of event 
is being discussed, making it unlikely that an RC would be needed for additional modification. 
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CHAPTER 6:  Conclusions 
 The experimental results reported in this dissertation can be summarized as follows.  
First, readers experience enhanced difficulty processing an expression that contains a semantic 
mismatch compared to control expressions when the critical constituents share a tight structural 
relationship (i.e., appearing together in the same clause of the sentence).  Second, this processing 
difficulty is reduced or eliminated completely when one of the critical constituents appears in the 
main clause of the sentence and another is embedded in a relative clause or some other adjunct 
phrase.  Third, the effect of sentence structure on the processing of complex semantic 
expressions depends on structural emphasis or deemphasis of the relationship between the 
critical linguistic elements that require a complex interpretation rather than specific constituents.  
The theoretical implications of each of these findings are discussed in the following sections. 
Interpretation of Nonliteral Language 
 A straightforward combination of the literal meanings of individual words often fails to 
produce the intended meaning of the expression.  Although there have been efforts to understand 
the mechanisms that allow readers to successfully comprehend nonliteral language, this work has 
tended to focus on specific expressions individually, without considering ways in which the 
processing of these various constructions might be similar.  Within the realm of figurative-
language processing, psycholinguists characterized the standard pragmatic model (Grice, 1975; 
Searle, 1979) as an indirect-access model (Clark & Lucy, 1975; Janus & Bever, 1985), which 
proposed that figurative expressions such as metaphor and metonymy are processed according to 
the following steps: (1) the comprehender computes the literal meaning of the expression using 
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the stored meanings of lexical entries; (2) the comprehender determines whether the literal 
meaning of the expression seems appropriate in the broader sentence context or whether it 
instead seems “defective” (Searle, 1979); and (3) if the literal meaning is defective, the 
comprehender searches for an alternative meaning.  According to the indirect access model, 
longer reading times for figurative compared to literal expressions are attributed to this sequence 
of processing stages.   
 Although this account has typically only been discussed in relation to figurative-language 
processing, its predictions can easily be expanded to other types of complex semantic 
expressions.  For example, Traxler, McElree, Williams, and Pickering (2005) have proposed that 
the processing difficulty associated with complement coercion (e.g., began the memo) can be 
attributed to the following sequence of operations: (1) the comprehender accesses the stored 
lexical entry for the complement noun (e.g., memo) and attempts to integrate its meaning with 
the unfolding meaning of the sentence; (2) the comprehender detects a semantic mismatch 
between the stored semantic characteristics of the noun and the thematic properties of the verb, 
which triggers the coercion process; (3) the comprehender attempts to resolve the semantic 
mismatch by using the context of the sentence to infer an action that could plausibly be 
performed on the noun; and (4) the comprehender reconfigures the semantic properties of the 
complement to allow for an event interpretation (e.g., began writing the memo).  This proposed 
sequence of processing stages closely resembles the indirect access model, yet Traxler et al. do 
not explicitly characterize it as such (see also Pylkkӓnen & McElree, 2006; Pylkkӓnen, 2008).  
I propose that the processing of a wide variety of complex semantic expressions proceeds 
in a way very similar to the predictions of the indirect access model and Traxler et al.’s 
explanation of the coercion cost described above: (1) the comprehender makes an initial attempt 
144 
 
to establish meaningful semantic relations based on the stored senses of the words in the 
sentence, (2) the comprehender detects a semantic mismatch (or “defect”) when initial 
interpretation fails, and (3) the comprehender uses contextual information to resolve the 
mismatch and ultimately arrive at the intended meaning.  The need to detect and resolve the 
semantic mismatch seems to be common across different types of complex semantic relations; 
however, the specific mechanisms that lead to detection and resolution of the semantic mismatch 
may differ depending on the type of expression.  For example, whereas a great deal of previous 
work argues that the cost of complement coercion reflects the time needed to mentally construct 
semantic representations that are not licensed by the syntax of the sentence (e.g., Frisson & 
McElree, 2008; McElree et al., 2001; Pickering et al., 2005; Traxler et al., 2002, 2005), work on 
metonymy argues that readers do not generate additional sentential material, but rather select the 
figurative sense of a metonym among several possible senses (e.g., Frisson & Pickering, 1999; 
Clark & Gerrig, 1983; Gerrig, 1989), which may be similar to the process of finding the 
contextually appropriate meaning of a homonym (e.g., Duffy et al., 1988; Rayner & Duffy, 1986; 
Rayner & Frazier, 1989; Sereno et al., 1992).  The view that different mechanisms are 
responsible for the interpretation of coercion and metonymy is consistent with the conclusions of 
previous work (see, e.g., McElree et al., 2006).  Critically though, this previous work has tended 
to argue that the processing of familiar metonyms is cost-free, whereas the processing of 
coercion is more complex.  In contrast to this view, our work shows that the processing of 
familiar metonyms is not as straightforward as the processing of literal expressions (Lowder & 
Gordon, 2013), but rather does impose a processing cost, at least when the metonym is in a 
syntactically prominent position. 
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Syntax-by-Semantics Interactions 
 The moderating effect of sentence structure on the processing of complex semantic 
expressions is not predicted by the indirect access model, although the model does identify the 
stages of processing where sentence structure might exert its effect.  I propose that when the 
critical constituents of a complex semantic expression are structurally separated, readers are less 
likely to detect the semantic mismatch or they interpret the semantic relation at a shallow or 
underspecified level.  More specifically, readers may compute the syntactic relationship between 
two semantically mismatched constituents without fully computing their meaning.  Initial 
support for this explanation comes from an eye-tracking experiment we’ve recently conducted 
(Lowder & Gordon, 2014a), where instead of manipulating semantic complexity between two 
constituents, we manipulated the syntactic feature of number agreement.  Participants read 
sentences where the subject and target verb either matched in grammatical number or 
mismatched, and whether integration occurred within a clause or across a clause boundary, as in 
(1).   
 (1a)  The cowboy injures the sheriff in the bar… 
 (1b)  The cowboy that injures the sheriff in the bar… 
 (1c)  The cowboy injure the sheriff in the bar… 
 (1d)  The cowboy that injure the sheriff in the bar… 
 (1e)  The cowboys injures the sheriff in the bar… 
 (1f)  The cowboys that injures the sheriff in the bar… 
 (1g)  The cowboys injure the sheriff in the bar… 
 (1h)  The cowboys that injure the sheriff in the bar… 
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In general, readers showed a higher proportion of regressive saccades and longer regression-path 
durations at the verb (e.g., injure/injures) when the subject and verb mismatched in grammatical 
number than when they matched.  Critically, this effect was larger when integration took place 
inside a relative clause than when integration took place locally within a single clause.  This 
pattern suggests that readers are concerned with computing accurate syntactic relations across 
clause boundaries.  Considering these results along with our experiments on semantic 
complexities (Lowder & Gordon, 2012, 2013, under review), it seems plausible to propose that 
readers compute the syntactic relationship between two semantically mismatched constituents 
(e.g., The memo that the secretary began announced…), but do not process the meaning of the 
relation at a deep level (e.g., “The secretary had something to do with the memo”).    
 It is also important to note that the structural manipulations employed in these 
experiments may have served as cues to the readers that some linguistic information should be 
interpreted as presupposed or given, compared to information being newly asserted in the 
sentence.  For example, relative clauses typically convey information that is presupposed or 
given by a previous discourse context (e.g., Fox & Thompson, 1990; Gordon & Hendrick, 2005), 
whereas the linguistic material presented in the main clause is likely seen as the more important 
information.  This perspective explains why readers do not spend as much time processing the 
semantic relation between an inanimate subject and an action verb (e.g., The pistol that injured 
the cowboy was in the saloon) or an event-selecting verb and an entity NP (e.g., The memo that 
the secretary began announced the pay cuts) when the verb is embedded in an RC compared to 
when it is in the main clause of the sentence.  That is, the relation between the sentence subject 
and embedded verb is perhaps interpreted as background knowledge compared to the 
information being asserted in the main clause of the sentence.  Similarly, embedding a metonym 
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in an adjunct phrase (e.g., The journalist offended the honor of the college) seems to indicate that 
the information it contains is presupposed, as the phrase “of the college” implies that “the 
college” had already been part of the discourse and is now appearing in the sentence to modify a 
new entity (e.g., “the honor”).  In this way, readers may use these structural cues to determine 
which parts of the sentence are more important to focus on than others, leading to shallow or 
underspecified interpretations of some semantic relationships.    
 The comprehension questions that followed sentences in the experiments discussed here 
were not designed to probe whether readers had arrived at the intended interpretation of the 
complex expression.  However, future work must begin to characterize the types of 
representations readers adopt when linguistic material is integrated across multiple clauses.  If it 
is the case that readers process the meaning of a complex expression at a shallower level when it 
spans two clauses, then we should be able to obtain evidence that comprehension for this 
material is lower or perhaps subsequent memory for this linguistic relationship is poor compared 
to expressions that are integrated locally within a single clause.  Indeed, having established that 
less time is spent reading complex semantic expressions that span multiple clauses, the next step 
is to better understand what the consequences are for comprehension or memory of this material. 
Structural Manipulation of Linguistic Relationships 
 Sentence structure has been shown to be a powerful device for marking a particular 
linguistic element as “focused” or “prominent” (i.e., to emphasize the most important 
information in the sentence).  For example, in the cleft sentence It was the secretary that wrote 
the memo, the word “secretary” is considered to be in linguistic focus, whereas in the pseudocleft 
What the secretary typed was the memo, the word “memo” is in linguistic focus.  A large body of 
literature spanning multiple subareas of cognitive psychology has demonstrated that 
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linguistically focused information enjoys a number of cognitive benefits relative to information 
that is not focused.  Linguistic focus attracts attention (Carpenter & Just, 1977; Hornby, 1974; 
Langford & Holmes, 1979; Sturt et al., 2004; Zimmer & Engelkamp, 1981), improves anomaly 
detection (Baker & Wagner, 1987, Bredart & Modolo, 1988), enhances memory (Birch et al., 
2000; Birch & Garnsey, 1995; McKoon, Ratcliff, Ward, & Sproat, 1993; Singer, 1976), and 
facilitates anaphor resolution (Almor, 1999; Foraker & McElree, 2007).  In addition, readers tend 
to spend more time processing focused compared to nonfocused information (Benatar & Clifton, 
2014; Birch & Rayner, 1997; Lowder & Gordon, 2014b; Price & Sanford, 2012, cf. Birch & 
Rayner, 2010; Morris & Folk, 1998).  Critically, research on linguistic focus has tended to 
investigate the processing of focused or defocused individual words rather than relationships 
between multiple constituents in a single sentence.  As we demonstrated (Lowder & Gordon, 
under review, Experiment 1), although readers spent less time reading words that were 
embedded in an RC compared to a main clause (e.g., The secretary wrote/began the memo vs. 
The secretary that wrote/began the memo), this manipulation had no effect on the magnitude of 
the coercion cost, suggesting that readers still computed the complex relationship between these 
constituents when both of them were deemphasized.  Similarly, readers spent more time 
processing the complement NP when it was focused by the pseudocleft (e.g., What the secretary 
wrote/began was the memo) compared to when the cleft focused a different NP (e.g., It was the 
secretary that wrote/began the memo), suggesting that the pseudocleft did mark “the memo” as 
the most important constituent in the sentence.  However, the magnitude of the coercion cost was 
reduced when the verb and complement appeared in separate clauses in the pseudocleft 
compared to when they appeared in the same clause in the cleft.  These patterns of results 
demonstrate that it is important to consider how sentence structure can emphasize or 
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deemphasize semantic relationships between various constituents and how the focus of a single 
sentential element may change its relation to other elements in the sentence.   
Complex Semantic—Syntactic Relationships in Naturally Occurring Language 
 The corpus analyses described in Chapter 5 do not correspond to our previous 
experimental findings in a straightforward way.  On the one hand, analysis of the frequency 
patterns of complement coercion in SRCs and ORCs showed convincingly that language 
producers are more likely to position an entity-denoting NP and an event-selecting verb in 
separate clauses (e.g., The memo that the secretary began) than to position the two constituents 
together in an RC (e.g., The secretary that began the memo), which is consistent our finding that 
structural separation reduces the processing difficulty of complement coercion (Lowder & 
Gordon, under review).  On the other hand, analysis of the frequency patterns of familiar 
metonyms showed that the distribution of literal versus figurative uses was practically identical 
for direct-object arguments (e.g., The journalist offended the college) and prepositional-phrase 
adjuncts (e.g., The journalist offended the honor of the college), although we showed a clear 
difference between these two structures in online processing times (Lowder & Gordon, 2013).  
The different patterns between coercion and metonymy in corpus counts perhaps provides further 
evidence that these two types of semantic mismatches are processed using very different 
cognitive mechanisms.  However, the corpus results for metonymy suggest that additional 
experimental work needs to be done that more carefully considers different types of arguments.  
Recall that the corpus analysis showed a reversal in literal versus figurative patterns for sentence 
subjects and direct objects: whereas only 30% of direct-object metonyms were used figuratively, 
74% of metonyms in subject position were used figuratively.  It is an open question whether this 
difference in frequency patterns corresponds to different online reading patterns.  On the one 
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hand, the greater proportion of figurative versus literal metonyms in subject position might 
suggest that readers would have less processing difficulty compared to when the metonym 
appears as a direct object.  On the other hand, it may still be the case that readers experience 
enhanced difficulty when a figurative expression appears as the subject of the sentence.  This 
latter outcome would be consistent with the notion that language producers place complex 
semantic expressions in focused sentence positions to elicit a noticeable rhetorical effect, even 
though the comprehender may have to exert extra processing effort to arrive at the intended 
interpretation.   
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APPENDIX 1:  STIMULI USED IN LOWDER AND GORDON (2012) EXPERIMENT 1 
 
The stimuli from Experiment 1 are shown below in their object-extracted forms with both 
animate and inanimate embedded NPs.  Each stimulus was also presented in its subject-extracted 
form, as described in the text. 
1. The guide that the {hikers/avalanche} buried appeared on the six o’clock news. 
2. The peasant that the {farmer/tractor} ran over assisted with the harvest every year. 
3. The sheriff that the {cowboy/pistol} injured persuaded the members of the jury. 
4. The bicyclist that the {woman/accident} crippled caused a number of serious injuries. 
5. The intruder that the {plumber/wrench} bruised remained near the back door. 
6. The policeman that the {burglar/revolver} shot remained in the bedroom. 
7. The hobo that the {boys/church} sheltered looked very shabby. 
8. The neighbors that the {kids/pizza} fed stayed in the basement all night. 
9. The maiden that the {farmer/crops} fed died after the early frost. 
10. The toddlers that the {girls/feathers} tickled came from South Africa. 
11. The journalist that the {senator/article} accused caused a scandal after the election. 
12. The foreigner that the {student/school} taught requested financial support. 
13. The acrobats that the {people/train} carried traveled to several major cities last year. 
14. The captain that the {pilot/helicopter} carried died on the way to the hospital. 
15. The commander that the {engineer/rocket} lifted continued to assist NASA for many 
years. 
16. The gladiator that the {warrior/spear} impaled attracted the attention of the crowd. 
17. The manager that the {worker/machine} injured cost the company time and money. 
18. The teenager that the {woman/water} scalded irritated everyone in the kitchen. 
19. The lady that the {actress/jewelry} decorated received a lot of attention at the party. 
20. The officer that the {punk/knife} wounded became an important part of the trial. 
21. The rebels that the {soldiers/camp} housed covered a large part of the forest. 
22. The vagrant that the {leper/medicine} treated made several others sick. 
23. The architect that the {expert/machinery} assisted detected a flaw in the metal. 
24. The citizen that the {cowboy/rope} hanged became a symbol of the revolution. 
25. The villain that the {actor/razor} shaved appeared in several horror movies. 
26. The supervisor that the {prospector/metal} poisoned arrived from Texas last year. 
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27. The technician that the {scientist/chemical} sickened worried many others in the lab. 
28. The spies that the {soldiers/fort} protected saved the city from the enemy. 
29. The gangsters that the {wrestlers/tattoos} covered intimidated everyone in the bar. 
30. The employee that the {executive/airplane} transported flew to Chicago once a year. 
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APPENDIX 2:  STIMULI USED IN LOWDER AND GORDON (2012) EXPERIMENT 2 
 
1. The {hikers that fled the avalanche/avalanche that buried the hikers} appeared on the six 
o’clock news. 
The {hikers fled the avalanche/avalanche buried the hikers} on the side of the mountain. 
2. The {farmer that washed the tractor/tractor that ran over the farmer} was standing next to 
the barn. 
The {farmer washed the tractor/tractor ran over the farmer} next to the barn. 
3. The {cowboy that concealed the pistol/pistol that injured the cowboy} was known to be 
unreliable. 
The {cowboy concealed the pistol/pistol injured the cowboy} last night in the saloon. 
4. The {woman that triggered the accident/accident that crippled the woman} caused a 
number of serious injuries. 
The {woman triggered the accident/accident crippled the woman} on the busy highway. 
5. The {plumber that gripped the wrench/wrench that bruised the plumber} was found near 
the back door. 
The {plumber gripped the wrench/wrench bruised the plumber} near the back door. 
6. The {burglar that found the revolver/revolver that shot the burglar} was in the bedroom. 
The {burglar found the revolver/revolver shot the burglar} in the bedroom. 
7. The {boys that vandalized the church/church that sheltered the boys} looked very shabby. 
The {boys vandalized the church/church sheltered the boys} several times last winter. 
8. The {girls that climbed the trees/trees that shaded the girls} were in the back yard. 
The {girls climbed the trees/trees shaded the girls} in the back yard. 
9. The {chef that measured the flour/flour that covered the chef} won a prize at the state 
fair. 
The {chef measured the flour/flour covered the chef} during the competition at the state 
fair. 
10. The {kids that ate the pizza/pizza that fed the kids} stayed in the basement all night. 
The {kids ate the pizza/pizza fed the kids} in the basement all night. 
11. The {farmer that planted the crops/crops that fed the farmer} died after the early frost. 
The {farmer planted the crops/crops fed the farmer} after the early frost. 
12. The {girls that gathered the feathers/feathers that tickled the girls} were from South 
Africa. 
The {girls gathered the feathers/feathers tickled the girls} in the African village. 
13. The {gangster that concealed the acid/acid that dissolved the gangster} came up during 
the trial. 
The {gangster concealed the acid/acid dissolved the gangster} in the abandoned 
warehouse downtown. 
14. The {senator that skimmed the article/article that accused the senator} was forgotten after 
the election. 
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The {senator skimmed the article/article accused the senator} before the scandal 
unfolded. 
15. The {student that attended the school/school that taught the student} was visited by the 
governor. 
The {student attended the school/school taught the student} for several years. 
16. The {patients that chewed the pills/pills that healed the patients} were mentioned in the 
medical journal. 
The {patients chewed the pills/pills healed the patients} in the hospital downtown. 
17. The {people that rode the train/train that carried the people} arrived at the station early. 
The {people rode the train/train carried the people} to every circus performance. 
18. The {drug dealer that damaged the street light/street light that illuminated the drug 
dealer} stood on the corner of Oak and Jefferson. 
The {drug dealer damaged the street light/street light illuminated the drug dealer} on the 
corner of Oak and Jefferson. 
19. The {pilot that flew the helicopter/helicopter that carried the pilot} crashed near the 
grocery store. 
The {pilot flew the helicopter/helicopter carried the pilot} into a dangerous wind storm. 
20. The {engineer that designed the rocket/rocket that lifted the engineer} flew over the 
wildlife preserve. 
The {engineer designed the rocket/rocket lifted the engineer} several days ahead of 
schedule. 
21. The {warrior that hurled the spear/spear that impaled the warrior} was photographed by 
the historian. 
The {warrior hurled the spear/spear impaled the warrior} during the fight at the 
Coliseum.  
22. The {worker that repaired the machine/machine that injured the worker} cost the 
company time and money. 
The {worker repaired the machine/machine injured the worker} several months ago. 
23. The {woman that prepared the water/water that scalded the woman} stayed in the bathtub 
for hours. 
The {woman prepared the water/water scalded the woman} in the bathtub. 
24. The {actress that purchased the jewelry/jewelry that decorated the actress} got a lot of 
attention at the movie premiere. 
The {actress purchased the jewelry/jewelry decorated the actress} at the movie premiere. 
25. The {punk that brandished the knife/knife that wounded the punk} was hidden under the 
stairs. 
The {punk brandished the knife/knife wounded the punk} in a dark alley downtown. 
26. The {soldiers that built the camp/camp that housed the soldiers} covered a large part of 
the forest. 
The {soldiers built the camp/camp housed the soldiers} in another part of the forest. 
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27. The {leper that swallowed the medicine/medicine that treated the leper} stayed in the 
operating room. 
The {leper swallowed the medicine/medicine treated the leper} in the operating room. 
28. The {secretary that drove the car/car that crushed the secretary} cost the insurance 
company a fortune. 
The {secretary drove the car/car crushed the secretary} on the icy roads. 
29. The {expert that operated the machinery/machinery that assisted the expert} detected a 
flaw in the metal. 
The {expert operated the machinery/machinery assisted the expert} without causing any 
accidents. 
30. The {cowboy that held the rope/rope that hanged the cowboy} was strong and tough. 
The {cowboy held the rope/rope hanged the cowboy} in the center of the town. 
31. The {actor that bought the razor/razor that shaved the actor} appeared in the horror 
movie. 
The {actor bought the razor/razor shaved the actor} in the very first scene of the horror 
movie. 
32. The {prospector that mined the metal/metal that poisoned the prospector} didn’t harm the 
animals. 
The {prospector mined the metal/metal poisoned the prospector} in the dark cavern. 
33. The {scientist that patented the chemical/chemical that sickened the scientist} came from 
Australia. 
The {scientist patented the chemical/chemical sickened the scientist} at an office in 
Australia. 
34. The {soldiers that occupied the fort/fort that protected the soldiers} saved the city from 
the enemy. 
The {soldiers occupied the fort/fort protected the soldiers} to save the city from the 
enemy. 
35. The {campers that built the fire/fire that warmed the campers} burned down the cabin. 
The {campers built the fire/fire warmed the campers} near the middle of the 
campgrounds. 
36. The {tourist that brought the electric fan/electric fan that cooled the tourist} was a 
nuisance for the maid. 
The {tourist brought the electric fan/electric fan cooled the tourist} on the African safari. 
37. The {mechanic that changed the oil/oil that splashed the mechanic} left a stain on the 
front seat. 
The {mechanic changed the oil/oil splashed the mechanic} at the garage around the 
corner. 
38. The {technician that replaced the brake fluid/brake fluid that soaked the technician} filled 
the can next to the hoist. 
The {technician replaced the brake fluid/brake fluid soaked the technician} next to the 
hoist. 
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39. The {wrestlers that displayed the tattoos/tattoos that covered the wrestlers} were as ugly 
as they could be. 
The {wrestlers displayed the tattoos/tattoos covered the wrestlers} as part of a publicity 
stunt. 
40. The {executive that borrowed the airplane/airplane that transported the executive} 
vanished into thin air. 
The {executive borrowed the airplane/airplane transported the executive} and was never 
seen again. 
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APPENDIX 3:  STIMULI USED IN LOWDER AND GORDON (2013) EXPERIMENT 1 
 
The stimuli from Experiment 1 are shown below.  Within each set, the first sentence represents 
the literal context, whereas the second sentence represents the figurative context.  Within the 
brackets, the first NP has a familiar metonymic sense, whereas the second NP does not. 
1. With determination, the two women purchased {the convent/the stadium} at the end of 
last April, which upset quite a lot of people. 
With determination, the two women disobeyed {the convent/the stadium} at the end of 
last March, but did not get a lot of support. 
2. Those angry protestors surrounded {the embassy/the cottage}, but not much was 
achieved by it. 
Those angry protestors debated {the embassy/the cottage}, but not much more could be 
done. 
3. Finally some of the workmen painted {the store/the sheds}, which really made everything 
look prettier. 
Finally some of the workmen thanked {the store/the sheds}, which really was a nice 
gesture by them. 
4. This morning, terrorists bombed {the prison/the statue} in order to gain publicity for their 
cause. 
This morning, terrorists threatened {the prison/the statue} in order to make their point a 
bit clearer. 
5. Enthusiastically, the young children approached {the school/the bridge} quite early on a 
sunny Wednesday morning. 
Enthusiastically, the young children questioned {the school/the bridge} quite early on a 
rainy Monday afternoon. 
6. To my dismay, the agitated senator damaged {the headquarters/the conservatory}, which 
was something none of us had been waiting for. 
To my dismay, the agitated senator obeyed {the headquarters/the conservatory}, which 
was something nobody could have prevented. 
7. That same day, the husband located {the hospital/the driveway} as soon as he had been 
informed about the accident. 
That same day, the husband sued {the hospital/the driveway} as soon as he had heard 
about the mistake that was made. 
8. Over the summer, the writer photographed {the college/the pyramid} after he had 
received an official invitation. 
Over the summer, the writer offended {the college/the pyramid} after he had bribed some 
crooked officials. 
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9. Last week the professor entered {the academy/the bedroom}, exactly as everyone had 
expected him to do. 
Last week the professor addressed {the academy/the bedroom}, exactly as I had wished 
that he would do. 
10. Within an hour, that gentleman accessed {the palace/the cellar}, according to the 
newspapers this morning. 
Within an hour, that gentleman displeased {the palace/the cellar}, according to the latest 
gossip in the tabloids. 
11. Two days ago, the criminal destroyed {the consulate/the apartment}, but then he got 
arrested the same day. 
Two days ago, the criminal notified {the consulate/the apartment}, but then he ran away 
in a great hurry. 
12. During the protest, the strikers encircled {the institute/the roadblock}, which was not 
something that I advised them to do. 
During the protest, the strikers insulted {the institute/the roadblock}, which was not a 
very sensible idea after all. 
13. An hour later, the businessmen found {the treasury/the building}, which was not what we 
had anticipated. 
An hour later, the businessmen greeted {the treasury/the building}, which was not 
exactly what we wanted. 
14. Sometime last night the thief escaped {the court/the tower}, just as his accomplice had 
done before him. 
Sometime last night the thief provoked {the court/the tower}, just as his partner had 
instructed him to do. 
15. During vacation, those British visitors toured {the gallery/the highway} and did not 
encounter any major problems. 
During vacation, those British visitors scolded {the gallery/the highway} and did not 
exactly enjoy the experience. 
16. On Labor Day, many sightseers explored {the university/the lighthouse}, although it was 
an official holiday. 
On Labor Day, many sightseers contacted {the university/the lighthouse}, although it was 
late in the afternoon. 
17. To my amazement, the executives purchased {the convent/the stadium} at the end of last 
April, which upset quite a lot of people. 
To my amazement, the executives disobeyed {the convent/the stadium} at the end of last 
March, but did not get a lot of support. 
18. Three days ago, the activists surrounded {the embassy/the cottage}, but not much was 
achieved by it. 
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Three days ago, the activists debated {the embassy/the cottage}, but not much more 
could be done. 
19. Reluctantly one of the boys painted {the store/the sheds}, which really made everything 
look prettier. 
Reluctantly one of the boys thanked {the store/the sheds}, which really was a nice 
gesture by him. 
20. Last year rebels bombed {the prison/the statue} in order to gain publicity for their cause. 
Last year rebels threatened {the prison/the statue} in order to make their point a bit 
clearer. 
21. After the incident, the concerned father approached {the school/the bridge} quite early on 
a sunny Wednesday morning. 
After the incident, the concerned father questioned {the school/the bridge} quite early on 
a rainy Monday afternoon. 
22. To my surprise, the guards damaged {the headquarters/the conservatory}, which was 
something none of us had been waiting for. 
To my surprise, the guards obeyed {the headquarters/the conservatory}, which was 
something nobody could have prevented. 
23. With tears in her eyes, the mother located {the hospital/the driveway} as soon as she had 
been informed about the accident. 
With tears in her eyes, the mother sued {the hospital/the driveway} as soon as she had 
heard about the mistake that was made. 
24. Sometime in August, the journalist photographed {the college/the pyramid} after he had 
received an official invitation. 
Sometime in August, the journalist offended {the college/the pyramid} after he had 
bribed some crooked officials. 
25. Yesterday afternoon the dean entered {the academy/the bedroom}, exactly as everyone 
had expected him to do. 
Yesterday afternoon the dean addressed {the academy/the bedroom}, exactly as I had 
wished that he would do. 
26. One year ago, the reporter accessed {the palace/the cellar}, according to the newspapers 
this morning. 
One year ago, the reporter displeased {the palace/the cellar}, according to the latest 
gossip in the tabloids. 
27. Last Tuesday, the traveler destroyed {the consulate/the apartment}, but then he got 
arrested the same day. 
Last Tuesday, the traveler notified {the consulate/the apartment}, but then he ran away in 
a great hurry. 
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28. At the riot, the teenagers encircled {the institute/the roadblock}, which was not 
something that I advised them to do. 
At the riot, the teenagers insulted {the institute/the roadblock}, which was not a very 
sensible idea after all. 
29. Before the interview, the applicants found {the treasury/the building}, which was not 
what we had anticipated. 
Before the interview, the applicants greeted {the treasury/the building}, which was not 
exactly what we wanted. 
30. Before sunrise, the drug smuggler escaped {the court/the tower}, just as his accomplice 
had done before him. 
Before sunrise, the drug smuggler provoked {the court/the tower}, just as his partner had 
instructed him to do. 
31. For two hours, the expert toured {the gallery/the highway} and did not encounter any 
major problems. 
For two hours, the expert scolded {the gallery/the highway} and did not exactly enjoy the 
experience. 
32. On Tuesday, several tourists explored {the university/the lighthouse}, although it was an 
official holiday. 
On Tuesday, several tourists contacted {the university/the lighthouse}, although it was 
late in the afternoon. 
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APPENDIX 4:  STIMULI USED IN LOWDER AND GORDON (2013) EXPERIMENT 2 
 
The stimuli from Experiment 2 are shown below.  Within each set, the critical NP in the first 
sentence is a person, whereas the critical NP in the second sentence is a metonym.  Each 
sentence was presented with and without the material in the parentheses such that the critical NP 
could be the object of the verb or part of an adjunct phrase. 
1. With determination, the two women disobeyed (the commands of) the priest at the end of 
last April, which upset quite a lot of people. 
With determination, the two women disobeyed (the commands of) the convent at the end 
of last March, but did not get a lot of support. 
2. Those angry protestors debated (the opinions of) the governor, but not much was 
achieved by it. 
Those angry protestors debated (the opinions of) the embassy, but not much more could 
be done. 
3. Finally some of the workmen thanked (the clerk sent by) the manager, which really made 
everyone happier. 
Finally some of the workmen thanked (the clerk sent by) the store, which really was a 
nice gesture by them. 
4. This morning, terrorists threatened (the competence of) the mayor in order to gain 
publicity for their cause. 
This morning, terrorists threatened (the competence of) the prison in order to make their 
point a bit clearer. 
5. Enthusiastically, the young children questioned (the actions of) the teacher quite early on 
a sunny Wednesday morning. 
Enthusiastically, the young children questioned (the actions of) the school quite early on 
a rainy Monday afternoon. 
6. To my dismay, the agitated senator obeyed (the orders of) the chairman, which was 
something none of us had been waiting for. 
To my dismay, the agitated senator obeyed (the orders of) the headquarters, which was 
something nobody could have prevented. 
7. That same day, the husband sued (the student working for) the doctor as soon as he had 
been informed about the accident. 
That same day, the husband sued (the student working for) the hospital as soon as he had 
heard about the mistake that was made. 
8. Over the summer, the writer offended (the honor of) the leader after he had published that 
negative article. 
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Over the summer, the writer offended (the honor of) the college after he had bribed some 
crooked officials. 
9. Last week the professor addressed (the concerns of) the secretary, exactly as everyone 
had expected him to do. 
Last week the professor addressed (the concerns of) the academy, exactly as I had wished 
that he would do. 
10. Within an hour, that gentleman displeased (the mood of) the queen, according to the 
newspapers this morning. 
Within an hour, that gentleman displeased (the mood of) the palace, according to the 
latest gossip in the tabloids. 
11. Two days ago, the criminal notified (a representative of) the diplomat, but then he got 
arrested the same day. 
Two days ago, the criminal notified (a representative of) the consulate, but then he ran 
away in a great hurry. 
12. During the protest, the strikers insulted (the reputation of) the president, which was not 
something that I advised them to do. 
During the protest, the strikers insulted (the reputation of) the institute, which was not a 
very sensible idea after all. 
13. An hour later, the businessmen greeted (the interns sent by) the director, which was not 
what we had anticipated. 
An hour later, the businessmen greeted (the interns sent by) the treasury, which was not 
exactly what we wanted. 
14. Sometime last night the thief provoked (the authority of) the judge, just as his accomplice 
had done before him. 
Sometime last night the thief provoked (the authority of) the court, just as his partner had 
instructed him to do. 
15. During vacation, those British visitors scolded (the policies of) the curator and did not 
encounter any resistance. 
During vacation, those British visitors scolded (the policies of) the gallery and did not 
exactly enjoy the experience. 
16. On Labor Day, many sightseers contacted (the guides sent by) the administrator, although 
it was an official holiday. 
On Labor Day, many sightseers contacted (the guides sent by) the university, although it 
was late in the afternoon. 
17. To my amazement, the executives disobeyed (the commands of) the priest at the end of 
last April, which upset quite a lot of people. 
To my amazement, the executives disobeyed (the commands of) the convent at the end of 
last March, but did not get a lot of support. 
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18. Three days ago, the activists debated (the opinions of) the governor, but not much was 
achieved by it. 
Three days ago, the activists debated (the opinions of) the embassy, but not much more 
could be done. 
19. Reluctantly one of the boys thanked (the clerk sent by) the manager, which really made 
everyone happier. 
Reluctantly one of the boys thanked (the clerk sent by) the store, which really was a nice 
gesture by him. 
20. Last year rebels threatened (the competence of) the mayor in order to gain publicity for 
their cause. 
Last year rebels threatened (the competence of) the prison in order to make their point a 
bit clearer. 
21. After the incident, the concerned father questioned (the actions of) the teacher quite early 
on a sunny Wednesday morning. 
After the incident, the concerned father questioned (the actions of) the school quite early 
on a rainy Monday afternoon. 
22. To my surprise, the guards obeyed (the orders of) the chairman, which was something 
none of us had been waiting for. 
To my surprise, the guards obeyed (the orders of) the headquarters, which was something 
nobody could have prevented. 
23. With tears in her eyes, the mother sued (the student working for) the doctor as soon as 
she had been informed about the accident. 
With tears in her eyes, the mother sued (the student working for) the hospital as soon as 
she had heard about the mistake that was made. 
24. Sometime in August, the journalist offended (the honor of) the leader after he had 
published that negative article. 
Sometime in August, the journalist offended (the honor of) the college after he had bribed 
some crooked officials. 
25. Yesterday afternoon the dean addressed (the concerns of) the secretary, exactly as 
everyone had expected him to do. 
Yesterday afternoon the dean addressed (the concerns of) the academy, exactly as I had 
wished that he would do. 
26. One year ago, the reporter displeased (the mood of) the queen, according to the 
newspapers this morning. 
One year ago, the reporter displeased (the mood of) the palace, according to the latest 
gossip in the tabloids. 
27. Last Tuesday, the traveler notified (a representative of) the diplomat, but then he got 
arrested the same day. 
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Last Tuesday, the traveler notified (a representative of) the consulate, but then he ran 
away in a great hurry. 
28. At the riot, the teenagers insulted (the reputation of) the president, which was not 
something that I advised them to do. 
At the riot, the teenagers insulted (the reputation of) the institute, which was not a very 
sensible idea after all. 
29. Before the interview, the applicants greeted (the interns sent by) the director, which was 
not what we had anticipated. 
Before the interview, the applicants greeted (the interns sent by) the treasury, which was 
not exactly what we wanted. 
30. Before sunrise, the drug smuggler provoked (the authority of) the judge, just as his 
accomplice had done before him. 
Before sunrise, the drug smuggler provoked (the authority of) the court, just as his partner 
had instructed him to do. 
31. For two hours, the expert scolded (the policies of) the curator and did not encounter any 
resistance. 
For two hours, the expert scolded (the policies of) the gallery and did not exactly enjoy 
the experience. 
32. On Tuesday, several tourists contacted (the guides sent by) the administrator, although it 
was an official holiday. 
On Tuesday, several tourists contacted (the guides sent by) the university, although it was 
late in the afternoon. 
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APPENDIX 5:  STIMULI USED IN LOWDER AND GORDON (UNDER REVIEW) 
EXPERIMENT 1 
 
The stimuli from Experiment 1 are shown below.  Within each set, the first sentence displays the 
Simple-Sentence condition, whereas the second sentence displays the SRC condition.  Within the 
brackets, the first verb was used in the Control condition, whereas the second verb was used in 
the Coercion condition. 
1. The engineer {read/started} the memo last week and had to send it to the employees 
today. 
The engineer that {read/started} the memo last week had to send it to the employees 
today. 
2. The girl {ate/tried} the soup at the restaurant while visiting friends. 
The girl that {ate/tried} the soup at the restaurant was visiting friends. 
3. The secretary {wrote/began} the memo about the new office policy shortly after being 
hired. 
The secretary that {wrote/began} the memo about the new office policy had just been 
hired. 
4. The editor {read/finished} the article about tax increases before going home for dinner. 
The editor that {read/finished} the article about tax increases went home for dinner. 
5. The architect {designed/finished} the house on time and met with the contractor. 
The architect that {designed/finished} the house on time met with the contractor. 
6. The stylist {braided/started} the braid in the girl’s hair after brushing it first. 
The stylist that {braided/started} the braid in the girl’s hair had brushed it first. 
7. The designer {designed/began} the kitchen in the house next door but was worried she 
wouldn’t finish. 
The designer that {designed/began} the kitchen in the house next door was worried she 
wouldn’t finish. 
8. The editor {edited/finished} the newspaper first thing in the morning and went home 
early. 
The editor that {edited/finished} the newspaper first thing in the morning went home 
early. 
9. The publisher {read/began} the novel written by Mark Twain’s son, hoping he could 
publish it. 
The publisher that {read/began} the novel written by Mark Twain’s son hoped he could 
publish it. 
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10. The student {wrote/tried} the papers assigned for class but did not receive a good grade. 
The student that {wrote/tried} the papers assigned for class did not receive a good grade. 
11. The critic {criticized/started} the portrait in the gallery, saying that it reminded him of 
Picasso. 
The critic that {criticized/started} the portrait in the gallery said it reminded him of 
Picasso. 
12. The guard {closed/finished} the gates on the property before going home for the night. 
The guard that {closed/finished} the gates on the property went home for the night. 
13. The woman {planted/started} the garden after the last winter frost and always grew 
beautiful flowers. 
The woman that {planted/started} the garden after the last winter frost always grew 
beautiful flowers. 
14. The farmer {plowed/started} the fields in the early spring months and always had a 
successful harvest. 
The farmer that {planted/started} the fields in the early spring months always had a 
successful harvest. 
15. The waitress {made/started} the coffee when the customers walked in and was praised by 
her manager. 
The waitress that {made/started} the coffee when the customers walked in was praised by 
her manager. 
16. The director {read/started} the script for the action movie and was excited to begin 
filming. 
The director that {read/started} the script for the action movie was excited to begin 
filming. 
17. The banker {drank/started} the coffee in the break room because he didn’t get much 
sleep last night. 
The banker that {drank/started} the coffee in the break room didn’t get much sleep last 
night. 
18. The teacher {recorded/started} the grades before report cards went out and was seen as 
very hardworking. 
The teacher that {recorded/started} the grades before report cards went out was seen as 
very hardworking. 
19. The professor {wrote/finished} the syllabus for his class but also needed to write up his 
lectures. 
The professor that {wrote/finished} the syllabus for his class also needed to write up his 
lectures. 
20. The lawyer {drove/preferred} the convertible with the fine leather seats after she worked 
her way up to the top. 
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The lawyer that {drove/preferred} the convertible with the fine leather seats had worked 
her way up to the top. 
21. The publisher {read/started} the manuscript two days ago, then gave it to the editor. 
The publisher that {read/started} the manuscript two days ago gave it to the editor. 
22. The lawyer {defended/endured} the defendant during the trial but thought he was guilty. 
The lawyer that {defended/endured} the defendant during the trial thought he was guilty. 
23. The doctor {wrote/began} the prescription for the new cold medicine but didn’t know 
how expensive it was. 
The doctor that {wrote/began} the prescription for the new cold medicine didn’t know 
how expensive it was. 
24. The auditor {audited/began} the taxes for the company and finished by early April. 
The auditor that {audited/began} the taxes for the company finished by early April. 
25. The surfer {wore/endured} the tuxedo at the wedding but felt very uncomfortable. 
The surfer that {wore/endured} the tuxedo at the wedding felt very uncomfortable. 
26. The nurse {wore/preferred} the velvet made in India but agreed that it was too expensive. 
The nurse that {wore/preferred} the velvet made in India agreed that it was too 
expensive. 
27. The child {wrote/began} the letter for Santa Claus and hoped it would get to him before 
Christmas. 
The child that {wrote/began the letter for Santa Claus hoped it would get to him before 
Christmas. 
28. The pilot {flew/preferred} the biplane on long trips and argued that it was quite safe. 
The pilot that {flew/preferred} the biplane on long trips argued that it was quite safe. 
29. The journalist {wrote/began} the article about the hurricane after he witnessed the 
destruction firsthand. 
The journalist that {wrote/began} the article about the hurricane had witnessed the 
destruction firsthand. 
30. The builder {built/started} the house for his family and hired a landscaper to do the yard. 
The builder that {built/started} the house for his family hired a landscaper to do the yard. 
31. The mechanic {repaired/finished} the truck ahead of schedule and started to work on the 
car. 
The mechanic that {repaired/finished} the truck ahead of schedule started to work on the 
car. 
32. The dieter {ate/resisted} the cake at the birthday party and ate baby carrots all week. 
The dieter that {ate/resisted} the cake at the birthday party had eaten baby carrots all 
week. 
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33. The teenager {read/began} the novel about vampires and had a hard time falling asleep 
that night. 
The teenager that {read/began} the novel about vampires had a hard time falling asleep 
that night. 
34. The student {read/finished} the book about sailing and was eager to try out her new 
skills. 
The student that {read/finished} the book about sailing was eager to try out her new 
skills. 
35. The robber {stole/attempted} the necklace at the museum but was spotted on the security 
camera. 
The robber that {stole/attempted} the necklace at the museum was spotted on the security 
camera. 
36. The pilot {flew/mastered} the plane after just six lessons but nearly crashed at takeoff. 
The pilot that {flew mastered} the plane after just six lessons nearly crashed at takeoff. 
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APPENDIX 6:  STIMULI USED IN LOWDER AND GORDON (UNDER REVIEW) 
EXPERIMENT 2 
 
The stimuli from Experiment 2 are shown below in their object-extracted form.  Each sentence 
was also presented as an SRC, as described in the text.  Within the brackets, the first verb was 
used in the Control condition, whereas the second verb was used in the Coercion condition. 
1. The memo that the engineer {read/started} outlined the details of the upcoming 
fundraiser. 
2. The soup that the girl {ate/tried} soothed the sick people in the hospital. 
3. The memo that the secretary {wrote/began} announced that there would be pay raises for 
all the employees. 
4. The article that the editor {read/finished} revealed that the senator was involved in a big 
scandal. 
5. The house that the architect {designed/finished} included a large porch in the backyard 
that we all loved. 
6. The braid that the stylist {braided/started} reminded me of a new hairstyle I saw in a 
magazine last week. 
7. The kitchen that the designer {designed/began} included several brand new appliances. 
8. The newspaper that the editor {edited/finished} received a Pulitzer Prize a couple of 
years ago. 
9. The novel that the publisher {read/began} earned a great deal of money from advance 
sales. 
10. The papers that the student {wrote/tried} received bad grades from several different 
teachers. 
11. The portrait that the critic {criticized/started} illustrated many important techniques to 
the art students. 
12. The gates that the guard {closed/finished} kept troublemakers off the property late at 
night. 
13. The garden that the woman {planted/started} grew beautiful tulips and daffodils every 
spring. 
14. The fields that the farmer {plowed/started} produced corn, beans, and cucumbers later 
that year. 
15. The coffee that the waitress {made/started} greeted the customers as soon as they walked 
in the diner. 
16. The script that the director {read/started} won the award for best screenplay at the film 
festival. 
17. The coffee that the banker {drank/started} remained in the break room all morning. 
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18. The grades that the teacher {recorded/started} improved tremendously over the course of 
the semester. 
19. The syllabus that the professor {wrote/finished} listed the dates of all the upcoming 
exams. 
20. The convertible that the lawyer {drove/preferred} attracted a lot of attention in the small 
town. 
21. The manuscript that the publisher {read/started} described the current state of our 
political system. 
22. The defendant that the lawyer {defended/endured} made one final plea to the jury. 
23. The prescription that the doctor {wrote/began} treats several rare bacterial infections. 
24. The taxes that the auditor {audited/began} upset everyone at the firm. 
25. The tuxedo that the surfer {wore/endured} looked much better than anyone had 
anticipated. 
26. The velvet that the nurse {wore/preferred} fascinated many of the patients in the hospital. 
27. The letter that the child {wrote/began} asked Santa for a shiny new bicycle. 
28. The biplane that the pilot {flew/preferred} soared high above the snowy mountains. 
29. The article that the journalist {wrote/began} accused the governor of embezzling millions 
of dollars. 
30. The house that the builder {built/started} included a stunning balcony in the master 
bedroom. 
31. The truck that the mechanic {repaired/finished} carried heavy supplies from the shed to 
the garage. 
32. The cake that the dieter {ate/resisted} looked incredibly unhealthy. 
33. The novel that the teenager {read/began} recounted terrifying stories of zombies and 
vampires. 
34. The book that the student {read/finished} proved to be a valuable resource in fixing the 
computer problems. 
35. The necklace that the robber {stole/attempted} attracted the attention of all the local 
media. 
36. The plane that the pilot {flew/mastered} glided effortlessly into the bright blue sky. 
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APPENDIX 7:  STIMULI USED IN LOWDER AND GORDON (UNDER REVIEW) 
EXPERIMENT 3 
 
The stimuli from Experiment 3 are shown below in their pseudocleft form.  Each sentence was 
also presented as a cleft, as described in the text.  Within the brackets, the first verb was used in 
the Control condition, whereas the second verb was used in the Coercion condition. 
1. What the engineer {read/started} was the memo for the new employee orientation today. 
2. What the girl {ate/tried} was the soup while chatting with friends at the new restaurant. 
3. What the secretary {wrote/began} was the memo about the new office policy shortly after 
being hired. 
4. What the editor {read/finished} was the article about tax increases before going home for 
dinner. 
5. What the architect {designed/finished} was the house for the family down the block. 
6. What the stylist {braided/started} was the braid in the girl’s hair yesterday afternoon. 
7. What the designer {designed/began} was the kitchen in the house next door, but she was 
worried that she wouldn’t finish. 
8. What the editor {edited/finished} was the newspaper that had to go out early the next 
morning. 
9. What the publisher {read/began} was the novel written by Mark Twain’s son. 
10. What the student {wrote/tried} was the papers assigned for class, but he did not receive a 
good grade. 
11. What the critic {criticized/started} was the portrait in the gallery, saying that it reminded 
him of Picasso. 
12. What the guard {closed/finished} was the gates on the property before going home for 
the night. 
13. What the woman {planted/started} was the garden as soon as the last winter frost melted 
away. 
14. What the farmer {plowed/started} was the fields on the south side of the property where 
he hoped to grow corn. 
15. What the waitress {made/started} was the coffee as soon as she saw all the customers 
lined up outside the diner. 
16. What the director {read/started} was the script for the action movie that would begin 
filming next summer. 
17. What the banker {drank/started} was the coffee in the break room since he was getting 
sleepy. 
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18. What the teacher {recorded/started} was the grades for her class since report cards are 
going out next week. 
19. What the professor {wrote/finished} was the syllabus for his class, but he also needed to 
write all his lectures. 
20. What the lawyer {drove/preferred} was the convertible with the fine leather seats, even 
though it was expensive. 
21. What the publisher {read/started} was the manuscript two days after receiving it from the 
editor. 
22. The one who the lawyer {defended/endured} was the defendant who everyone thought 
was guilty. 
23. What the doctor {wrote/began} was the prescription for the new cold medicine that the 
child needed. 
24. What the auditor {audited/began} was the taxes for the company that had gotten into 
trouble with the IRS. 
25. What the surfer {wore/endured} was the tuxedo even though it made him feel 
uncomfortable all night long. 
26. What the nurse {wore/preferred} was the velvet made in India, but she agreed that it was 
too expensive. 
27. What the child {wrote/began} was the letter for Santa Claus, hoping it would get to him 
before Christmas. 
28. What the pilot {flew/preferred} was the biplane whenever he went on long trips. 
29. What the journalist {wrote/began} was the article about the hurricane that had devastated 
the town. 
30. What the builder {built/started} was the house for his family, but he still needed a 
landscaper to do the yard. 
31. What the mechanic {repaired/finished} was the truck several days before he started to 
work on the car. 
32. What the dieter {ate/resisted} was the cake at the birthday party, even though she had 
eaten carrots all week. 
33. What the teenager {read/began} was the novel about vampires, even though he knew if 
would give him nightmares. 
34. What the student {read/finished} was the book about sailing, and she was eager to try out 
her new skills. 
35. What the robber {stole/attempted} was the necklace at the museum, but he was spotted 
on the security camera. 
36. What the pilot {flew/mastered} was the plane after just six lessons, but he nearly crashed 
at takeoff. 
  
173 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Allen, K., Pereira, F., Botvinick, M., & Goldberg, A. (2012). Distinguishing grammatical 
 constructions with fMRI pattern analysis. Brain & Language, 123, 174-182. 
Almor, A. (1999). Noun-phrase anaphora and focus: The informational load hypothesis. 
 Psychological Review, 106, 748-765. 
Baayen, R. H., Davidson, D. J., & Bates, D. M. (2008). Mixed-effects modeling with crossed 
 random effects for subjects and items. Journal of Memory and Language, 59, 390-412. 
Baggio, G., Choma, T., van Lambalgen, M., & Hagoort, P. (2009). Coercion and 
 compositionality. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 22, 2131-2140. 
Baker, L., & Wagner, J. L. (1987). Evaluating information for truthfulness: The effects of logical 
subordination. Memory & Cognition, 15, 247-255. 
Bates, D. M., & Sarkar, D. (2007). lme4: Linear mixed-effects models using S4 classes. R 
package version 0.9975-12. 
Benatar, A., & Clifton, C., Jr. (2014). Newness, givenness and discourse updating: Evidence 
from eye movements. Journal of Memory and Language, 71, 1-16. 
Betancort, M., Carreiras, M., & Sturt, P. (2009). The processing of subject and object relative 
clauses in Spanish: An eye-tracking study. The Quarterly Journal of Experimental 
Psychology, 62, 1915-1929. 
Birch, S. L, Albrecht, J. E., & Myers, J. L. (2000). Syntactic focusing structures influence 
 discourse processing. Discourse Processes, 30, 285-304. 
Birch, S. L., & Garnsey, S. M. (1995). The effect of focus on memory for words in sentences. 
 Journal of Memory and Language, 34, 232-267. 
Birch, S., & Rayner, K. (1997). Linguistic focus affects eye movements during reading. Memory 
 & Cognition, 25, 653-660. 
Birch, S., & Rayner, K. (2010). Effects of syntactic prominence on eye movements during 
 reading. Memory & Cognition, 38, 740-752. 
Boland, J. E., & Blodgett, A. (2006). Argument status and PP-attachment. Journal of 
Psycholinguistic Research, 35, 385-403. 
Brants, T., & Franz, A. (2006). Web 1T 5-gram version 1. Philadelphia: Linguistic Data 
Consortium. 
Bredart, S., & Modolo, K. (1988). Moses strikes again: Focalization effects on a semantic 
illusion. Acta Psychologica, 67, 135-144. 
174 
 
Brysbaert, M., & New, B. (2009). Moving beyond Kucera and Francis: A critical evaluation of 
current word frequency norms and the introduction of a new and improved word 
frequency measure for American English. Behavior Research Methods, 41, 977-990. 
Cacciari, C., & Tabossi, P. (1988). The comprehension of idioms. Journal of Memory and 
Language, 27, 668-683. 
Caplan, D., Alpert, N., & Waters, G. (1998). Effects of syntactic structure and propositional 
number on patterns of regional cerebral blood flow. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 
10, 541-552. 
Caramazza, A., & Zurif, E. (1976). Dissociation of algorithmic and heuristic processes in 
sentence comprehension: Evidence from aphasia. Brain and Language, 3, 572-582. 
Carpenter, P. A., & Just, M. A. (1977). Integrative processes in comprehension. In D. LaBerge 
 & S. J. Samuels (Eds.), Basic processes in reading: Perception and comprehension (pp. 
 217-241). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. 
Choi, W., & Gordon, P. C. (2013). Coordination of word recognition and oculomotor control 
 during reading: The role of implicit lexical decisions. Journal of Experimental 
 Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 39, 1032-1046. 
Christianson, K., Hollingworth, A., Halliwell, J. F., & Ferreira, F. (2001). Thematic roles 
assigned along the garden path linger. Cognitive Psychology, 42, 368-407. 
Clark, H. H., & Gerrig, R. J. (1983). Understanding old words with new meanings. Journal of 
Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 22, 591-608. 
Clark, H. H., & Lucy, P. (1975). Understanding what is meant from what is said: A study in 
conversationally conveyed requests. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 
14, 56-72. 
Clifton, C., Jr., Speer, S. R., & Abney, S. P. (1991). Parsing arguments: Phrase structure and 
argument structure as determinants of initial parsing decisions. Journal of Memory and 
Language, 30, 251-271. 
Clifton, C., Jr., Staub, A., & Rayner, K. (2007). Eye movements in reading words and sentences. 
 In R. P. G. van Gompel, M. H. Fischer, W. S. Murray, & R. L. Hill (Eds.), Eye 
 movements: A window on mind and brain. Amsterdam: Elsevier. 
Cohen, J., Cohen, P., West, S. G., & Aiken, L. S. (2003). Applied multiple regression/correlation 
 analysis for the behavioral sciences (3rd ed.). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum 
 Associates Publishers. 
Coulson, S., & Van Petten, C. (2002). Conceptual integration and metaphor: An ERP study. 
Memory & Cognition, 30, 958-968. 
175 
 
Coulson, S., & Van Petten, C. (2007). A special role for the right hemisphere in metaphor 
comprehension? ERP evidence from hemifield presentation. Brain Research, 1146, 128-
145. 
Cruse, D. A. (1973). Some thoughts on agentivity. Journal of Linguistics, 9, 11-23. 
Davies, M. (2008-). The Corpus of Contemporary American English: 450 million words, 1990-
present. Available online at http://corpus.byu.edu/coca/. 
De Grauwe, S., Swain, A., Holcomb, P. J., Ditman, T., & Kuperberg, G. R. (2010). 
Electrophysiological insights into the processing of nominal metaphors. 
Neuropsychologia, 48, 1965-1984. 
Dews, S., & Winner, E. (1999). Obligatory processing of literal and nonliteral meanings in 
verbal irony. Journal of Pragmatics, 31, 1579-1599. 
Dowty, D. R. (1991). Thematic proto-roles and argument selection. Language, 67, 547-619. 
Duffy, S. A., Morris, R. K., & Rayner, K. (1988). Lexical ambiguity and fixation times in 
 reading. Journal of Memory and Language, 27, 429-446. 
Engelkamp, J., & Zimmer, H. D. (1982). The interaction of subjectivization and concept 
 placement in the processing of cleft sentences. Quarterly Journal of Experimental 
 Psychology, 34A, 463-478. 
Ferreira, F. (2003). The misinterpretation of noncanonical sentences. Cognitive Psychology, 47, 
164-203. 
Ferreira, F., Bailey, K. G. D., & Ferraro, V. (2002). Good-enough representations in language 
comprehension. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 11, 11-15. 
Ferreira, F., Christianson, K., & Hollingworth, A. (2001). Misinterpretations of garden-path 
sentences: Implications for models of sentence processing and reanalysis. Journal of 
Psycholinguistic Research, 30, 3-20. 
Ferreira, F., & Patson, N. D. (2007). The ‘good enough’ approach to language comprehension. 
Language and Linguistics Compass, 1, 71-83. 
Filik, R., & Moxey, L. M. (2010). The on-line processing of written irony. Cognition, 116, 421-
436. 
Fillmore, C. J. (1968). The case for case. In E. Bach & R. T. Harms (Eds.), Universals in 
linguistic theory. New York: Holt, Rinehart, & Winston. 
Foraker, S., & McElree, B. (2007). The role of prominence in pronoun resolution: Active versus 
 passive representations. Journal of Memory and Language, 56, 357-383. 
176 
 
Ford, M. (1983). A method for obtaining measures of local parsing complexity throughout 
sentences. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 22, 203-218. 
Fox, B., & Thompson, S. A. (1990). A discourse explanation of the grammar of relative clauses 
in English conversation. Language, 66, 297-316. 
Frisson, S. (2009). Semantic underspecification in language processing. Language and 
Linguistics Compass, 3, 111-127. 
Frisson, S., & McElree, B. (2008). Complement coercion is not modulated by competition: 
Evidence from eye movements. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, 
and Cognition, 34, 1-11. 
Frisson, S., & Pickering, M. J. (1999). The processing of metonymy: Evidence from eye 
movements. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 25, 
1366-1383. 
Frisson, S., & Pickering, M. J. (2001). Obtaining a figurative interpretation of a word: Support 
for underspecification. Metaphor and Symbol, 16, 149-171. 
Frisson, S., & Pickering, M. J. (2007). The processing of familiar and novel senses of a word: 
Why reading Dickens is easy but reading Needham can be hard. Language and Cognitive 
Processes, 22, 595-613. 
Gennari, S. P., & MacDonald, M. C. (2008). Semantic indeterminacy in object relative clauses. 
Journal of Memory and Language, 58, 161-187. 
Gennari, S., P., & MacDonald, M. C. (2009). Linking production and comprehension processes: 
The case of relative clauses. Cognition, 111, 1-23. 
Gerrig, R. J. (1989). The time course of sense creation. Memory & Cognition, 17, 194-207. 
Gerrig, R. J., & Healy, A. F. (1983). Dual processes in metaphor understanding: Comprehension 
and appreciation. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and 
Cognition, 9, 667-675. 
Ghio, M., Bott, L., Schumacher, P. B., & Bambini, V. (2012). Different processing dynamics for 
metaphor and metonymy. Poster presented at the 25
th
 Annual CUNY Conference on 
Human Sentence Processing, New York, March 14-16. 
Gibbs, R. W. (1980). Spilling the beans on understanding and memory for idioms. Memory & 
Cognition, 8, 149-156. 
Gibbs, R. W. (1986). Skating on thin ice: Literal meaning and understanding idioms in 
conversation. Discourse Processes, 9, 17-30. 
Gibbs, R. W. (1990). Comprehending figurative referential descriptions. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 16, 56-66. 
177 
 
Gibbs, R. W. (1994). The poetics of mind: Figurative thought, language, and understanding. 
Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. 
Gibbs, R. W., Bogdanovich, J. M., Sykes, J. R., & Barr, D. J. (1997). Metaphor in idiom 
comprehension. Journal of Memory and Language, 37, 141-154. 
Gibbs, R. W., & Gerrig, R. J. (1989). How context makes metaphor comprehension seem 
“special.” Metaphor and Symbolic Activity, 4, 145-158. 
Gildea, P., & Glucksberg, S. (1983). On understanding metaphor: The role of context. Journal of 
Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 22, 577-590. 
Giora, R., Fein, O., & Schwartz, T. (1998). Irony: Graded salience and indirect negation. 
Metaphor and Symbol, 13, 83-101. 
Glucksberg, S. (1991). Beyond literal meanings: The psychology of allusion. Psychological 
Science, 2, 146-152. 
Glucksberg, S. (2001). Understanding figurative language: From metaphors to idioms. Oxford, 
United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. 
Glucksberg, S. (2003). The psycholinguistics of metaphor. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 7, 92-
96. 
Glucksberg, S., Gildea, P., & Bookin, H. A. (1982). On understanding nonliteral speech: Can 
people ignore metaphors? Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 21, 85-98. 
Gordon, P. C., & Hendrick, R. (1998). The representation and processing of coreference in 
discourse. Cognitive Science, 22, 389-424. 
Gordon, P. C., & Hendrick, R. (2005). Relativization, ergativity, and corpus frequency. 
Linguistic Inquiry, 36, 456-463. 
Gordon, P. C., Hendrick, R., & Johnson, M. (2001). Memory interference during language 
processing. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 27, 
1411-1423. 
Gordon, P. C., Hendrick, R., & Johnson, M. (2004). Effects of noun phrase type on sentence 
complexity. Journal of Memory and Language, 51, 97-114. 
Gordon, P. C., Hendrick, R., Johnson, M., & Lee, Y. (2006). Similarity-based interference during 
language comprehension: Evidence from eye tracking during reading. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 32, 1304-1321. 
Gordon, P. C., & Lowder, M. W. (2012). Complex sentence processing: A review of theoretical 
perspectives on the comprehension of relative clauses. Language and Linguistics 
Compass, 6, 403-415. 
178 
 
Grice, P. (1975). Logic and conversation. In P. Cole & J. Morgan (Eds.), Syntax and semantics 
(Vol. 3, pp. 41-58). New York: Academic Press. 
Holmes, V. M., & O’Regan, J. K. (1981). Eye fixation patterns during the reading of relative-
clause sentences. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 20, 417-430. 
Honeck, R. P., Welge, J., & Temple, J. G. (1998). The symmetry control in tests of the standard 
pragmatic model: The case of proverb comprehension. Metaphor and Symbol, 13, 257-
273. 
Hornby, P. A. (1974). Surface structure and presupposition. Journal of Verbal Learning and 
 Verbal Behavior, 13, 530-538. 
Humphrey, H. E., Kemper, S., & Radel, J. D. (2004). The time course of metonymic language 
text processing by older and younger adults. Experimental Aging Research, 30, 75-94. 
Husband, E. M., Kelly, L. A., & Zhu, D. C. (2011). Using complement coercion to understand 
the neural basis of semantic composition: Evidence from an fMRI study. Journal of 
Cognitive Neuroscience, 23, 3254-3266. 
Inhoff, A. W., Lima, S. D., & Carroll, P. J. (1984). Contextual effects on metaphor 
comprehension in reading. Memory & Cognition, 12, 558-567. 
Jackendoff, R. (1997). The architecture of the language faculty. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Jaeger, T. F. (2008). Categorical data analysis: Away from ANOVAs (transformation or not) and 
 towards logit mixed models. Journal of Memory and Language, 59, 434-446. 
Janus, R. A., & Bever, T. G. (1985). Processing of metaphoric language: An investigation of the 
three-stage model of metaphor comprehension. Journal of Psycholinguistic Research, 14, 
473-487. 
Johnson, M. L., Lowder, M. W., & Gordon, P. C. (2011). The sentence-composition effect: 
Processing of complex sentences depends on the configuration of common noun phrases 
versus unusual noun phrases.  Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 140, 707-
724. 
Just, M. A., Carpenter, P. A., Keller, T. A., Eddy, W. F., & Thulborn, K. R. (1996). Brain 
activation modulated by sentence comprehension. Science, 274, 114-116. 
Keysar, B. (1989). On the functional equivalence of literal and metaphorical interpretations in 
discourse. Journal of Memory and Language, 28, 375-385. 
King, J., & Just, M. A. (1991). Individual differences in syntactic processing: The role of 
working memory. Journal of Memory and Language, 30, 580-602. 
179 
 
Kuperberg, G. R., Choi, A., Cohn, N., Paczynski, M., & Jackendoff, R. (2010). 
 Electrophysiological correlates of complement coercion. Journal of Cognitive 
 Neuroscience, 22, 2685-2701. 
Kuperman, V., & Van Dyke, J. A. (2013). Reassessing word frequency as a determinant of word 
 recognition for skilled and unskilled readers. Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
 Human Perception and Performance, 39, 802-823. 
Lai, V. T., Curran, T., & Menn, L. (2009). Comprehending conventional and novel metaphors: 
An ERP study. Brain Research, 1284, 145-155. 
Lakoff, G., & Johnson, M. (1980). Metaphors we live by. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Langford, J., & Holmes, V. M. (1979). Syntactic presupposition in sentence comprehension. 
 Cognition, 7, 363-383. 
Lee, Y., Lee, H., & Gordon, P. C. (2007). Linguistic complexity and information structure in 
Korean: Evidence from eye-tracking during reading. Cognition, 104, 495-534. 
Lowder, M. W., Choi, W., & Gordon, P. C. (2013). Word recognition during reading: The 
interaction between lexical repetition and frequency. Memory & Cognition, 41, 738-751. 
Lowder, M. W., & Gordon, P. C. (2012). The pistol that injured the cowboy: Difficulty with 
inanimate subject-verb integration is reduced by structural separation. Journal of Memory 
and Language, 66, 819-832. 
Lowder, M. W., & Gordon, P. C. (2013). It’s hard to offend the college: Effects of sentence 
structure on figurative-language processing. Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 39, 993-1011. 
Lowder, M. W., & Gordon, P. C. (2014a). Processing grammatical agreement across clause 
boundaries. Poster presented at the 27
th
 annual CUNY conference on Human Sentence 
Processing. Columbus, OH, March 13-15.  
Lowder, M. W., & Gordon, P. C. (2014b). Increased linguistic focus leads to increased reading 
times. Poster presented at the 27
th
 annual CUNY conference on Human Sentence 
Processing. Columbus, OH, March 13-15. 
Lowder, M. W., & Gordon, P. C. (in press). Effects of animacy and noun-phrase relatedness on 
the processing of complex sentences. Memory & Cognition. 
Lowder, M. W., & Gordon, P. C. (under review). The manuscript that we finished: Structural 
separation reduces the cost of complement coercion. Manuscript submitted for 
publication. 
Mack, J. E., Clifton, C., Jr., Frazier, L., & Taylor, P. V. (2012). (Not) hearing optional subjects: 
 The effects of pragmatic usage preferences. Journal of Memory and Language, 67, 211-
 223. 
180 
 
Mak, W. M., Vonk, W., & Schriefers, H. (2002). The influence of animacy on relative clause 
processing. Journal of Memory and Language, 47, 50-68. 
Mak, W. M., Vonk, W., & Schriefers, H. (2006). Animacy in processing relative clauses: The 
hikers that rocks crush. Journal of Memory and Language, 54, 466-490. 
Marcus, M. P., Marcinkiewicz, M. A., & Santorini, B. (1993). Building a large annotated corpus 
of English: The Penn Treebank. Computational Linguistics, 19, 313-330. 
McDonald, S. A., & Shillcock, R. C. (2003). Eye movements reveal the on-line computation of 
lexical probabilities during reading. Psychological Science, 14, 648-652. 
McElree, B., Frisson, S., & Pickering, M. J. (2006). Deferred interpretations: Why starting 
Dickens is taxing but reading Dickens isn’t. Cognitive Science, 30, 113-124. 
McElree, B., Pylkkӓnen, L., Pickering, M. J., & Traxler, M. J. (2006). The time course of 
enriched composition. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 13, 53-59. 
McElree, B., Traxler, M. J., Pickering, M. J., Seely, R. E., & Jackendoff, R. (2001). Reading 
 time evidence for enriched composition. Cognition, 78, B17-B25. 
McKoon, G., Ratcliff, R., Ward, G., & Sproat, R. (1993). Syntactic prominence effects on 
 discourse processes. Journal of Memory and Language, 32, 593-607. 
Morris, R. K., & Folk, J. R. (1998). Focus as a contextual priming mechanism in reading. 
 Memory & Cognition, 26, 1313-1322. 
Nunberg, G. (1978). The pragmatics of reference. Bloomington: Indiana University Linguistic 
Club. 
Onishi, K. H., & Murphy, G. L. (1993). Metaphoric reference: When metaphors are not 
understood as easily as literal expressions. Memory & Cognition, 21, 763-772. 
Ortony, A., Schallert, D. L., Reynolds, R. E., & Antos, S. J. (1978). Interpreting metaphors and 
idioms: Some effects of context on comprehension. Journal of Verbal Learning and 
Verbal Behavior, 17, 465-477. 
Pickering, M. J., McElree, B., & Traxler, M. J. (2005). The difficulty of coercion: A response to 
 de Almeida. Brain and Language, 93, 1-9. 
Pickering, M. J., & Traxler, M. J. (1998). Plausibility and recovery from garden paths: An eye-
tracking study. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 
24, 940-961. 
Pickering, M. J., & Traxler, M. J. (2001). Strategies for processing unbounded dependencies: 
Lexical information and verb-argument assignment. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 27, 1401-1410. 
181 
 
Price, J. M., & Sanford, A. J. (2012). Reading in healthy aging: The influence of information 
 structuring in sentences. Psychology and Aging, 27, 529-540. 
Pustejovsky, J. (1995). The generative lexicon. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Pustejovsky, J., Anick, P., & Bergler, S. (1993). Lexical semantic techniques for corpus analysis. 
 Computational Linguistics, 19, 331-358. 
Pylkkӓnen, L. (2008). Mismatching meanings in brain and behavior. Language and Linguistics 
 Compass, 2, 712-738. 
Pylkkӓnen, L., & McElree, B. (2006). The syntax-semantics interface: On-line composition of 
 sentence meaning. In M. Traxler & M. A. Gernsbacher (Eds.), Handbook of 
 psycholinguistics (2nd ed.). New York: Elsevier. 
Pylkkӓnen, L., & McElree, B. (2007). An MEG study of silent meaning. Journal of Cognitive 
 Neuroscience, 19, 1905-1921. 
Ramscar, M., Matlock, T., & Dye, M. (2010). Running down the clock: The role of expectation 
 in our understanding of time and motion. Language and Cognitive Processes, 25, 589-
 615. 
Rapp, A. M., Erb, M., Grodd, W., Bartels, M., & Markert, K. (2011). Neural correlates of 
metonymy resolution. Brain and Language, 119, 196-205. 
Rayner, K. (1998). Eye movements in reading and information processing: 20 years of research. 
 Psychological Bulletin, 124, 372-422. 
Rayner, K., & Duffy, S. A. (1986). Lexical complexity and fixation times in reading: Effects of 
 word frequency, verb complexity, and lexical ambiguity. Memory & Cognition, 14, 191-
 201. 
Rayner, K., & Frazier, L. (1989). Selection mechanisms in reading lexically ambiguous words. 
 Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 15, 779-790. 
Rayner, K., & McConkie, G. W. (1976). What guides a reader’s eye movements? Vision 
 Research, 16, 829-837. 
Rayner, K., Sereno, S. C., & Raney, G. E. (1996). Eye movement control in reading: A 
 comparison of two types of models. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human 
 Perception and Performance, 22, 1188-1200. 
Rayner, K., Slattery, T. J., Drieghe, D., & Liversedge, S. P. (2011). Eye movements and word 
 skipping during reading: Effects of word length and predictability. Journal of 
 Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 37, 514-528. 
Sanford, A. J. S., Sanford, A. J., Filik, R., & Molle, J. (2005). Depth of lexical-semantic 
processing and sentential load. Journal of Memory and Language, 53, 378-396. 
182 
 
Sanford, A. J., & Sturt, P. (2002). Depth of processing in language comprehension: Not noticing 
the evidence. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 6, 382-386. 
Scheepers, C., Keller, F., & Lapata, M. (2008). Evidence for serial coercion: A time course 
 analysis using the visual-world paradigm. Cognitive Psychology, 56, 1-29. 
Schlesinger, I. M. (1989). Instruments as agents: On the nature of semantic relations. Journal of 
Linguistics, 25, 189-210. 
Schütze, C. T., & Gibson, E. (1999). Argumenthood and English prepositional phrase 
attachment. Journal of Memory and Language, 40, 409-431. 
Schwoebel, J., Dews, S., Winner, E., & Srinivas, K. (2000). Obligatory processing of the literal 
meaning of ironic utterance: Further evidence. Metaphor and Symbol, 15, 47-61. 
Searle, J. (1979). Metaphor. In A. Ortony (Ed.), Metaphor and thought (pp. 92-123). Cambridge, 
England: Cambridge University Press. 
Sereno, S. C., Pacht, J. M., & Rayner, K. (1992). The effect of meaning frequency on processing 
lexically ambiguous words: Evidence from eye fixations. Psychological Science, 3, 296-
300. 
Shinjo, M., & Myers, J. L. (1987). The role of context on metaphor comprehension. Journal of 
Memory and Language, 26, 226-241. 
Singer, M. (1976). Thematic structure and the integration of linguistic information. Journal of 
 Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 15, 549-558. 
Speer, S. R., & Clifton, C. Jr. (1998). Plausibility and argument structure in sentence 
comprehension. Memory & Cognition, 26, 965-978. 
Sturt, P., Sanford, A. J., Stewart, A., & Dawydiak, E. (2004). Linguistic focus and good-enough 
 representations: An application of the change-detection paradigm. Psychonomic Bulletin 
 & Review, 11, 882-888. 
Tartter, V. C., Gomes, H., Dubrovsky, B., Molholm, S., & Stewart, R. V. (2002). Novel 
metaphors appear anomalous at least momentarily: Evidence from N400. Brain and 
Language, 80, 488-509. 
Temple, J. G., & Honeck, R. P. (1999). Proverb comprehension: The primacy of literal meaning. 
Journal of Psycholinguistic Research, 28, 41-70. 
Tooley, K. M., Traxler, M. J., & Swaab, T. Y. (2009). Electrophysiological and behavioral 
evidence of syntactic priming in sentence comprehension. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 35, 19-45. 
183 
 
Traxler, M. J. (2009). A hierarchical linear modeling analysis of working memory and implicit 
prosody in the resolution of adjunct attachment ambiguity. Journal of Psycholinguistic 
Research, 38, 491-509. 
Traxler, M. J., McElree, B., Williams, R. S., & Pickering, M. J. (2005). Context effects in 
 coercion: Evidence from eye movements. Journal of Memory and Language, 53, 1-25. 
Traxler, M. J., Morris, R. K., & Seely, R. E. (2002). Processing subject and object relative 
clauses: Evidence from eye movements. Journal of Memory and Language, 47, 69-90. 
Traxler, M. J., & Pickering, M. J. (1996). Plausibility and the processing of unbounded 
dependencies: An eye-tracking study. Journal of Memory and Language, 35, 454-475. 
Traxler, M. J., Pickering, M. J., & McElree, B. (2002). Coercion in sentence processing: 
 Evidence from eye-movements and self-paced reading. Journal of Memory and 
 Language, 47, 530-547. 
Traxler, M. J., & Tooley, K. M (2008). Priming in sentence comprehension: Strategic or 
syntactic? Language and Cognitive Processes, 23, 609-645. 
Traxler, M. J., Williams, R. S., Blozis, S. A., & Morris, R. K. (2005). Working memory, 
animacy, and verb class in the processing of relative clauses. Journal of Memory and 
Language, 53, 204-224. 
Wanner, E., & Maratsos, M. (1978). An ATN approach to comprehension. In M. Halle, J. 
Bresnan, & G. Miller (Eds.), Linguistic theory and psychological reality. Cambridge: 
MIT Press. 
Weiland, H., Bambini, V., & Schumacher, P. B. (2012). Masked priming ERP supports the role 
of literal meaning in figurative language comprehension. Poster presented at the 25
th
 
Annual CUNY Conference on Human Sentence Processing, New York, March 14-16. 
Wells, J. B., Christiansen, M. H., Race, D. S., Acheson, D. J., & MacDonald, M. C. (2009). 
Experience and sentence processing: Statistical learning and relative clause 
comprehension. Cognitive Psychology, 58, 250-271. 
Wolff, P., Jeon, G., Klettke, B., & Li, Y. (2010). Force creation and possible causes across 
languages. In B. Malt, & P. Wolff (Eds.), Words and the mind: How words capture 
human experience. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Wolff, P., Jeon, G., & Li, Y. (2009). Causers in English, Korean, and Chinese and the 
individuation of events. Language and Cognition, 1, 167-196. 
Zimmer, H. D., & Engelkamp, J. (1981). The given-new structure of cleft sentences and their 
 influence on picture viewing. Psychological Research, 43, 375-389. 
 
